CHAPTER III
1790–1792
The Emperor Leopold—His Internal Policy—The Policy of Prussia—Leopold’s Foreign Policy—Conference of Reichenbach—Leopold and the Turks—Treaty of Sistova—Leopold crowned Emperor—Leopold and Hungary—State of Parties in Belgium—Their Internal Dissensions—Congress at the Hague—Leopold reconquers Belgium—War between Russia and Sweden—Treaty of Verela—War between Russia and the Turks—Capture of Ismail—Treaty of Jassy—Position of Leopold—The State of France—Mirabeau’s advice—Death of Mirabeau—The Flight to Varennes—Its Results: in France—The Massacre of 17th July 1791—Revision of the Constitution—Its Results: in Europe—Manifesto of Padua—Declaration of Pilnitz—Completion of the French Constitution of 1791—The Polish Constitution of 1791—The Legislative Assembly in France—The Girondins—Approach of War between France and Austria—Causes of the War—Attitude of Europe—Death of the Emperor Leopold—Murder of Gustavus ii. of Sweden—Policy of Dumouriez—War declared by France against Austria—Invasion of the Tuileries, 20th June 1792—Francis ii. crowned Emperor—Invasion of France by Prussia and Austria—Insurrection of 10th August 1792—Suspension of Louis xvi.—Desertion of Lafayette—The Massacres of September in the prisons—Battle of Valmy—Meeting of the National Convention—The Girondins and the Mountain—Conquest of Savoy, Nice, and Mayence—Battle of Jemmappes—Conquest of Belgium—Execution of Louis xvi.—War declared against Spain, Holland, England and the Empire—Catherine invades Poland—Overthrow of the Polish Constitution—Second Partition of Poland—Contrast between the resistance of France and Poland.
The Emperor Leopold.
The successor of Joseph II., the Emperor Leopold, was, except perhaps Catherine of Russia, the ablest monarch of his time. He had had a long experience in the art of government, for he had succeeded to the sovereignty of the Grand Duchy of Tuscany in 1765, on the death of his father, the Emperor Francis of Lorraine. While his brother Joseph was kept until 1780 by Maria Theresa in leading-strings as far as the actual administration of the Hapsburg dominions was concerned, and was only able to exert his authority as Emperor, Leopold had from his boyhood been an absolute and irresponsible sovereign, and had imbibed from his education an Italian knowledge of statecraft. During his long reign in Tuscany he showed the finest qualities of a benevolent despot in his measures for increasing the material comforts of his people, combined with tact and diplomatic subtlety. His reforms were as sweeping as those of Joseph, but were so managed as not to set his dominions in a flame. With the help of Scipio de Ricci, Bishop of Pistoia, he freed the people of Tuscany from the heavy burden of an excessive number of ecclesiastics; he reorganised the internal administration, and especially the judicial system; and he showed such intelligence in grasping and partially applying the new principles of political economy as to be called ‘the physiocratic prince.’ He had been Grand Duke of Tuscany for twenty-five years, and when he succeeded his elder brother Joseph as King of Hungary and Bohemia in February 1790, he had earned the reputation of a singularly wise and prudent statesman, and of one who, if it could be done, might be expected to restore the power of the House of Austria. He abandoned the Grand Duchy of Tuscany to his second son Ferdinand, and at once applied himself to the difficult task bequeathed to him by Joseph II.
Policy of Leopold.
Leopold found the power of Austria seriously affected by dangers from within and dangers from without. He at once undid much of Joseph’s work. He recognised the difference between consolidating and unifying a nation, which was essentially one, and a congeries of nations speaking different languages, belonging to different races, and geographically widely separated. In Tuscany he had accomplished a great work in abolishing the local franchises of the cities and building up a Tuscan state, but he understood that such a work was impossible in the divided hereditary dominions of the House of Hapsburg, and that the Emperor Joseph had been attempting a hopeless task. Leopold’s first step was, therefore, to restore the former state of things in such parts of his dominions as were not in open insurrection. In Austria proper, in Bohemia, in the Milanese, and in the Tyrol, the concessions of Leopold were received with demonstrations of popular gratitude. He abolished the new system of taxation and the unpopular seminaries; he recognised the separate administrations of provinces which were essentially diverse; he gave up futile attempts at unification. But, at the same time, he maintained the edict of religious toleration, the most noble of Joseph’s reforms, and introduced many slight but appreciable improvements in the local institutions which he restored. Having thus assured the fidelity of an important body of his subjects, he prepared to deal with the declared rebels in Belgium and the unconcealed opposition in Hungary. It was here that Leopold suffered most from the foreign policy of Maria Theresa and Joseph, for it was indisputable that the prevalent discontent and insurrection in Belgium and Hungary was fostered by the Triple Alliance, and especially by Prussia. He had a serious war with the Turks on his hands; his ally, Catherine of Russia, was too much occupied with her wars with the Swedes and Turks and with the affairs of Poland, to come to his help; France, excited by her internal dissensions, and with the Assembly indisposed to the maintenance of the Treaty of 1756, might almost be reckoned an enemy; the Empire had been roused to distrust by the policy of Joseph, and the Triple Alliance was openly hostile. Under these circumstances Prussia appeared at once the chief power on the Continent and the principal enemy of Austria, and it was with Prussia that Leopold first resolved to deal.
The Policy of Prussia.
The events of the year 1789 had greatly improved the position of Prussia on the Continent. The pretensions of Joseph to Bavaria had made Frederick William II., as it had made Frederick the Great, the real leader of the Princes of the Empire, and the Triple Alliance had done more to improve and strengthen his position in Europe. The classic policy of Prussia was consistent opposition to Austria, and Hertzberg, the Prussian minister, in pursuance of this policy, had made use of all Joseph’s mistakes to lower the power of the House of Hapsburg. He felt it necessary, indeed, to disavow a treaty with the Turks, which the too zealous Prussian envoy had signed in January 1790, but he was eager to make use of the difficulties of Russia and Austria caused by the Turkish war to forward Prussia’s designs on Poland. His main aim was to obtain the cession of the important Polish cities of Thorn and Dantzic, which would give Prussia complete control of the great river Vistula. The ablest Prussian diplomatist, Lucchesini, was sent to Warsaw, and on 29th March 1790 he signed a treaty of friendship and union with the Poles, by which Poland was to cede Thorn and Dantzic to Prussia in return for the retrocession of part of Austrian Galicia, which had fallen to Austria at the first partition, while Prussia promised to guarantee the territory and constitution of Poland, and to send an army of 18,000 men to the help of the Poles if they were attacked.
This treaty, shameless even in its epoch for its desertion of allies, breach of former engagements and absence of good faith, was highly approved by Frederick William II. and Hertzberg. They would not have dared to conclude it but for the seeming weakness of Russia and Austria, the partners in the former partition. Russia was hampered by the Swedish and Turkish wars, and the discontent of the ceded provinces of Poland. Austria was in a still more desperate condition. With the Turkish war still unconcluded, with open insurrection in Belgium, and disaffection in Hungary, unpopular in the Empire, and deprived of the alliance of France by the unconcealed dislike of the Assembly to the Treaty of 1756, it seemed as if the House of Hapsburg must now give way entirely to the House of Hohenzollern. Of the active encouragement given to the Turks, the Belgians, the Hungarians, and the Princes of the Empire against Austria by Prussia, mention has been made. Not less skilful was the conduct of the Prussian ambassador at Paris, Goltz, who intrigued with the more extreme leaders in the Assembly, and especially Pétion,[7] against Austria, and in particular did all in his power to increase the growing unpopularity of Marie Antoinette and to insist that she was a traitor to France.
The Policy of Leopold.