Immediately the junction of the two columns had been effected the retirement to camp commenced; a mountain battery was posted at the Chagru Kotal, and another, with a battalion, on the Samana Sukh, to cover the withdrawal—a difficult operation and attended with considerable loss, for the path was very steep and broken, and the enemy pressed the rearguard closely. They do not, however, appear to have pursued beyond the heights, and the further retirement of Sir Power Palmer’s force to Shinawari via the Chagru Kotal was unmolested. Our total casualties this day amounted to one officer and seven men killed, five officers and twenty-nine men wounded.
The reports which he had received, as to the relation of the Dargai position in occupation by the enemy to the use of the road over the Chagru Kotal, seem to have convinced General Yeatman-Biggs, now again commanding his division, that passage could not safely be attempted unless the tribesmen were dislodged from the heights on the left flank. He, therefore, proposed to Sir William Lockhart on the 19th, that the advance be made by way of Gulistan, the Samana Sukh, and the Talai Spur;[[121]] but this suggestion was negatived, and the previous arrangement for the advance to Kharappa over the Chagru Kotal was to stand, Sir William considering that the well-known anxiety of the enemy as to their flanks, would cause them to evacuate the Dargai position on our troops arriving at the junction of the Narikh and Chagru ravines; at the same time the G.O.C.-in-Chief admitted that “it would be necessary to clear the Dargai heights overlooking the road to the west.” It seems, then, that what Sir William Lockhart suggested was a frontal attack on the Dargai position, combined with a threatening of the flanks by continuing the advance towards Kharappa.
The force placed at the disposal of General Yeatman-Biggs on the 20th, was composed of the troops of his own division, which had already taken the Dargai position on the 18th, less the 36th Sikhs, but strengthened by the inclusion of the 21st Madras Pioneers (divisional troops) and by the loan of two infantry battalions (2nd Battalion Derbyshire Regiment and 3rd Sikhs) from the 1st Division. The whole force left camp at Shinawari at 4.30 a.m. on the 20th by the direct road to the Chagru Kotal: no flank attack was attempted as on the previous occasion, but, fortunately, the expectation of such a movement kept a large contingent of the enemy from the actual point of attack during the whole day. As might have been expected with the passage by a single narrow road of so large a body of troops and transport, the block, inevitable under ordinary conditions, was accentuated by the opposition experienced; and, while some of the baggage was unable even to leave the Shinawari camp that day, late on the 21st the Shinawari-Chagru Kotal road was for quite half its length still absolutely choked with transport of all kinds—many of the animals had been standing loaded up for upwards of thirty-six hours.
Second Action at Dargai
The Dargai position, which on the 18th had been held by a limited number of Orakzais, was now occupied by a gathering of tribesmen estimated to number 12,000, partly Orakzais, but more than half consisting of Afridis from the Malikdin Khel, Kambar Khel, Kamar Khel, Zakha Khel, Kuki Khel, and Sipah clans.
The advanced troops, under Brigadier-General Kempster, reached the kotal about 8 a.m., and, on being joined there by Major-General Yeatman-Biggs, were at once ordered to take the position; the remainder of the force being halted on the summit or the south side of the pass, and no attempt being made to threaten the enemy’s flanks by continuing the advance. The assault on Dargai was led by the Gurkha Scouts and 1st Battalion 2nd Gurkhas, with the Dorsets in support and the Derbyshire Regiment in reserve, covered by the long-range fire of the Gordons and Maxim gun from a ridge immediately west of the kotal, of three mountain batteries on the pass, and of another on the Samana Sukh. The whole of the infantry of the attack was able to mass, without loss and under cover, within less than 500 yards of the position, and from here the Gurkhas dashed out, and, with something over fifty casualties, succeeded in establishing themselves in shelter in the broken and dead ground immediately under the cliffs. The enemy now concentrated a rapid, accurate, and well-sustained fire upon the narrow col or saddle described on page [322]. The remainder of the Gurkhas were unable to get across, and attempts made, first by the Dorsets and then by the Derbyshires, to rush forward in driblets (necessitated both by the narrow exit from the “funnel” and the congested state of the ground whereon these regiments were massed) were beaten back with considerable loss. About 2.30 p.m. the colonel of the Dorsets, the senior officer on the spot, signalled for reinforcements. The Gordon Highlanders and 3rd Sikhs were then sent up, and, under a rapid concentrated fire from all the batteries, the Gordons led a dash, which was joined by all the other troops in the position, and the enemy, not waiting for the final assault, fled towards the Khanki Valley.
Second Capture of Position
By this time it was too late to continue the advance; consequently, while the bulk of the force bivouacked about the Chagru Kotal, the Narikh Sukh was held by the Derbyshires, the position at Dargai by the Gurkhas and Dorsets, with the Gordon Highlanders lower down the hill. The total casualties sustained in this, the second assault on Dargai, amounted to four officers and thirty-four men killed, fourteen officers and 147 men wounded. It may here be mentioned that the troops now holding these heights remained wholly unmolested, even when, after the 23rd, the position was occupied by no more than one battalion—the 30th Punjab Infantry.
On the 21st the Second Division resumed its march; on the 24th the First Division began to move from Shinawari; and by the evening of the 27th the whole of the main force under Sir William Lockhart’s command, was, with its supplies and transport, concentrated at Kharappa ready for a further advance. During this time the Sampagha Pass to the north was reconnoitred, foraging parties were sent out, camps were strengthened and communications improved; the enemy was always active, following up reconnoitring and foraging parties, and “sniping” nightly into camp, whereby several casualties were sustained.
By the 28th a force of some 17,600 fighting men, nearly as many followers, and 24,000 animals, was concentrated in camp, and marched out this day to Ghandaki, a short four miles from Kharappa, proceeding by two roads; and in the afternoon a reconnaissance by the 1st Brigade of the First Division was pushed to the foot of the Sampagha Pass. On the following day the same brigade moved out while it was still dark; the Devons seized a village and some spurs on the right of the road to the pass, the Derbyshire Regiment occupied a mass of small brown hills in the centre—afterwards the first artillery position, and the 1st Gurkhas moved against the Kandi Mishti villages on the left. The Sampagha was captured by direct attack, the opposition not being very serious, and by 11.30 a.m. was in our hands, at a cost of two killed and thirty wounded. Three brigades were that same day pushed forward into the Mastura Valley, where up to this date no European had ever penetrated, the 1st Brigade remaining on the south of the Sampagha to help forward the transport, and eventually joining the main body on the night of the 30th.