All impeachments are tried in the Senate, and a majority of two-thirds is requisite for a conviction. If the President be on trial, the Chief Justice, or head of the Supreme Court, presides. While power of trial rests with the Senate, the power of impeachment rests solely with the House of Representatives. In addition to the ordinary functions of an Upper House, the Senate has also what is called "an Executive Session," which is held with closed doors; at this Session all treaties and high appointments are discussed, and the appointments are not held to be valid till ratified by them. Whenever fresh land becomes sufficiently populous, the general Government admit it as territory, and appoint an administration. This was the case with Nebraska and Kansas in 1853; and the "Missouri Compromise" (which confined slavery south of the 36º 3' parallel of latitude) having been repealed, it became optional with them to adopt slavery or not. Kansas fought barbarously for the dishonourable privilege, and with temporary success: Nebraska has declined the honour as yet. The interests of territories are watched over at Washington by delegates in the House of Representatives, who have a seat, but no vote. This sensible arrangement might, in my humble opinion, be adopted in this country with reference to our colonies, whose wants at present have no interpreter intimately acquainted with colonial affairs in either branch of the Legislature.
Each State in the Union has its own Governor, House of Representatives, Senate, and Judiciary, and is in every respect a sovereign State—they like the word as much as they pretend to dislike the reality—acting perfectly independently within its limits, except in such cases as were mutually agreed upon by the terms of the Union, and to some of which we shall refer by and by. This sovereignty of individual States renders the elective franchise different in different States.
At the date of the first elections after the Declaration of Independence, no State admitted mere citizenship as a qualification for the elective franchise. The great men who appeared upon the stage at that period, profiting by the experience of past ages, threw certain guards around the franchise in every State in the Union, varying in different States, but all bearing unmistakeable testimony to the fact, that a perfect democracy was not the basis on which they ever contemplated building up the Republic. A few short years have rolled by; the 13 States are increased to 33, and according to Mr. Tremenheere, "a grave departure from the theory of the Constitution, as it existed in the eyes and expectations of its careful and prudent founders, has taken place, in the gradual lowering throughout nearly all the States of the Union, and the entire abandonment in two-thirds of them, of those qualifications for the exercise of the franchise which existed when the Constitution was adopted." In one State—Illinois—aliens being residents are entitled to vote. Now, if the great men of 1776 thought safeguards around the franchise wise and prudent in their day, before the great tide of emigration had set in to the westward, and when the population was only 4,000,000, what would they say, could they but rise from their graves and see how their successors have thrown down the prudent barriers they had raised, and laid the franchise bare to citizenship, now that the Union numbers 23,000,000 souls, and that the tide of emigration is daily flooding them with hordes of the discontented and turbulent from every country in the Old World?
But perhaps it may be said that I, as an Englishman, am prejudiced against republican institutions in any shape; let me, then, quote you an authority which every educated American will respect. Mr. Justice Kent says, "The progress and impulse of popular opinion, is rapidly destroying every constitutional check, every conservative element, intended by the sages who framed the earliest American Constitutions as safeguards against the abuses of popular suffrage." Let us turn to another equally eminent American authority, Mr. Justice Story. "It might be urged, that it is far from being clear, upon reasoning or experience, that uniformity in the composition of a representative body is either desirable or expedient, founded in sounder policy, or more promotive of the general good, than a mixed system, embracing, representing, and combining distinct interests, classes, and opinions. In England, the House of Commons, as a representative body, is founded upon no uniform principle, either of numbers, or classes, or places; ... and in every system of reform which has found public favour in that country, many of these diversities have been embodied from choice, as important checks upon undue legislation, as facilitating the representation of different interests and different opinions, and as thus securing, by a well-balanced and intelligent representation of all the various classes of society, a permanent protection of the public liberties of the people, and a firm security of the private rights of persons and property."
Thus far I have quoted the opinions of the highest American authorities upon the franchise. And, as far as the lowering it in England affords us any light, I would wish some unbiased and competent person to inform the public, whether—whatever other benefit it may have procured to the community—it has increased or decreased bribery and corruption; and how the balance between advantage and disadvantage will stand, in reference to the community at large, by a further lowering of the franchise in this country; and also to what extent—if any—it can be lowered, without throwing all but unlimited power into the hands of the masses, and thus destroying that balance of the different interests of the community which are—thank God—still represented, and which, if once lost, would reduce our beloved Sovereign to the position of a gaudy puppet, and the House of Lords to a mere cypher, and be as certainly followed by all the horrors of a revolution, and all the evils of a corrupt democracy. How easy is it to find politicians ever ready to sniff the incense of popularity at the plausible shrine of a descending franchise!--how difficult to find those who, while granting what is just and prudent, have the wisdom to plan, and the courage to dare, measures to arrest a mobular avalanche!
With regard to the frequency of elections, I will only insert the following sentence from Mr. Justice Story, as, I believe, public opinion in this country is all but universal in its condemnation: "Men, to act with vigour and effect, ... must not be hurried on to their conclusions by the passions of elections has a tendency to create agitation and dissensions in the public mind, to nourish factions and encourage restlessness, to favour rash innovations in domestic legislation and public policy, and to produce violent and sudden changes in the administration of public affairs, founded upon temporary excitements and prejudices: ... it operates also as a great discouragement upon suitable candidates offering themselves for the public service ... the period of service ought, therefore, to bear some proportion to the variety of knowledge and practical skill which the duties of the station demand."—If any annual-parliament maniac still exist, let him profit by these words of wisdom from the pen of a republican, dipped in the ink of Prudence and Patriotism; and in the marked difference between the House of Representatives and the Senate Chamber—the former of whom are elected for two, the latter for six years—let him behold the most incontrovertible living proof's of their truth. John Jay, one of the most able men of America, writing to Washington, expresses his wish that the Upper House, or Senate, should be elected for life.
I will now turn to a topic which probably interests the British public more than any other—except the franchise—I mean the Ballot. So much has been said about the coercion of voters by those on whom they are dependent, and so much disgraceful jobbery at elections in this country has been laid bare, that if the Ballot were really a panacea for the evil, every patriot should exert his utmost energies to forward the introduction of so essential a measure. In reading any American document where the word "ballot" is used, it must be remembered that, unless the word "secret" precede it, the meaning is merely voting by an open piece of paper on which the name of the candidate is printed, and which he may enclose in an envelope or not, as he chooses. It is, therefore, only with the secret ballot we have to deal at present; for although the power to vote secretly exists, it is obvious, that unless secret voting is made compulsory, it affords no protection to those who are in a position to be bribed or coerced, inasmuch as those who did bribe or coerce would insist upon the vote so obtained being given openly.
It will perhaps astonish an Englishman to be told that "secret" ballot is all but unknown in the United States. Nevertheless, such is the case. An act was passed some four years ago in Massachusetts requiring secrecy; and what was the effect of this act? A large body of the electors met together to denounce with indignation any attempt at enforcing that which they repudiated as unworthy of freemen. So strong was this feeling that in 1853, the act which enforced it was repealed, and in the convention called to discuss the revision of their Constitution—according to Mr. Tremenheere—although the democratic party were in a great majority, the effort to impose secrecy was thrown out by a majority of 5000[[CB]].
A friend of mine, who took considerable interest in this question, was present at the elections for the State of Massachusetts, and when, at the same time, a popular vote was to be taken on the proposed revision of the Constitution; this latter was by special enactment made compulsorily secret. How far this object was attained, the following statement will show. As the voters came up to the polling-place, tickets were offered them by the agents of the opposite parties, in a large room full of people. The voters selected whichever ticket they preferred, in the presence of the whole room, and then, in compliance with the terms of the enactment, they sealed it up in an envelope before depositing it in the voting-box. So much for compulsory secrecy. Of course on this occasion, as on all electioneering occasions, the voters might have concealed their votes, had they chosen so to do.
The only States, that I am aware of, where secrecy is enjoined by law are New York and Indiana; and in the former of these I can most certainly testify, from personal observation, that in many instances, if not in most, it is a dead letter. I never met a soul who, in talking about politics, ever thought of concealing his sentiments. I am therefore forced to the conclusion that secrecy only exists among the very lowest; and here it may be as well to introduce the opinions of the Governor of this important State. Mr. Washington Hunt, in his Message of January 7, 1851, says, "The alarming increase of bribery in our popular elections demands your serious attention. The preservation of our liberties depends on the purity of the elective franchise, and its independent exercise by the citizen, and I trust you will adopt such measures as shall effectually protect the ballot-box from all corrupting influences."