[55] Spencer, Ind. Inst., p. 472. [↑]
[56] Letourneau, pp. 423, 355, 356. In a letter we received from Mr. A. C. Kruyt, it is remarked that among the Dyaks and the Toradja of Celebes a slave in some cases rises to the position of a serf; he is then no longer continually in the service of his master, but only has to work at definite periods. [↑]
[57] Mr. Westermarck observes: “According to a common definition of slavery, the slave is the property of his master, but this definition is hardly accurate. It is true that even in the case of inanimate property the notion of ownership does not involve that the owner of a thing is always entitled to do with it whatever he likes; a person may own a thing and yet been prohibited by law from destroying it. But it seems that the owner’s right over his property, even when not absolute, is at all events exclusive, that is, that nobody but the owner has a right to the disposal of it. Now the master’s right of disposing of his slave is not necessarily exclusive; custom or law may grant the latter a certain amount of liberty, and in such a case his condition differs essentially from that of a piece of property. The chief characteristic of slavery is the compulsory nature of the slave’s relation to his master” (Moral Ideas, I pp. 670, 671).
We are fully aware that a certain amount of liberty is often granted to the slaves. This was also the case in ancient Rome; yet we think the Roman legislators were correct in calling the slaves the property of their masters. For every check, put by custom or law upon the master’s power over his slaves, is foreign to the nature of slavery; in principle the master’s power is unlimited, just as the owner’s power over his property. It is just in this that slavery differs from other relations of a compulsory nature. [↑]
[58] Ellis, Tshi-speaking peoples, p. 294. [↑]
[59] Puchta, II p. 250; see also Wilken, Pandrecht, pp. 42–44. [↑]