From the Black Mountain to Waziristan / Being an account of the border countries and the more turbulent of the tribes controlled by the north-west frontier province, and of our military relations with them in the past

by H. C. Wylly

2nd Battalion King’s Own Scottish Borderers. 1st Battalion Northamptonshire Regiment. 1st Battalion 3rd Gurkhas,

supplemented for this day by

No. 5 Mountain Battery. No. 9 Mountain Battery. Rocket Detachment Royal Artillery.

First Action at Dargai

The two columns left camp at Shinawari, the one at 4.30 a.m., the other half an hour later. The main column moved along the foothills to the north-west of camp and, then, making a wide circle to the east, was to operate against the right flank and right rear of the enemy occupying the cliffs about Dargai. The second column was to make a frontal attack upon Dargai from the Chagru Kotal; and on its arrival here about 8.30, and seeing few of the enemy on the Dargai position, it was decided to at once attack without awaiting the turning movement of the main column. Some description of the famous position must now be given. [^[119]] “The Chagru Kotal is at the top of the hill, 5525 feet high, between the plain on the southern or Shinawari side of the Samana Range and the Khanki Valley, but at the lowest point of the gap between the Samana Sukh, or western extremity of that part of the Samana Range on which stand Forts Gulistan, Saraghari and Lockhart, and the heights above Dargai. These heights, continued to the north beyond the village of Dargai, form what is called the Narikh Sukh, from which a rough track drops down into the Narikh Darra a short distance above its junction with the Chagru defile, which again meets the Khanki River almost at right angles some two miles further on. The road from Shinawari to the Khanki Valley runs very nearly due north. At the Chagru Kotal it is overlooked on the east by the Samana Sukh, a steep cliff rising precipitously to a height of some 700 feet above it, at a distance of from 700 to 800 yards. Opposite and nearly parallel to this on the western side of the kotal, but 1000 yards from it, are the Dargai heights, which attain an elevation of slightly over 6600 feet, 1100 feet above the Chagru Kotal. Although the range from the kotal to the enemy’s sangars on the top of the heights was only 1800 yards, the distance to be traversed on foot was about a couple of miles. For the first mile or more the track followed a more or less level course, until, passing through the village of Mamu Khan, it took a sharp turn to the right and began to zigzag up a very steep watercourse, which became gradually narrower as it neared the top of a small wooded, rocky ridge running roughly parallel to the enemy’s position and connected with it by a narrow col or saddle. This ridge was 400 feet lower than the crest of the position, and some 350 yards from the foot of it. The angle of descent from the position to the top of the ridge, or rather to the narrow gap at which alone it was possible to cross the ridge—which elsewhere was precipitous on the side nearest the position—was less steep than the slope from the gap downwards—or rearwards. Consequently, except at a point not far beyond the village of Mamu Khan, which was too distant from the position to be of any importance, the attacking force was not exposed to the enemy’s fire until it reached the gap. The approach to the gap was, as has been already stated, up a watercourse which narrowed at the top until it formed a sort of funnel, not wide enough to admit of the passage of more than two or three men abreast, who, as they issued from it, found themselves at the edge of a narrow ledge, 350 yards long to the foot of the position, exposed every inch of the way to a fire from half a mile of sangared crest.”

The cliffs of Dargai are everywhere almost sheer, the final ascent being made by a rough track, which climbs up at a point where the cliff is rather more broken and shelving than elsewhere.

The Dargai Position

The advance commenced about 9 a.m., the 3rd Gurkhas leading, followed by the King’s Own Scottish Borderers and Northamptons; and just before midday the position had been taken, the enemy, chiefly Orakzai Ali Khels, at the last only offering a comparatively feeble resistance, as they were beginning to feel the pressure of the main column. These fled towards the Khanki Valley, leaving twenty dead behind them. The attacking force had sustained but fifteen casualties—two killed and thirteen wounded. The advance of the main column had been greatly delayed by the impracticable character of the ground, which had necessitated the return of the mountain battery and all other pack animals; and it was after 3 p.m. before the junction of the two columns was effected at Dargai, by which time parties of the enemy had commenced to harass the rear of the main column, and some 4000 Afridis appeared to be advancing from the direction of the Khanki Valley, with the intention of attempting a re-occupation of the position.

No operation of this campaign has been more criticised, either by those who took part in it or by historians, than the evacuation on the 18th October of the Dargai position and its recapture thereby necessitated only two days later. The matter is barely touched upon in Sir William Lockhart’s despatch, appearing in the Gazette of India of January 22nd, 1898, beyond a remark that “the track to the water supply was afterwards found to be about three miles in length, so commanded from the adjacent heights that water could not have been obtained in the presence of an enemy unless these heights as well as Dargai itself had been held.” The inference is that, to hold the position won on the 18th, and safeguard the water supply, a far larger force would have been required than could at the time be spared. “Colonel (now Lieutenant-General) Hutchinson in his book, the Campaign in Tirah, states[^[120]] as the principal excuse for the failure to hold the Dargai heights when they had once been captured, that ‘the water supply of Dargai was at a place called Khand Talao, nearly three miles away to the west, and the road to it was commanded throughout by adjacent heights, so that, in the presence of an enemy, water could not have been obtained for the troops, unless these heights, as well as the village of Dargai, had been held in force.’ This statement is all the more remarkable in view of the fact that, on the excellent map of the position which he gives three pages before, are clearly marked both the small Talao (or tank), 100 yards below the village, containing muddy but not undrinkable water, which we used at first on the morning of the 21st, but also the larger tank some 500 yards further to the east.... The summit of the Narikh Sukh completely dominates the village of Dargai and the reverse slope of the enemy’s position, and commands an extensive view of the country for miles round. It is strewn with large rocks, very much like a Dartmoor Tor, and abounds in natural cover. A battalion left there on the 18th could have set at defiance any number of tribesmen, and, supported by another battalion on the kotal to connect it with the base and furnish it with supplies, could with little difficulty, in conjunction with the troops already in possession of the Samana across the valley, have effectually prevented any attempt of the Afridis to come up to meet us from the Khanki Valley.”

Retirement from Dargai