“In the voyage between the Mackenzie and Coppermine, I carefully executed their lordships’ instructions with respect to the examination of the coast-line, and became fully convinced that no ships had passed within view of the mainland. It is, indeed, nearly impossible that they could have done so unobserved by some of the numerous parties of Eskimos on the look-out for whales. We were, moreover, informed by the Eskimos of Back’s Inlet, that the ice had been pressing on their shore nearly the whole summer; and its closely packed condition when we left it on the 4th of September made it highly improbable that it would open for ship navigation later in the season. I regretted extremely that the state of the ice prevented me from crossing to Wollaston Land, and thus completing, in one season, the whole scheme of their lordships’ instructions. The opening between Wollaston and Victoria Lands has always appeared to me to possess great interest, for through it the flood-tide evidently sets into Coronation Gulf, diverging to the westward by the Dolphin and Union Strait, and to the eastward round Cape Alexander. By the fifth clause of Sir John Franklin’s instructions, he is directed to steer southwestward from Cape Walker, which would lead him nearly in the direction of the strait in question. If Sir John found Barrow Strait as open as when Sir Edward Parry passed it on four previous occasions, I am convinced that (complying as exactly as he could with his instructions and without looking into Wellington Sound, or other openings either to the south or north of Barrow Strait) he pushed directly west to Cape Walker, and from thence southwestwards. If so, the ships were probably shut up on some of the passages between Victoria, Banks, and Wollaston Lands.
“Being apprehensive that the boats I left on the coast would be broken up by the Eskimos, and being, moreover, of opinion that the examination of the opening in question might be safely and efficiently performed in the only remaining boat I had fit for the transport from Bear Lake to the Coppermine, I determined to entrust this important service to Mr. Rae, who volunteered, and whose ability and zeal in the cause I cannot too highly commend. He selected an excellent crew, all of them experienced voyageurs and capable of finding their way back to Bear Lake without guides, should any unforeseen accident deprive them of their leader.
“In the month of March (1849) a sufficient supply of pemmican, and other necessary stores, with the equipments of the boat, were transported over the snow on dog-sledges to a navigable part of the Kendall River, and left there under the charge of two men. As soon as the Dease broke up in June, Mr. Rae would follow, with the boat, the rest of the crew, and a party of Indian hunters, and would descend the Coppermine River about the middle of July, at which time the sea generally begins to break up. He would then, as soon as possible, cross from Cape Krusenstern to Wollaston Land, and endeavor to penetrate to the northward, erecting signal-columns, and making deposits on conspicuous headlands, and especially on the north shore of Banks’ Land, should he be fortunate enough to attain that coast. He was further instructed not to hazard the safety of his party by remaining too long on the north side of Dolphin and Union Strait, and to be guided in his movements by the season, the state of the ice, and such intelligence as he might obtain from the Eskimos. He was also requested to engage one or more families of Indian hunters to pass the summer of 1805 on the banks of the Coppermine River, to be ready to assist any party that may direct their course that way.”
Upernavik
SIR JAMES CLARK ROSS
The 6th of July, 1848, found the Enterprise and Investigator of the third expedition, at the Danish settlement of Upernavik; from this port Sir James Clark Ross wrote a letter to the British Admiralty stating that after passing a second winter near Port Leopold, should no traces of Sir John Franklin’s party be discovered, he would send the Investigator under Captain Bird back to England and proceed with the search alone.
This caused great uneasiness at the Admiralty, and the North Star was at once despatched with a supply of extra stores and instruction to Ross to remain in company with the Investigator and not follow out the design expressed in his letter. The North Star was further instructed that should she fail to reach the ships, stores were to be left at the farthest point she could reach in safety, and then she should return to England. Though explicitly warned against getting beset in the ice, the season of 1849 passed, and the North Star did not return, thus causing great anxiety in England as to her safety.
To return to the Enterprise and Investigator, these two ships, after leaving Upernavik, had found very unfavourable conditions in the ice, which necessitated towing the ships or proceeding slowly under light winds and calms. By the 23d of August, the ships had reached Pond Bay, having sustained severe shocks through ice pressure and other discouraging conditions. They kept close to the shore, firing guns and sending up signals at frequent intervals, but no sign of Eskimos or other human beings were discovered.
Upon reaching Possession Bay, a party was sent on shore to search for traces of the expedition, but nothing was found except a paper left there by Sir Edward Parry on the same day (August 30) in 1819. Again at Cape York another party went ashore, and, though no traces were found, a conspicuous mark was erected for the benefit of any other party that might reach there. The ships then proceeded.