Foods and Their Adulteration / Origin, Manufacture, and Composition of Food Products; Description of Common Adulterations, Food Standards, and National Food Laws and Regulations

by Harvey Washington Wiley

In reply to your question, I have the honor to say that, under the provisions of the act of March 3, 1903, to which you refer, the jurisdiction and power of your Department, and that of the Treasury Department, in respect of the matter here considered, end with the delivery of the imported article from the custom-house to the owner or consignee, and this provision of the act confers no power to prevent or punish the false labeling or branding of such imported articles after such delivery to the owner or consignee. The whole power there conferred in this respect is to examine such imported articles before such delivery, and to refuse delivery if found to come within the ban of the act. Whatever power there may be to prevent or punish the false labeling or branding of such imported goods after such delivery must be looked for elsewhere.

If the evils of false labeling of such imported articles have reached a magnitude requiring Congressional legislation, it would seem almost, or quite, as important to prevent such false labeling after the articles have passed the custom-house as before; and it would seem that Congress, while having the matter directly in hand, has omitted what would have been very appropriate legislation. But this omission cannot be supplied by those called upon to interpret or administer the law.

But I think the act of July 1, 1902, may be resorted to for partial relief from the evil to which you refer. The first section provides:

That no person ... shall introduce into any State or Territory of the United States or the District of Columbia, from any other State or Territory of the United States or the District of Columbia, or sell in the District of Columbia or in any Territory, any dairy or food products which shall be falsely labeled or branded as to the State or Territory in which they are made, produced, or grown, or cause or procure the same to be done by others.

The second section provides the penalty for violation of the act.

The prohibition is of the introduction into any State or Territory or the District of Columbia from any other State or Territory or the District of Columbia, and the sale in said District or any Territory, of dairy or food products which are “falsely branded or labeled as to the State or Territory in which they are made, produced, or grown.”

It is important to notice that the prohibition extends to falsely labeled articles introduced or brought from another State or Territory, and is not confined to articles which are made, produced, or grown in some other State or Territory of the United States. If dairy or food products which are falsely labeled or branded as to the State or Territory of their origin are introduced or brought into one State or Territory or the District of Columbia from another State or Territory or the District of Columbia, or are sold in any Territory or said District, this is clearly within the prohibition of the act, no matter whether such articles were of domestic or foreign origin. I repeat the section does not confine or purport to confine its prohibition to the introduction of falsely labeled articles made, grown, or produced in this country, but extends it to all such articles introduced from another State or Territory which are falsely labeled “as to the State or Territory in which they are made, produced, or grown.”

But, as I have stated above, the act can give only partial relief. For it is plain from the context that the words “State or Territory” refer to a State or Territory of the United States, and can not be extended to include the wider signification of foreign country. Thus, if articles of foreign origin are imported into New York, for example, and thence introduced into another State or Territory with a label or brand falsely stating their origin as to another foreign country, the case would not fall within the provisions of the statute. On the other hand, it is certain that if foreign articles imported into New York are introduced into another State or Territory with a label or brand showing them to be of New York make or growth, such articles would be “falsely labeled or branded as to the State or Territory in which they are made, produced, or grown,” and such introduction would be within both the letter and the spirit and purpose of the act.

In this respect Congress can interfere only with interstate trade. It can prevent the use of false labels of dairy or food products only when they become objects of commerce between different States or Territories. Hence, the prohibition is confined to articles introduced from one State or Territory into another. But this does not imply, nor is there anything to imply, that the prohibition is confined also to articles made, produced, or grown in the State or Territory from which they are introduced, or to articles of domestic origin. It is the use of false labels on dairy and food products in interstate commerce which is prohibited. And if it is interstate commerce, it is quite unimportant whether the articles falsely labeled were of domestic or foreign origin. If an imported article of foreign origin is labeled as of domestic origin, the article is “falsely labeled or branded as to the State or Territory in which it is made, produced, or grown;” and if such article, thus falsely labeled, is introduced from one State or Territory into another or the District of Columbia, it is a violation of the act. Nor does it make any difference in this respect whether the false label or brand be placed on the article before or after leaving the custom-house in a case of foreign importation.

If it were required, a familiar rule of construction might be invoked in support of this interpretation. Statutes should be construed in aid of their manifest purpose and object. And when it is considered that the sole purpose of this act is to prevent the use of false labels or brands of dairy or food products, when articles of interstate commerce, it is manifest that a construction which limits the prohibition to domestic articles would defeat rather than aid the purpose of the act. Indeed, the greater and more prevalent evil in this respect is not in falsely stating a particular State or Territory as the origin of a domestic article, but is the labeling of a foreign article as the product of some particular State or Territory, or vice versâ. This is the more serious and prevalent evil, and in my opinion is as certainly forbidden by the act referred to as is the labeling of an article of one State or Territory as being the product of another.