It is most striking that the extraordinary tenor of this old Pendletonian exhumation of the War Records office in Washington should so long have passed entirely unnoticed by everybody, despite the researches of the most industrious. It remained for Mr. Leslie J. Perry, one of the historical experts then in charge of the government publication of the Union and Confederate records of the Civil War, to point out some nine years ago how glaringly the Pendleton report of 1863 stultified the Pendleton story of 1873.
The immediate result of the exploitation of the Pendleton report was the elimination of the sunrise story from the repertory of the anti-Longstreet crusaders. In the subsequent literature of the subject a decided change of tone regarding other allegations was soon perceived, more favorable to Longstreet. General Longstreet was astounded by this bald disclosure of his old military associate’s tergiversation, to call it nothing worse. For a time after the appearance of the Lexington story, he had charitably presumed that, in an excess of zeal to protect General Lee’s military fame, Pendleton might really have harbored in good faith the belief that his Lexington statements were true. But after reading the detailed analysis of the Pendleton report, and carefully studying the report itself, General Longstreet speedily arrived at the conclusion that he was the victim of a deliberate conspiracy. It is not strange that he found it hard to forgive the conspirators, even after becoming fully aware that the world was practically convinced that he had been cruelly misrepresented.
Let us see how “fairly” Pendleton stated the case against General Longstreet in his Lexington lecture. His official report[E] of Gettysburg was written only about sixty days after the battle. It was dated September 12, 1863. It is a detailed report of the operations of the Confederate artillery in the Pennsylvania campaign, embodying a minute description of General Pendleton’s personal movements on that day. That is its only value to this discussion. The paragraphs having a bearing upon the time of Longstreet’s attack are as follows:
“From the farthest occupied point on the right and front, in company with Colonels Long and Walker and Captain Johnston (engineer), soon after sunrise I surveyed the enemy’s position towards some estimate of the ground and best mode of attack. So far as judgment could be formed from such a view, assault on the enemy’s left by our extreme right might succeed, should the mountain there offer no insuperable obstacle. The attack on that side, if practicable, I understood to be the purpose of the commanding general.
“Returning from this position more to the right and rear, for the sake of tracing more exactly the mode of approach, I proceeded some distance along the ravine road noticed the previous evening, and was made aware of having entered the enemy’s lines by meeting two armed dismounted cavalrymen. Apparently surprised, they immediately surrendered, and were disarmed and sent to the rear.
“Having satisfied myself of the course and character of this road, I returned to an elevated point on the Fairfield road, which furnished a very extensive view, and despatched messengers to General Longstreet and the commanding general. This front was, after some time, examined by Colonel Smith and Captain Johnston (engineers), and about midday General Longstreet arrived and viewed the ground. He desired Colonel Alexander to obtain the best view he then could of the front. I therefore conducted the colonel to the advanced point of observation previously visited. Its approach was now more hazardous from the fire of the enemy’s sharp-shooters, so that special caution was necessary in making the desired observation. Just then a sharp contest occurred in the woods to the right and rear of this forward point. Anderson’s division, Third Corps, had moved up and was driving the enemy from these woods. These woods having thus been cleared of the enemy, some view of the ground beyond them, and much farther to the right than had yet been examined, seemed practicable. I therefore rode in that direction, and when about to enter the woods, met the commanding general en route himself to survey the ground.
“There being here still a good deal of sharp-shooting, the front had to be examined with caution.... Having noticed the field and the enemy’s batteries, etc., I returned to General Longstreet for the purpose of conducting his column to this point, and supervising, as might be necessary, the disposition of his artillery. He was advancing by the ravine road (as most out of view), time having already been lost in attempting another, which proved objectionable because exposed to observation. On learning the state of facts ahead, the general halted, and sent back to hasten his artillery. Members of my staff were also despatched to remedy, as far as practicable, the delay. Cabell’s, Alexander’s, and Henry’s battalions at length arrived, and the whole column moved towards the enemy’s left.... The enemy opened a furious cannonade, the course of which rendered necessary a change in the main artillery column. Cabell’s deflected to the left, while Alexander’s was mainly parked for a season, somewhat under cover, till it could advance to better purpose.... Soon after, at about 4 P.M., the general assault was made.”
Here is the whole of Pendleton’s celebrated report, so far as it bears upon the hour of Longstreet’s attack on the 2d of July. Nothing is omitted relating to the preliminary movements of Longstreet’s column of attack, or that in any manner modifies the tenor of the parts introduced.
CHAPTER VII
PENDLETON’S UNRELIABLE MEMORY
All the battle worthy the name for the Southern cause at Gettysburg on the 2d and 3d was made by Longstreet. The whole superstructure of the contentions against his honor as a soldier is based solely on the statements since the war, and since Lee’s death, of two or three obscure individuals. They are easily exploded by the records of the battles; they are corroborated by none.
When the Rev. Dr. Pendleton told that dramatic story to his breathless hearers at Lexington in 1873, under “pressure of imperative duty,” had he forgotten the tenor of his official report, made in 1863? The story as modified by the prior report forms the greatest anticlimax in all history. Several decisive facts are disclosed by this unbiassed report.