If any efforts were made to stay the tide of corruption, the message of the same Governor the following year will enable you to judge of their success. In his address on the 6th of January, 1852, this paragraph occurs: "The increase of corrupt practices in our elections has become a subject of general and just complaint: it is represented that in some localities the suffrages of considerable numbers of voters have been openly purchased with money. We owe it to ourselves and to posterity, and to the free institutions which we have inherited, to crush this hateful evil in its infancy, before it attains sufficient growth to endanger our political system. The honest and independent exercise of the right of suffrage is a vital principle in the theory of representative government. It is the only enduring foundation for a republic. Not only should the law punish every violation of this principle as a crime against the integrity of the State, but any person concerned in giving or receiving any pecuniary consideration for a vote should, upon challenge, be deprived of the privilege of voting. I submit the subject to your consideration, in the hope that additional remedies may be prescribed and enforced."—The two foregoing extracts do equal credit to the head and heart of Governor Hunt; but what a picture do they portray of the effects of secret voting!
Let us now turn from Governor Hunt, and see what the Press says on the subject. The New York Herald, which if not highly esteemed is at least widely circulated, thus writes in the month of May, 1852:—"Look at the proceedings on Thursday last in the 19th Ward. Voters carried to the ballot-boxes in scores of waggons from, various localities; and, in other wards, hundreds of democrats voting for Scott and for Fillmore, men ignorant and steeped in crime, picked up in all the purlieus of the city and purchased at a dollar a head; and some, it is said, so low as half a dollar, to deposit in the ballot-box a vote they had never seen."—The article then goes on to explain the methods employed at elections—viz., a lazy fellow who wont work, brawls, and drinks, and spouts, and defames every honest man in the ward, till he becomes a semi-deity among the riff-raff, then "his position is found out by those who want to use him. He is for sale to the highest bidder, either to defeat his own party by treachery, or to procure a nomination for any scoundrel who will pay for it. He has no politics of any kind. He has rascality to sell, and there are those who are willing to purchase it, in order that they may traffic in it, and sell it to themselves again at a very high profit.... We have heard of a case in one of the Lower Wards of the city, in which one man got, at the time of the late democratic conventions, the enormous sum of two thousand dollars, out of which it is said he bribed the majority of the electors and kept the balance for himself."
A few paragraphs further on he suggests remedies for the evil;—and what do you suppose they are? First, that honest people should not leave politics to the riff-raff. Secondly, "there ought to be a registration established, by which no man could sail under false colours, or deposit a vote at a primary election, unless he belonged to the ward, and belonged to the party to which he professed to belong." Conceive the state to which secret voting has reduced the wealthy and intelligent city of New York; absolutely, a return to open voting is considered insufficient to reach the vitals of the evil which secrecy has brought about. Here we have proposed as a remedy the compulsory register of political sentiments; and to prove that things are not mending, in the "Retrospect of the year 1852," which forms a leading article in the same journal at the commencement of 1853, after a lengthy panegyric upon the state of America, &c., during 1852, he winds up with these most serious drawbacks to the previous eulogy: "if we are bound to admit with crimson blush that crime is sadly on the increase, and that our municipal institutions have reached the lowest depths of inefficiency and infamy, these but remind us that the work which 1852 has bravely carried on is not yet achieved."—I would wish carefully to guard against being understood to endorse the violent language employed by the New York Herald. I am aware how unsafe a guide the Press ever is in times of political excitement; but after making every reasonable allowance, enough remains to prove the tendency of the secret ballot, corroborated as it is by the authoritative message of the Governor of the State.
Let us now turn for a moment to that most witty and amusing writer, Sydney Smith. In speaking of Mr. Grote's proposal for the ballot, the author says, "He tells us that the bold cannot be free, and bids us seek for liberty by clothing ourselves in the mask of falsehood, and trampling on the cross of truth;"—and further on, towards the end of the pamphlet, he quotes an authority that Americans must respect—"Old John Randolph, the American orator, was asked one day, at a dinner-party in London, whether the ballot prevailed in his State of Virginia? 'I scarcely believe,' he said, 'we have such a fool in all Virginia as to mention even the vote by ballot; and I do not hesitate to say that the adoption of the ballot would make any nation a set of scoundrels if it did not find them so.'"—John Randolph was right; he felt that it was not necessary that a people should be false in order to be free. Universal hypocrisy would be the consequence of ballot. We should soon say, on deliberation, what David only asserted in his haste, that "all men are liars."[[CC]]—How strangely prophetic the opinion of John Randolph appears, when read by the light of the New York Herald of 1852.
It has always appeared to me that the argument in favour of ballot which is drawn from its use in clubs, if it prove anything at all, is rather against than for it; its value there arises from the fact of the independence of the members, which enables any member if asked by the rejected candidate how he had voted, to decline giving any answer without fear of consequences. Were he dependent, he must either deny the black-ball he gave, had he so voted, or, confessing the fact, he must suffer for it, and silence would be sure to be construed into a black-ball: therefore, before ballot could be of any value to a constituency, they must be independent; and if independent, there would be no need of the ballot. Of course secrecy could be obtained by falsehood. Moreover, the object of it in a club is to keep out of a select society not only those who are considered absolutely offensive, but many with whom, though you might like to meet them in general society, you do not think it desirable to be on more intimate terms; and even in a club, who will deny that it is often used to gratify private malice, and frequently, when candidates are numerous, are black-balls put in to hasten forward the election of friends? While freely confessing and deeply regretting the disgraceful jobbery and bribery which an inquiry into our own elections too often reveals, we ought to be thankful for the light of experience which a contemplation of the elective system of the United States affords, warning us as it does that an imprudent lowering of the franchise and a recourse to the secret ballot do but aggravate the evils they were intended to cure. Before we proceed to lower our franchise, should we not do wisely to try and devise some means for obtaining the votes of those already entitled to vote? Many an honest and industrious artisan at present entitled to a vote will not come to the poll on account of the violence which—if not of the mobular party—he may be subject to; his family depend on his exertions for their daily bread—a broken limb, or any such accident happening to him, may bring the whole family to deep distress, if not to the workhouse. It appears by the Edinburgh Review of October, 1852, that at a previous general election, 40 per cent, of those possessing the privilege did not poll their votes. A hasty lowering of the franchise would certainly increase that number, and thus while losing more votes of the peaceful and industrious citizens, we should be increasing those of the more turbulent, and of those who are excited by designing demagogues.
But to return to the United States. In the former edition I omitted to explain that "a Congress" meant a Parliament for two years—the term for which the representatives are elected. One of the sessions is from the first Monday in December to about the end of August, and is called the long session; the other commences the same day, and sits till the 4th March, and is called the short session; but, besides these regular sittings, there may be extra sessions as often as the President thinks fit to assemble Congress. At the time I was in the States, by a fiction very agreeable to the members, if Congress closed the session on Monday, and the President ordered its reassembling on Tuesday, the members were supposed to be at their respective homes, and received mileage payment accordingly. This snug little bonus was called "constructive mileage."
In the year 1856 an act was passed fixing the payment of members at 1260l. each for their services in each Congress of two years, and abolishing the constructive mileage job. The only deduction from the above is that made for non-attendance of members. The payment is thus arranged:—Each member receives 1l. 13s. 6d. for every day he attends in Congress; the whole number of days a session lasts are calculated at the above rate, and the difference between that amount and 630l. (the half of 1260l.) is a bonus given, at the end of the first year's session, and is in lieu of all further payments for any extra sessions which the President may think it advisable to call during the year. It will thus be seen that each member receives the same sum, minus 1l. 13s. 6d. for every day's non-attendance.
Mileage is allowed at the rate of 1l. 13s. 6d.. for every twenty miles distance to and fro, but only for one session each; year. The advantage Texas and Californian members obtain from this liberal allowance is obvious, and its injustice is felt by those who live in the neighbouring States to Washington.
Now, as travelling, in most parts of the Union, is at the rate of less than 2d. a mile, and living at the rate of two and a half dollars (10s. 6d.) a day, it is obvious that the situation of a representative is advantageous in a pecuniary point of view to those who wish to make a trade of politics. A member coming from a distance, say of 200 miles, and attending 120 days, would have a clear balance of about 150l. left for the rest of the year; and a member from Texas would clear about 500l. How far such a measure is wise, and brings the most desirable men into the public service, let their own countrymen tell. Mr. Venables, of North Carolina, in a speech at Richmond, Virginia (quoted by Mr. Tremenheere) says, "With money enough, any bill can be carried through Congress." No nation—and, least of all, so very sensitive a nation as the United States—would pass an act which could possibly throw a cloud of doubt over the integrity of its representatives were there not some imperative necessity; the act referred to below will be found in page 363 of Appendix to Tremenheere's Constitution of the United States, one clause of which runs thus:—"That any senator or representative in Congress who, after the passage of this act ... shall receive any gratuity, or any share of, or interest in, any claim from any claimant against the United States, &c., on conviction shall pay a fine not exceeding 5000 dollars (1000l.), suffer imprisonment in the Penitentiary, not exceeding one year, or both, as the court in its discretion shall adjudge." Another clause follows, against the knowing and wilful destruction of public documents; another, against any individual who shall tempt any member of the Senate or House of Representatives with bribe of any kind to influence his vote, and against members accepting the same. This act bears date Feb. 26, 1853, and certainly proves that Mr. Venables' assertion had some solid foundation in truth.
It will be remembered by some that Collins, finding the Cunard line of steamers, when supported by Government, too strong for him to contend against, applied to Congress for a Government grant. In obtaining that grant, I do not pretend to say that he, or any one on his behalf, used bribery or corruption, when he took round one of his magnificent vessels to Washington, and feasted Congress on board in a most champagnely style; but this I know, that many Americans were most indignant at the proceeding, for, coupled with the act above referred to, it could not but excite suspicion; and I feel sure, if Cunard had brought round one of his splendid steamers to the Thames, and there feasted the Legislature while his obtaining a Government grant was under discussion, he could not have taken a more effectual method to mar his object. La femme de César ne doit pas être suspecte. Thus, then, as far as we can judge of any advantage to be derived from payment of members, we can see nothing to induce us to adopt such a system; and, if I mistake not, the American himself feels disposed to give it up, believing that the standard of the representative will be raised thereby.