After their arrival upon Seminary Ridge, the infantry of Hood and McLaws was massed in a field within musket shot of General Lee’s head-quarters, and there rested until the troops took arms for the march to the point of attack. From this point of rest near Lee’s head-quarters to the point of attack, by the circuitous route selected by Pendleton, was between five and seven miles.
So that Longstreet’s infantry, the nearest at hand, had from nine to eleven miles to march to reach the selected point of attack, the greater part of which march by the back roads and ravines, to avoid the observation of the enemy, was necessarily slow at best, and made doubly so by the mistakes of Pendleton’s guides, who put the troops upon the wrong routes. The artillery, still back on the Chambersburg road, did not all get up until noon, causing a further delay of the whole column, as shown by the Pendleton report. General Law’s brigade, marching from 3 A.M., arrived about noon.
After they came up all movements were still several hours delayed, awaiting Lee’s personal reconnoissances on the left and right to determine the point of attack.
Colonel Venable says that “about sunrise” he was sent to General Ewell on the left to inquire if it were not more feasible to attack in that quarter. While he was riding from point to point with Ewell, Lee himself came over to see Ewell in person. Lee did not return to Longstreet’s front until about nine o’clock. Meanwhile, his staff-officers, Pendleton, Long, Colonel Walker, and Captain Johnston, by Lee’s orders, had been examining the ground to the right. Upon Lee’s return from the left he rode far to the right and joined Pendleton.
Not until then was the attack on the enemy’s left by Longstreet finally decided upon. Longstreet said it was not earlier than eleven o’clock when he received his orders to move; from the time consumed by Lee and his staff it was probably later. The front of the Confederate army was six miles in extent.
Hence matters on the morning of July 2 were not awaiting Longstreet’s movements. All that long forenoon everything was still in the air, depending upon Lee’s personal examinations and final decisions.
It is perfectly clear from this indecision on the 2d that Lee could not have arrived at a decision the previous night, as asserted by Pendleton at Lexington long after the war.