1. Instead of being dilatory and obstructive, Pendleton himself establishes that Longstreet was personally exerting himself to “hasten forward” the very artillery of which he, Pendleton, was the chief.
2. As late certainly as eleven o’clock, if not noon, General Lee and his staff-officers were still rambling all over a front six miles long, yet undetermined either as to the point or proper route of attack. According to both Pendleton and Venable, they did not begin this necessary preliminary survey until “about sunrise,” the specific hour at which General Lee on the night previous had already ordered Longstreet to begin his attack, as asserted by Pendleton at Lexington.
3. Not until Lee and Pendleton had devoted the entire forenoon to the examination of the ground, did Pendleton go to conduct Longstreet to the point of attack thereupon decided upon. Evidently Longstreet was not delaying action; he was awaiting their motions.
The following general conclusions upon the state of facts disclosed by Pendleton’s remarkable report are therefore inevitable and unavoidable.
1. At sunrise of the 2d, General Lee himself did not know where to attack. He did not know as late as ten or eleven o’clock. His mind was not fully made up until after he came back from Ewell’s front (about nine o’clock, according to all authorities), and had made the final examination on the right. General Longstreet says he received his orders to move about eleven o’clock, and this corresponds with Pendleton’s report. But if anything, it was later, rather than earlier.
2. These painstaking, time-consuming reconnoissances of the commanding general and his staff-officers, the journey of Colonel Venable to Ewell, three miles to the left, and Lee’s later visit to Ewell, together with the unavoidable absence of General Longstreet’s troops until late in the morning, prove absolutely that Lee issued no order for Longstreet to attack at any specific hour on July 2.
3. Longstreet’s preliminary movements from start to finish were under the personal supervision of Lee’s confidential staff-officer, Pendleton, and the subordinate staff-officers. So Longstreet has positively stated, so has General McLaws, and both are confirmed by Pendleton’s report. The staff guide caused a loss of three hours by putting the head of McLaws’s column upon a wrong road. This compelled Longstreet to “hasten matters” by assuming personal direction of the movement, and pushing Hood’s division rapidly to the front past McLaws.
4. Pendleton’s official utterances make it an “established fact” that General Longstreet made his tremendous and successful attack on July 2 at the earliest moment possible after receiving Lee’s orders to advance, under the conditions imposed by Lee,—viz., to be conducted to the point of attack by Pendleton himself and the other staff-officers.
Thus the misapprehensions respecting Longstreet’s great part at Gettysburg were cleared away, and a better general understanding of what actually occurred was obtained from the Rev. Mr. Pendleton’s report of September 12, 1863. Few military students now hold that Longstreet was in the remotest degree culpable for Lee’s defeat. On the contrary, most of them severely criticise Lee’s operations from start to finish, particularly the hopeless assaults he persisted in making, and for the lack of concert. It is held generally now that the dreadful result fully justified Longstreet’s protests against attacking the Federals in that position, and that his suggestion of a turning movement was far more promising of success.
In all the circumstances it is not only entirely improbable, but the developed facts of the battle make it impossible that “General Lee died believing that he lost Gettysburg at last by Longstreet’s disobedience of orders.” Longstreet disobeyed no orders at Gettysburg, and Lee was well aware of the fact. General Gordon has simply reiterated the claque set up after Lee’s death by his fond admirers to shift the responsibility of defeat from his shoulders upon Longstreet. It was necessary to the success of that folly to make the world believe Lee always quietly held that view, and only imparted it in the strictest confidence to close friends like the ex-army chaplain, Rev. J. William Jones, and the Rev. William N. Pendleton.