“It may not be amiss for the troops to know, that if any man in action shall presume to skulk, hide himself, or retreat from the enemy without the orders of his commanding officer, he will be instantly shot down as an example of cowardice; cowards having too frequently disconcerted the best troops by their dastardly behavior.”
Amid all this stern preparation for the battlefield and its incidents, the most careful attention was given to the comfort and personal well-being of the privates in the ranks. While obedience was required of all, of whatever grade or rank, the cursing or other abuse of the soldier was considered an outrage upon his rights as a citizen, and these met his most scorching denunciation and punishment.
A Soldier was in command of the Continental Army of America.
CHAPTER VI.
BRITISH CANADA ENTERS THE FIELD OF ACTION.
The Continental Army about Boston was largely composed of New England troops. This was inevitable until the action of Congress could be realized by reënforcements from other Colonies. The experience of nearly all veteran soldiers in the Cambridge camps had been gained by service in Canada or upon its borders. British garrisons at Halifax, Quebec, and Montreal, as well as at Ticonderoga, Crown Point, and St. John’s, offered an opportunity for British aggression from the north. The seizure of the nearer posts, last named, temporarily checked such aggressions, but seemed to require adequate garrisons, and a watchful armed outlook across the border.
There had been very early urged upon the Massachusetts Committee of Safety more extensive operations into Canada, especially as the “Canadian Acts of Parliament” had become nearly as offensive to Canadians as other Acts which had alienated the American Colonies from respect for the common “Mother Country.” The Canadian Acts, however, had not been pressed to armed resistance; and differences of race, language, and religious forms were not conducive to those neighborly relations which would admit of combined action, even in emergencies common to both sections. But the initiative of a general movement into Canada had been taken, and Congress precipitated the first advance, before Washington became Commander-in-Chief. In order to appreciate the action of Washington when he became more directly responsible for the success of these detachments from his army, for service in Canada, they must be noticed.
The adventurous spirit of Arnold prompted the suggestion that the conquest of Canada would bring disaster to Great Britain and fend off attacks upon the other Colonies. He once traded with its people, was familiar with Quebec, and after his adventure at Crown Point, in June, had written from that place to the Continental Congress that Gen. Sir Guy Carleton’s force in Canada was less than six hundred men, promising to guarantee the conquest of Canada if he were granted the command of two thousand men for that purpose. On the second day of June, Ethan Allen, who had anticipated Arnold in the capture of Ticonderoga, had made a similar proposition to the Provincial Congress of New York. Both Allen and Seth Warner had visited Congress, and requested authority to raise new regiments. Authority was not given, but a recommendation was forwarded to the New York Provincial Congress, that the “Green Mountain Boys” should be recognized as regular forces, and be granted the privilege of electing their own officers.
It is of interest in this connection to notice the fact that when Arnold, in his first dash up Lake Champlain, found that Warner had anticipated his projected capture of Crown Point, as Allen had that of Ticonderoga, he was greatly offended, usurped command of that post and of a few vessels which he styled his “Navy,” and upon finding that his assumption of authority was neither sanctioned by Massachusetts nor Connecticut, discharged his force and returned to Cambridge in anger. This same navy, however, chiefly constructed under his skilful and energetic direction, won several brilliant successes and certainly postponed movements from Canada southward, for many months.
Eventually a formal expedition was authorized against Montreal, and Generals Schuyler and Montgomery were assigned to its command. This force, consisting of three thousand men, was ordered to rendezvous during the month of August at Ticonderoga, where Allen and Warner also joined it.
During the same month a committee from Congress visited Washington at Cambridge, and persuaded him to send a second army to Canada, via the Kennebec river, to capture Quebec. Existing conditions seemed to warrant these demonstrations which, under other circumstances, might have proved fatal to success at Boston. The theory upon which Washington concurred in the action of Congress is worthy of notice, in estimating his character as a soldier. He understood that the suddenness of the resistance at Lexington, and the comparatively “drawn game” between the patriots and British regulars at Breed’s Hill, would involve on the part of the British government much time and great outlay of money, in order to send to America an adequate force for aggressive action upon any extended scale; and that the control of New York and the southern coast cities must be of vastly more importance than to harass the scattered settlements adjoining Canada. Inasmuch, however, as New York and New England seemed to stake the safety of their northern frontier upon operations northward, while Quebec and Montreal were almost destitute of regular troops, and the season of the year would prevent British reënforcements by sea, it might prove to be the best opportunity to test the sentiment of the Canadian people themselves as to their readiness to make common cause against the Crown. If reported professions could be realized, the north would be permanently protected.