The force deployed on a gentle slope facing the right-hand sangars, and the two guns opened fire at 800 yards range. This shell-fire and the volleys of the infantry cleared the enemy out of the right sangar, while the Hunza levies had already driven them from those higher up. The next line of sangars was attacked in the same manner, and the enemy now began to give way and were soon in full flight, having lost between fifty and sixty killed. Our casualties were only four men wounded.
Forcing the Nisa Gol
Colonel Kelly now moved on to Mastuj, where the rest of his column closed up on the 11th, and the three days spent here were occupied in the collection of transport and supplies and in pushing out reconnaissances. These disclosed the presence of the enemy in a strong and well-fortified position, where the Chitral River Valley is cleft by a deep ravine known as the Nisa Gol, 200 or 300 feet deep, with precipitous sides. The defence was prepared on much the same lines as at Chakalwat, but the sangars were of better construction, being provided with head cover, while their front was covered by the precipices of the Nisa Gol.
It was decided to attack on the 13th and to try and turn the enemy’s left. Colonel Kelly pursued the same tactics as in the earlier action, bringing his artillery fire to bear on the sangars while keeping up a heavy rifle fire, his levies climbing the precipitous hillsides and turning the flank. The guns silenced sangar after sangar, gradually moving in closer; a place was discovered where the ravine could be crossed, and a party reached the opposite side just as the levies had turned the position. The enemy now evacuated their defences and fled, fired on by the guns and the infantry. Our loss was seven killed and thirteen wounded.
There was no further opposition to the advance of the Gilgit column, beyond such as was experienced from broken bridges and roads, and on the 20th April Colonel Kelly’s force marched into Chitral and joined the garrison.
Siege of Chitral Fort
The Siege of Chitral Fort.—This commenced, as has been said, on the 3rd March, after the action of that date wherein the British troops had suffered many casualties; and when, in consequence of Captain Campbell having been severely wounded, the command of the troops devolved upon Captain Townsend. The garrison of the fort consisted of six British officers, of whom five only were fit for duty, ninety-nine men of the 14th Sikhs, and 301 of all ranks of the 4th Kashmir Rifles. There were in addition fifty-two Chitralis—men whose loyalty was at best dubious—and eighty-five followers. The supplies, on half-rations, could be made to last two and a half months, while of ammunition there were 300 rounds per Martini-Henri rifle of the Sikhs and 280 rounds per Snider of the Kashmir troops. The fort was about seventy yards square with a tower at each corner, and a fifth guarded the path to the river; the walls of the fort were some twenty-five feet in height and from eight to ten feet thick; it was practically commanded on all sides, and surrounded on three by houses, walls, and all kinds of cover. The number of British officers was so small and the Kashmir troops, who composed three-fourths of the fort-garrison, were so shaken by their losses on the 3rd, that Captain Townsend resolved to remain as far as possible on the defensive. He confined his energies, therefore, to devising measures of defence, to the provision of cover within and the demolition of cover without the walls, to arranging a system for quickly extinguishing fires, and to providing as far as possible for proper sanitation.
The garrison was therefore engaged in real fighting on two occasions only during the forty-eight days that the siege lasted, and the losses incurred in the passive defence of the fort were not heavy; there was, however, much sickness, and at the end of the first week only eighty Sikhs and 240 of the Kashmir Rifles remained fit for duty. From the 16th to the 23rd there was a truce, during which Sher Afzul did his best to persuade the British Agent to agree to withdraw the garrison to Mastuj, or to India by way of Jandol. During the suspension of hostilities Captain Townsend effected many improvements in the defences. The guard duties were very heavy, half the effectives being on duty at a time, and the defenders were harassed day and night by a desultory rifle fire.
On the 7th, under cover of a heavy rifle fire, a party of the enemy crept up to the tower at the south-eastern corner and managed to set it on fire. A strong wind was blowing, and for some time matters looked very serious, as the tower, being largely composed of wood, burned fiercely. No sooner did the fire seem to be mastered than it blazed up again; the enemy, occupying the high ground, were able to fire upon men going in and out of the tower with water and earth; the British Agent and a Sikh soldier were here wounded, while a sentry of the Kashmir Rifles was killed. On the 10th an attack was made on the waterway, and on the morning of the 17th the enemy could distinctly be heard at work upon a mine, leading to the same tower as that attacked on the 7th. It was clear that the entrance of the mine was in a summer-house about a hundred and fifty feet from the tower, and which there had been no time to demolish; while from the distinctness with which the sound of digging could be heard, the mine had evidently reached within a few feet of the base of the tower. It was decided to make a sortie, carry the summer-house where it was thought the mine shaft would be found, and destroy the mine, since matters had gone too far to counter-mine.
Harley’s Sortie