A fierce but unsuccessful attack was made just before dawn, and firing was kept up during the 8th from a large number of Martini and Snider rifles; at the end of the day the total losses of the defence—including the casualties near Parpish—amounted to seven killed or died of wounds and sixteen wounded. For the next five days the little garrison defended its post with conspicuous gallantry against heavy odds and repeated attacks from the enemy, who had succeeded in establishing themselves under cover close up to the walls. Lieutenant Fowler specially distinguished himself in making several successful sorties to obtain water. On the 13th the enemy opened negotiations, stating that all fighting at Chitral had ceased, and that Sher Afzul was engaged in friendly correspondence with the British Government. By the 15th, it seeming that matters were in course of arrangement, the two officers were persuaded to leave their defences, and were then treacherously seized, while the Chitralis succeeded in rushing the defences. Lieutenants Edwardes and Fowler were now taken in charge by some of Umra Khan’s men, and proceeding by Chitral and Drosh to Jandol, were eventually released and sent in to Sir Robert Low’s camp at Sado in April.
When, on the 6th March, Lieutenant Edwardes heard of the gathering below Reshun, he had at once sent back news to Mastuj, where it arrived the same evening, and Captain Ross thereupon started next morning with his party—two British officers, one native officer and ninety-three of other ranks—to bring Lieutenant Edwardes’ detachment back to Buni. Reaching Buni late on the night of the 7th, he there left his native officer with thirty-three rank and file, and pushed on next morning for Reshun with the remainder of his party. At 1 p.m. the Koragh Defile was reached; as described by Robertson, “the defile is the result of the river cutting its winding course through terrible cliffs. A goat, scuttling along the high ridges, might start a thunderous avalanche of boulders down the unstable slopes. At the lower end of this frightful gorge the pathway begins to ascend from the river above some caves, and then zigzags upwards. There the ‘point’ of the advance guard was fired upon, and hundreds of men disclosed themselves and set the very hillsides rolling down.” The small party were in a trap. Several men were at once hit, and Captain Ross then decided to occupy some caves in the river bank. He made several attempts to scale the cliffs and to force his way back to Buni, but was everywhere met by a heavy fire from both banks of the river, and by a deadly hail of rocks from the cliffs above. Captain Ross was killed, and eventually his subaltern, Lieutenant Jones, with only fourteen men, ten of the party being wounded, reached Buni on the evening of the 10th. Here he occupied a house and held it until the 17th, when Lieutenant Moberley marched out from Mastuj with 150 men of the Kashmir troops, and relieved and brought in the remnants of Captain Ross’ party.
From the 22nd March until the 9th April Mastuj was invested by the enemy, but on this latter date they began to retire owing to the advance of the Gilgit column under Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly. The Mastuj garrison had only one man wounded.
The Gilgit Column
Advance of the Gilgit Column.—During the first week in March reports of the serious state of affairs in the Chitral Valley began to reach Gilgit, whence a few days later the Assistant British Agent sent down a request to Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly to bring to Gilgit a wing of the 32nd Pioneers, then engaged in road-making between Bunji and Chilas. In peace time this officer commanded no more than his own regiment, but on hostilities occurring he automatically became the military head of the whole district, and all military responsibility rested on him alone. The message reached Colonel Kelly on the 14th, and by the 22nd the wing (strength 403) had arrived at Gilgit; on the same day Colonel Kelly was informed by telegraph from the Adjutant General that he was in military command in the Gilgit Agency, and was also Chief Political Officer so long as communications with Chitral were interrupted; in regard to operations he was to use his own judgment but was to run no unnecessary risks. He was also informed of the advance of a relief force via Swat about the 1st April. Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly now issued the following orders: 200 men to start early on the 23rd for Chitral, followed on the next day by the remainder of the wing, accompanied by two guns of No. 1 Kashmir Mountain Battery. Of the other half battalion 200 were called up to Gilgit from the Indus Valley, while the remainder of the regiment (242) was to proceed to Chilas.
At this time the various happenings on the Gilgit-Chitral road were known, except that no tidings had come in of the disaster to the party under Lieutenant Edwardes. Colonel Kelly’s command now extended from Astor to Chitral, and contained, exclusive of the troops in the Mastuj and Chitral districts, four mountain guns, 845 of the 32nd Pioneers, about 1250 Rifles of the Kashmir Infantry, and 160 Kashmir Sappers. But in deciding upon the numbers of which the Relief Column was to be composed, with which he intended to force his way to Chitral, it was necessary also to provide for the safety of Gilgit and for keeping open the line of communications. There was nothing to be feared from the people of Hunza and Nagar, whose chiefs at once furnished 1000 men for employment as levies; but the people of Chilas required watching, though apparently submissive, while those of Yasin were sure to be in sympathy with their near neighbours of Chitral. From Gilgit to Chitral was 220 miles, and between the two posts was the Shandur Pass (12,250 feet), at this season deep in snow. As far as Gupis there was a made mule road, but thence forward the road was a mere track; while throughout its length there were many places where it might be easily blocked, and where an enemy might take up an almost impregnable position. The supply question was further one of great anxiety, especially should the country prove hostile, but it was known that reserve supplies were stored at Gupis, Ghizr and Mastuj. Bearing all these points in mind, Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly decided to limit the strength of the Relief Column to 400 men of the 32nd Pioneers, two guns of the Kashmir Mountain Battery, 40 Kashmir Sappers and 100 of the Hunza and Nagar levies. The column started in two parties. As far as Gupis, which was reached on the 26th and 27th, mule transport was used, but this was here exchanged for coolies and ponies; owing, however, to desertions among the coolies the loads had to be reduced—there were no tents and each man had an allowance of 15 lbs. of baggage—while only six days’ supplies could be taken with the column.
Crossing the Shandur
Ghizr was reached on the 30th and 31st March, and the march to the Shandur Pass was commenced. The snow was now so deep that the battery mules and the ponies could not proceed; Colonel Kelly therefore withdrew 200 of his men under Captain Borradaile to Teru and returned himself with the rest of the column to Ghizr where the supply question did not present such difficulties. Borradaile was next day to attempt to cross the Shandur Pass, reach and entrench himself at Laspur, return the transport, and try and open communications with Mastuj.
Snow fell heavily during the next twenty-four hours and no start could be made until 11 a.m. on the 3rd, by which time the guns and a detachment of the Kashmir Rifles had joined Borradaile. The pass was crossed under extraordinary difficulties, the infantry reaching Laspur on the night of the 4th, and the guns and Kashmir Infantry the following afternoon. A reconnaissance on the 6th revealed the presence in the neighbourhood of the enemy, who were reported also to be entrenched near the Chakalwat defile some thirteen miles further on. On this day Colonel Kelly arrived with fifty Nagar levies, and next day fifty Puniali levies also came in. Some idea of the severity of the climate may be gathered from the fact that among the troops there were sixty-three cases of snow blindness and forty-three of frost-bite.
The second part of the column, delayed at Ghizr, was unable to reach Laspur until the 9th, but Colonel Kelly, considering it inadvisable to wait, pushed on to Gasht with the remainder of his party, and after reconnoitring the enemy’s position, determined to attack. The enemy’s position was naturally very strong and the sangars well placed; these blocked the valley on either side of the river and were continued up to the snow line, while the right of the position was further protected by a mass of fallen snow descending into the water. On the 9th Colonel Kelly advanced towards the enemy’s position at Chakalwat; the Hunza levies were sent up the heights on one side to get above and fire into the sangars; while the Puniali men ascended on the other flank to drive the enemy from their stone shoots on the slopes above the river.