Revolutionary Europe, 1789-1815

by H. Morse Stephens

Had a less able statesman than Leopold been the successor of Joseph, the schemes of Prussia might have been crowned with success. But he had not ruled in the native city of Machiavelli for a quarter of a century for nothing; and he set to work to checkmate the designs of Hertzberg and Frederick William II. His wise measures of conciliation speedily rallied the heart of the hereditary dominions to him; and he determined to use diplomacy to establish his position in Europe before he dealt with Belgium and Hungary. He quickly perceived that Prussia’s real strength lay in the support of the Triple Alliance; her financial situation was such that she dared not undertake a serious war without the active countenance of England and Holland. He knew that it was worse than hopeless to rely upon France, and therefore at once applied to England. He protested that he did not share his brother’s attachment for Russia, or his schemes for the division of the Ottoman provinces; and he further hinted that he would abandon all attempt to reconquer Belgium and surrender it to France unless he received some assistance. Pitt felt the weight of these considerations; he did not care much about what happened to Poland, but he cared a great deal that the French should not occupy Belgium. When, therefore, the King of Prussia mobilised a powerful army in Silesia, and demanded through Hertzberg that Austria should on the one hand make an armistice with the Turks, and on the other restore Galicia to Poland, Leopold, trusting that he had broken the harmony of the Triple Alliance, made no elaborate warlike preparations, but demanded a conference.

The Conference of Reichenbach. June 1790.

The King of Hungary and Bohemia thoroughly understood the character of the Prussian king and the intrigues of his courtiers and ministers; he knew that Hertzberg was the real enemy of Austria, and that Frederick William was unstable and easily persuaded. He felt that his own strength lay in diplomacy, not war. On 26th June the two Austrian envoys, Reuss and Spielmann, arrived at the headquarters of the Prussian army in Silesia at Reichenbach, and demanded a conference. Rather to the disgust of the Prussians, their allies of the Triple Alliance insisted on being present, and a regular congress was held, at which Hertzberg and Lucchesini represented Prussia, Reuss and Spielmann, Austria, Ewart, England, Reden, Holland, and Jablonowski, the Poles. Even the Hungarian malcontents and the Belgian rebels, relying on the promises of Frederick William, ventured to send envoys. The conclusions of the congress justified Leopold’s diplomatic skill. When Hertzberg laid the Prussian demands in full before the assembled envoys, to his surprise Jablonowski declared that the Poles would never cede Thorn and Dantzic, while the representatives of England and Holland not only advocated the maintenance of the status quo, but refused the co-operation of their governments in Prussia’s schemes for aggrandisement. The policy of Hertzberg and Kaunitz, of perpetuating the rivalry of Prussia and Austria, had failed. Leopold was far too acute to leave these matters to ministers. He placed himself in direct communication with the King of Prussia and his personal favourites, Lucchesini and Bischofswerder; he argued that the interests of the two great German states both with regard to Poland and France were identical, and on 27th July 1790 the Convention of Reichenbach was signed, by which Austria promised at once to make an armistice with the Turks, and eventually to conclude peace with them under the mediation of the Triple Alliance, while, on the other hand, the powers of the Triple Alliance guaranteed the restoration of the Austrian authority in Belgium. It was more privately arranged that Prussia should withdraw from encouraging discontent in Hungary and Belgium, and support Leopold’s candidature for the Imperial throne. This great diplomatic victory did more than merely check the active enmity of Prussia; it established the ascendency of Leopold over the weak mind of Frederick William; and it eventually, in May 1791, brought about, not indeed his actual dismissal from office, but the removal of Hertzberg, the sworn foe of Austria, from the charge of the foreign policy of Prussia.

Leopold and the Turks.

The Treaty of Sistova. 4th Aug. 1791.

The first actual consequence of the Convention of Reichenbach was the conclusion of an armistice between Austria and the Turks. The war had never been looked on with favour by Leopold, who regarded Joseph’s infatuation for the grandiose schemes of Catherine of Russia as absurd, and the dismemberment of Turkey as impracticable, and at the present time undesirable. He had not attempted to press matters against the Turks, and had withdrawn many of his best troops under Loudon from the seat of war to Bohemia to strengthen his position at Reichenbach. The Prince of Coburg, who succeeded Loudon, aided by an earthquake, took Orsova, and laid siege to Giurgevo, but he was defeated in his camp after a severe battle on 8th July 1790. This defeat was only partially compensated by a victory won by Clerfayt, and by the capture of Zettin by General de Vins on 20th July. Under these circumstances Leopold was not sorry to conclude an armistice for nine months at Giurgevo on 19th September. Shortly afterwards a congress of plenipotentiaries from Austria, Turkey, and the mediating powers met, as had been arranged at Reichenbach, at Sistova. The negotiations lasted for many months; Leopold insisted on the cession by Turkey of Old Orsova and a district in Croatia, which would make the Danube and the Unna the boundary between Austria and Turkey; Prussia at first strongly protested against any cession to Austria; the congress even for a time broke up; and it was not until Leopold adroitly got Lucchesini, the Prussian envoy, on his side, that the important Treaty of Sistova upon the terms desired by Leopold was concluded on 4th August 1791.

Leopold crowned Emperor. 9th Oct. 1790.

By this treaty the hereditary dominions of the House of Hapsburg were relieved from the danger of foreign war; the next result which Leopold drew from the Convention of Reichenbach was the re-establishment of the Austrian ascendency in Germany. Assured of the support of Prussia, Leopold travelled to the Rhine. On 30th September 1790 he was unanimously elected King of the Romans; on 4th October he solemnly entered Frankfort, and on 9th October he was crowned Emperor. But it was not enough for him to be crowned Emperor; he had to destroy the bad effect of his brother Joseph’s attitude towards the Empire; he had to become the real as well as the nominal head and leader of the German princes, and to win back the advantages which Prussia had secured by forming the League of Princes. The opportunity was afforded to him by the disinclination of the German princes, who owned territories in Alsace, Lorraine, and Franche Comté, to accept the compensation offered to them by the French Constituent Assembly. Their protests took the shape of a clause in the ‘capitulation’ laid before him and accepted by him on his election as Emperor by which he promised to intervene on behalf of the Empire for the preservation of the rights, sanctioned by the Treaty of Westphalia, of the princes, whose interests were affected. Leopold thus seized this opportunity to pose as the head of the German Empire, and on 14th December 1790 he wrote a very strong letter to Louis XVI., in which he said: ‘The territories in question have not been transferred to the kingdom of France; they are subject to the supremacy of the Emperor and the Empire: no member of the Empire has the right to transfer that supremacy to a foreign nation. It follows, therefore, that the decrees of the Assembly are null and void so far as concerns the Empire and its members, and that everything ought to be replaced on the ancient footing.’[8]

Leopold and Hungary.

Leopold crowned King of Hungary. 15th Nov. 1790.