Scott had acquired his military reputation, and attained the rank of major-general at twenty-eight.
But it may be asked, how are we to secure this combination of military instruction and military energy; how are we to fill the higher grades of our army with young and active men possessing due military instruction and talent? The question is not a difficult one, and our government can easily attain the desired object, if it will only set at work honestly, disregarding all party prejudices and the mercenary and selfish interests of its own members and advisers. Other governments have pointed out to us the way. It is this: let merit be the main test for all appointments and promotions in the army. Let one or more of the subordinate grades be thrown open to the youth of the whole country, without distinction as to birth, or wealth, or politics; let them be kept on probation in this subordinate grade, and be thoroughly instructed in all that relates to the military profession; after strict examination let them be promoted to the vacancies in the higher grades as rapidly as they shall show themselves qualified for the duties of those grades, merit and services being here as elsewhere the only tests.
The first part of this rule is already accomplished by the Military Academy. One young man is selected from each congressional district, on an average, once in about two years, the selection being made by the representative of the district; these young men are made warrant officers in the army, and sent to a military post for instruction; frequent and strict examinations are instituted to determine their capacity and fitness for military service; after a probation of a certain length of time, the best are selected for commission in the army, relative rank and appointments to corps being made strictly with reference to merit; birth, wealth, influence of political friends—all extraneous circumstances being excluded from consideration. What can be more truly and thoroughly democratic than this? What scheme can be better devised to supply our army with good officers, and to exclude from the military establishment the corrupting influence of party politics, and to prevent commissions in the army from being given to "the sons of wealthy and influential men, to the almost total exclusion of the sons of the poor and less influential men, regardless alike of qualifications and of merit?"
Unfortunately for the army and for the country this system ends here, and all further advancement is made by mere seniority, or by executive favoritism, the claims of merit having but little or no further influence. Indeed, executive patronage is not infrequently permitted to encroach even upon these salutary rules of appointment, and to place relatives and political friends into the higher ranks of commissioned officers directly from civil life, "regardless alike of qualifications and of merit," while numbers "of sons of the poor and less influential men," who have served a probation of four or five years in military studies and exercises, and have proved themselves, in some thirty examinations made by competent boards of military officers, to be most eminently qualified for commissions, are passed by in utter neglect! Our army is much more open to this kind of favoritism and political partiality, than that of almost any of the governments of Europe, which we have been accustomed to regard as aristocratic and wholly unfriendly to real merit.
In the Prussian service, in time of peace, the government can appoint no one, even to the subordinate grade of ensign, till he has followed the courses of instruction of the division or brigade-school of his arm, and has passed a satisfactory examination. And, "no ensign can be promoted to a higher grade till after his promotion has been agreed to by the superior board or commission of examiners at Berlin, and his name has been placed on the list of those whose knowledge and acquirements (connaissances) render them qualified (aptes) for the responsible duties of their profession. The nomination to the grade of second-lieutenant is not, even after all these conditions are fulfilled, left to the choice of the government. When a vacancy occurs in this grade, the subaltern officers present to the commandant of the regiment a list of three ensigns who have completed their course of study; the commandant, after taking the advice of the superior officers of the regiment, nominates the most meritorious of these three to the king, who makes the appointment." The government can appoint to the engineers and artillery only those who have been instructed as élèves in the Berlin school of cadets and the school of artillery and engineers, and these appointments must be made in the order in which the pupils have passed their final examination. In these corps the lieutenants and second captains can be promoted to a higher grade only after they have passed a satisfactory examination. No political influence, nor even royal partiality, can interfere with this rule.
Even in the arbitrary monarchies of Austria and Russia it is deemed necessary to subject all military appointments and promotions, in the peace establishments, to certain fixed rules. In the Austrian army all sub-lieutenants must be taken from the military schools, or the specially-instructed corps of cadets and imperial guards; from this grade to that of captain all promotions are made by the commandants of regiments and corps on the advice of the other superior officers. Above the grade of captain all nominations for promotion are made to the emperor by the Aulic Council, in the order of seniority of rank, except the claims of superior merit interfere. "In the Russian army," says Haillot, "no one, not even a prince of the imperial family, can reach the grade of officer till he has satisfactorily passed his several examinations, or finished the severe novitiate to which the cadets in the corps are subjected." Promotion below the grade of colonel is made partly by seniority, and partly by merit; above that grade, by selection alone.
In the British service, rank in the line of the army is obtained by purchase, and the higher grades are in this way filled with young men of energy and enterprise; but this efficiency is gained by injustice to the poor man, who is without the means of purchasing rank. In some respects it is preferable to our ruinous system of exclusive seniority and executive favoritism, but far more objectionable than that based on merit. Wellington has recently said that the system of exclusive seniority would soon utterly destroy the efficiency of the army, by preventing young men from reaching the higher grades. "At first," says an officer of some distinction in the British navy, in speaking of promotions in that arm of service, "it certainly looks very hard to see old stagers grumbling away their existence in disappointed hopes; yet there can be little doubt that the navy, and, of course, the country at large, are essentially better served by the present system of employing active, young, and cheerful-minded officers, than they ever could be by any imaginable system by seniority. It must not be forgotten, indeed, that at a certain stage of the profession, the arrangement by which officers are promoted in turn is already made the rule, and has long been so: but, by a wise regulation, it does not come into operation before the rank of post-captain be attained. Antecedent to this point, there must occur ample opportunities of weeding out those persons, who, if the rule of mere seniority were adopted, would exceedingly embarrass the navy list." We fully agree with this writer respecting the evils of a system of exclusive seniority, but not respecting the best means of remedying these evils. In England, where the wealthy and aristocratic classes govern the state, they may very well prefer a system of military appointment and promotion based exclusively on wealth and political influence; but in this country we are taught to consider merit as a claim much higher than wealth, or rank, or privilege.
The various changes in the rules of appointment and promotion in the French service, and the various results of these changes, both on the character of the army and the welfare of the state, are so instructive that we regret that our limits will not allow us to enter into a full discussion of them. We can give only a very brief outline.
Previous to the Revolution, military appointment and promotion were wholly subject to the rules of nobility, certain grades in the army belonging of right to certain grades of the noblesse; merit and service being excluded from consideration. But the constituent assembly changed this order of things, and established the rule that three-fourths of the sub-lieutenants be appointed by selection, after a concours, and the other quarter be appointed from the sub-officers, alternately by seniority and selection, without concours; the captains and lieutenants by seniority; the colonels and lieutenant-colonels two-thirds by seniority and one-third by selection; maréchaux-de-camp and lieutenant-generals one-half by seniority and one-half by selection. In 1793 the grades were still further opened to selection, and in the turbulent times that followed, a part of them were even thrown open to election by the soldiers. But in 1795 the combined system of merit and seniority, with certain improvements, was restored. In 1796 and the wars that followed, merit was the only qualification required, and Bonaparte, Moreau, and other young generals were actually placed in command of their seniors in rank. Military talent and military services, not rank, were the recognised claims for promotion, the baptism of blood, as it was called, having equalized all grades. Bonaparte, in leaving Egypt, paid no attention to seniority of rank, but gave the command to Kleber, who was then only a general of brigade, while Menou was a general of division. Everybody knows that on the death of Kleber, General Menou succeeded in the command; and that Egypt, saved by the selection of Kleber, was lost by the seniority of Menou.