“General Lee never in his life gave me orders to open an attack at a specific hour. He was perfectly satisfied that when I had my troops in position and was ordered to attack, no time was ever lost.”​—​Longstreet On the Second Day at Gettysburg.

The hour, the feasibility, and point of attack have now been thoroughly discussed, mainly from the stand-point of the official records. As supplementary to the recitations of the official reports of Lee, Longstreet, Pendleton, and others quoted on these heads, it seems desirable to introduce just here General Longstreet’s version of his operations on July 2, published so long ago as 1877, only twelve years after Appomattox and two decades before he knew the tenor of Pendleton’s report. It was given to the world long before the publication of the official records by the government, to which he could therefore have had no access. How closely he is confirmed in all essential particulars by the records is marvellous. In this regard it is to be noted that in all these controversies his statements have always stood analysis in the light of all the evidence far better than those of his reckless critics. The following is useful because it comprehensively sums up from Longstreet’s stand-point all the movements relating to fixing the point and time of his attack, the movement and disposition of his troops, and other incidents:

SECOND DAY’S BATTLE, GETTYSBURG.

“General Lee never in his life gave me orders to open an attack at a specific hour. He was perfectly satisfied that when I had my troops in position and was ordered to attack, no time was ever lost. On the night of the 1st I left him without any orders at all. On the morning of the 2d I went to General Lee’s head-quarters at daylight and renewed my views against making an attack. He seemed resolved, however, and we discussed the probable results. We observed the position of the Federals and got a general idea of the nature of the ground. About sunrise General Lee sent Colonel Venable, of his staff, to General Ewell’s head-quarters, ordering him to make a reconnoissance of the ground in his front, with a view of making the main attack on his left. A short time afterwards he followed Colonel Venable in person. He returned at about nine o’clock and informed me that it would not do to have Ewell open the attack. He finally determined that I should make the main attack on the extreme right. It was fully eleven o’clock when General Lee arrived at this conclusion and ordered the movement. In the mean time, by General Lee’s authority, Law’s brigade, which had been put upon picket duty, was ordered to rejoin my command, and upon my suggestion that it would be better to await its arrival, General Lee assented. We waited about forty minutes for these troops and then moved forward. A delay of several hours occurred in the march of the troops. The cause of this delay was that we had been ordered by General Lee to proceed cautiously upon the forward movement so as to avoid being seen by the enemy. General Lee ordered Captain Johnston, of his engineer corps, to lead and conduct the head of the column. My troops therefore moved forward under guidance of a special officer of General Lee, and with instructions to follow his directions. I left General Lee only after the line had stretched out on the march, and rode along with Hood’s division, which was in the rear. The march was necessarily slow, the conductor frequently encountering points that exposed the troops to the view of the signal station on Round Top. At length the column halted.

“After waiting some time, supposing that it would soon move forward, I sent to the front to inquire the occasion of the delay. It was reported that the column was awaiting the movements of Captain Johnston, who was trying to lead it by some route by which it could pursue its march without falling under view of the Federal signal station. Looking up towards Round Top, I saw that the signal station was in full view, and, as we could plainly see this station, it was apparent that our heavy columns were seen from their position and that further efforts to conceal ourselves would be a waste of time.

“I became very impatient at this delay, and determined to take upon myself the responsibility of hurrying the troops forward. I did not order General McLaws forward because, as the head of the column, he had direct orders from General Lee to follow the conduct of Colonel Johnston. Therefore I sent orders to Hood, who was in the rear and not encumbered by these instructions, to push his division forward by the most direct route so as to take position on my right. He did so, and thus broke up the delay. The troops were rapidly thrown into position and preparations were made for the attack.

“We had learned on the night of the 1st, from some prisoners captured near Seminary Ridge, that the First, Eleventh, and Third Corps had arrived by the Emmitsburg road and had taken position on the heights in front of us, and that reinforcements had been seen coming by the Baltimore road just after the fight of the 1st. From an intercepted despatch we learned that another corps was in camp about four miles from the field. We had every reason, therefore, to believe that the Federals were prepared to renew the battle. Our army was stretched in an elliptical curve, reaching from the front of Round Top around Seminary Ridge, and enveloping Cemetery Heights on the left; thus covering a space of four or five miles. The enemy occupied the high ground in front of us, being massed within a curve of about two miles, nearly concentric with the curve described by our forces. His line was about fourteen hundred yards from ours. Any one will see that the proposition for this inferior force to assault and drive out the masses of troops upon the heights was a very problematical one. My orders from General Lee were ‘to envelop the enemy’s left and begin the attack there, following up as near as possible the direction of the Emmitsburg road.’

“My corps occupied our right, with Hood on the extreme right and McLaws next. Hill’s corps was next to mine, in front of the Federal centre, and Ewell was on our extreme left. My corps, with Pickett’s division absent, numbered hardly thirteen thousand men. I realized that the fight was to be a fearful one; but being assured that my flank would be protected by the brigades of Wilcox, Perry, Wright, Posey, and Mahone, moving en echelon, and that Ewell was to co-operate by a direct attack on the enemy’s right, and Hill to threaten his centre and attack if opportunity offered, and thus prevent reinforcements from being launched either against myself or Ewell, it seemed that we might possibly dislodge the great army in front of us.”

CHAPTER VI
PENDLETON’S REPORT

“Pendleton’s report will destroy many illusions of Lee’s misguided friends who are unwittingly doing deadly injury to his military fame by magnifying the mistakes of Gettysburg and ascribing them to another.”​—​Leslie J. Perry, formerly of the War Records Department.

There is even more positive proof than has yet been produced. That Lee gave no such order as described in Pendleton’s Lexington lecture, or for an “early attack,” as asserted by Gordon now, is absolutely proved by an official report of Gettysburg, penned by General Pendleton himself. That Pendleton was an oral falsifier of history is established by his own hand, under date of September 12, 1863, only nine weeks after the battle.

Confident in his own rectitude of purpose and conduct, and far from being an expert controversialist, for he was without guile himself, it is not at all singular that the significance of Pendleton’s report in connection with the Lexington story should for years have entirely escaped General Longstreet’s notice. He knew that the document was printed in its sequence in the Gettysburg volumes of the War Records, and for certain purposes had even quoted from it regarding other questions. He was also fully aware that General Pendleton had long been distinguished for the unreliability of his memory. Nevertheless General Longstreet had never analyzed the report to the extent of observing that it made ridiculous the reverend gentleman’s version of 1873.