Napoleon formed rules for promotion, both for peace and war, based on merit. His peace regulations were much the same as the system of 1795; his field regulations, however, from the circumstances of the times, were almost the only ones used. The following extract from the Reglement de Campagneof 1809, (title XX.,) gives the spirit of this system:—"The next day after an action the generals of brigade will present to the generals of division the names of all such as have distinguished themselves in a particular manner; the generals of division will immediately report these to the commander-in-chief, and also the names of the generals and superior officers whose conduct has contributed most to secure success, so that the general-in-chief may immediately inform his majesty."
On the restoration of the Bourbons there were also restored many of the ancient privileges and claims of rank by the officers of the maison militaire du roi, and court favoritism was substituted for merit and service. But the revolution of 1830 produced a different order of things. "The laws now regulate military promotion; the king can appoint or promote only in conformity to legal prescriptions; and even in the exercise of this prerogative, he is wise enough to restrain himself by certain fixed rules, which protect him from intrigues, and from the obsessions of persons of influence, and of party politicians." Would that the same could always be said of the executive of this country in making appointments and promotions in the army.
The existing laws and regulations of the French service differ slightly for different corps, but the general rule is as follows: No one can be appointed to the grade of officer in the army who has not graduated at one of the military schools, or has not served at least two years as a sub-officer in a corps d'armée. In time of peace, no one can be promoted to the rank of lieutenant, captain, or major, (chef-d'escadron and chef-de-bataillon,) till he has served two years in the next lower grade; no one can be made lieutenant-colonel till he has served four years, nor be made colonel till he has served three years, in the next lower grade; no one can be made maréchal-de-camp, lieutenant-general, or marshal of France, till he has served two years in the next lower grade. These numbers are all diminished one half in time of war. For the grades of first-lieutenant and captain, two-thirds of the promotions are by seniority, and one-third by selection; for the chef-de-bataillon and chef-d'escadron, one-half by seniority and one-half by selection; for all the other grades by selection only. In time of war, one-half of the promotions to the grades of first-lieutenant and captain are filled by selection, and all the promotions to other grades in this way. For promotion by selection, a list of the authorized candidates for each grade is made out every year by inspectors, and boards of examiners appointed ad hoc, and the name, qualifications, and particular claim are given of each officer admitted to the concours. The recommendations of these inspectors and examiners are almost invariably followed by the government in its selections. This combined system of seniority and merit secures a gradual promotion to all, and at the same time enables officers of great talents and acquirements to attain the higher grades while still young and efficient. Merit need not, therefore, always linger in the subaltern grades, and be held subordinate to ignorance and stupidity, merely because they happen to be endowed with the privileges of seniority. Moreover, government is precluded from thrusting its own favorites into the higher grades, and placing them over the heads of abler and better men.
If such a system of appointment were introduced into our army, and fixed by legal enactments, and no one were allowed to receive a commission till he had either distinguished himself in the field, or had passed an examination before a board of competent officers, we are confident that better selections would be made in the appointments from civil life than have been within the last ten years by the present system of political influence. It would scarcely be possible to make worse selections.[[50]] And if the combined system of seniority and examination were pursued in promoting the subalterns already in service, it certainly would produce less injustice, and give greater efficiency to the army, than the present one of exclusive seniority and brevet rank, obtained through intrigue and political influence, or high military appointments bestowed as a reward for dirty and corrupt party services. As a military maxim, secure efficiency, by limiting the privileges of rank; exclude favoritism, by giving the power of selection to boards of competent officers, totally independent of party politics. Such a system has been for some time pursued in the medical department of our army; it has produced the most satisfactory results; stupidity, ignorance, and aged inefficiency have been overslaughed, and will soon entirely disappear from that corps; they have been replaced by young men of activity, talent, character, intelligence, and great professional skill. Is it less important to have competent military officers to command where the lives of thousands, the honor of our flag, the safety of the country depend upon their judgment and conduct, than it is to have competent surgeons to attend the sick and the wounded?
To show the working of this system of political appointments, we would call attention to a single fact. On the formation of an additional regiment of dragoons in 1836, thirty of its officers were appointed from civil life, and only four from the graduates of the Military Academy. Of those appointed to that regiment from civil life, twenty-two have already been dismissed or resigned, (most of the latter to save themselves from being dismissed,) and only eight of the whole thirty political appointments are now left, their places having been mainly supplied by graduates of the Military Academy.
In case of another increase of our military establishment, what course will our government pursue? Will it again pass by the meritorious young officers of our army,—graduates of the Military Academy,—who have spent ten or twelve of the best years of their life in qualifying themselves for the higher duties of their profession, and place over their heads civilians of less education and inferior character—men totally ignorant of military duties, mere pothouse politicians, and the base hirelings of party,—those who screech the loudest in favor of party measures, and degrade themselves the most in order to serve party ends?—and by thus devoting the army, like the custom-house and post-office, to political purposes, will it seek to increase that vast patronage of the executive which is already debasing individual morality, and destroying the national character? Should any administration of the government be so unmindful of the interests and honor of the country as to again pursue such a course, it is to be hoped that the sword of political justice will not long slumber in its scabbard.
We wish to call particular attention to this subject. It deserves attention at all times, but at the present moment it more especially demands a close and candid consideration. The higher grades of our peace establishment are now filled with men so far advanced in life that, in case of an increase of the army, many of them must undoubtedly be either passed over, or put on a retired list. Sooner or later some change of this kind will undoubtedly be made. It is demanded by the good of service, even in time of peace; and in time of war, it will be absolutely necessary to the success of our arms.[[51]] But the great danger is that the change may be made for the worse—that all the appointments and promotions to the higher grades will be made through political influence, thus converting the army and navy into political engines. Let proper measures be taken to prevent so dangerous a result; let executive patronage in the army be limited by wholesome laws, like those in France and Prussia; and let military merit and services, as determined by boards of competent military officers, be the only recognised claims to appointment and promotion, thus giving to the poor and meritorious at least an equal chance with the man of wealth and the base hireling of party. In actual service the system of exclusive seniority cannot exist; it would deaden and paralyze all our energies. Taking advantage of this, politicians will drive us to the opposite extreme, unless the executive authority be limited by wholesome laws, based on the just principles of merit and service.