The logicians have attempted to answer the preceding considerations. For that, a transformation of logistic was necessary, and Russell in particular has modified on certain points his original views. Without entering into the details of the debate, I should like to return to the two questions to my mind most important: Have the rules of logistic demonstrated their fruitfulness and infallibility? Is it true they afford means of proving the principle of complete induction without any appeal to intuition?

II

The Infallibility of Logistic

On the question of fertility, it seems M. Couturat has naïve illusions. Logistic, according to him, lends invention 'stilts and wings,' and on the next page: "Ten years ago, Peano published the first edition of his Formulaire." How is that, ten years of wings and not to have flown!

I have the highest esteem for Peano, who has done very pretty things (for instance his 'space-filling curve,' a phrase now discarded); but after all he has not gone further nor higher nor quicker than the majority of wingless mathematicians, and would have done just as well with his legs.

On the contrary I see in logistic only shackles for the inventor. It is no aid to conciseness—far from it, and if twenty-seven equations were necessary to establish that 1 is a number, how many would be needed to prove a real theorem? If we distinguish, with Whitehead, the individual x, the class of which the only member is x and which shall be called ιx, then the class of which the only member is the class of which the only member is x and which shall be called μx, do you think these distinctions, useful as they may be, go far to quicken our pace?

Logistic forces us to say all that is ordinarily left to be understood; it makes us advance step by step; this is perhaps surer but not quicker.

It is not wings you logisticians give us, but leading-strings. And then we have the right to require that these leading-strings prevent our falling. This will be their only excuse. When a bond does not bear much interest, it should at least be an investment for a father of a family.

Should your rules be followed blindly? Yes, else only intuition could enable us to distinguish among them; but then they must be infallible; for only in an infallible authority can one have a blind confidence. This, therefore, is for you a necessity. Infallible you shall be, or not at all.

You have no right to say to us: "It is true we make mistakes, but so do you." For us to blunder is a misfortune, a very great misfortune; for you it is death.