Washington the Soldier

by Henry B. Carrington

Taking into account that General Carleton would never anticipate an advance upon Quebec, but concentrate his small force at Montreal, with view to the ultimate recapture of St. John’s, Crown Point, and Ticonderoga, and estimating, from advices received, that Carleton’s forces numbered not to exceed eight hundred regulars and as many Provincials, he regarded the detail of three thousand men as sufficient for the capture of Montreal. This estimate was a correct one. Its occupation was also deemed practicable and wise, because it was so near the mouth of Sorel River and Lake Champlain as to be readily supported, so long as the British army was not substantially reënforced along the Atlantic coast.

There was one additional consideration that practically decided the action of Washington. The mere capture of Montreal, on the north bank of the St. Lawrence river, and so easily approached by water from Quebec, would be of no permanent value so long as Quebec retained its place as the almost impregnable rendezvous of British troops and fleets. This view of the recommendation of Congress was deemed conclusive; provided, that the movement against Quebec could be immediate, sudden, by surprise, and involve no siege. Under the assumption that Congress had been rightly advised of the British forces in Canada, and of the sentiments of the Canadians themselves, the expedition had promise of success.

There was a variance of religious form and religious faith which did not attract all the New England soldiers in behalf of Canadian independence. This was sufficiently observed by Washington’s keen insight into human nature to call forth the following order, which placed the Canadian expeditions upon a very lofty basis. The extract is as follows: “As the Commander-in-Chief has been apprised of a design formed for the observance of that ridiculous and childish custom of burning the effigy of the Pope, he cannot help expressing his surprise that there should be officers and soldiers in this army so void of common-sense as not to see the impropriety of such a step at this juncture, at a time when we are soliciting, and have really obtained the friendship and alliance of Canada, whom we ought to consider as brethren embarked in the same cause—the defence of the general liberty of America.... At such a juncture, and in such circumstances, to be insulting their religion is so monstrous as not to be suffered or excused; indeed, instead of offering the most remote insult, it is our duty to address public thanks to those our brethren, as to them we are so much indebted for every late happy success over the common enemy in Canada.”

Washington, however, hinged his chief objection to these distant enterprises, which he habitually opposed throughout the war, upon the pressing demand for the immediate capture of Boston, and an immediate transfer of the Headquarters of the Army to New York, where, and where only, the Colonies could be brought into close relation for the organization and distribution of an army adequate to carry on war, generally, wherever along the Atlantic coast the British might land troops.

As early as June, Congress had disclaimed any purpose to operate against Canada, and Bancroft says that the invasion was not determined upon until the Proclamation of Martial Law by the British Governor, his denunciation of the American borderers, and the incitement of savages to raids against New York and New England had made the invasion an act of self-defence. But there had been no such combination of hostile acts when these expeditions were planned, and Mr. Bancroft must have associated those events with the employment of Indian allies during the subsequent Burgoyne campaign of 1777.

The details of the two contemporary expeditions to Canada are only sufficiently outlined to develop the relations of the Commander-in-Chief to their prosecution, and to introduce to the reader certain officers who subsequently came more directly under Washington’s personal command. The substantial failure of each, except that it developed some of the best officers of the war, is accepted as history. But it is no less true that when Great Britain made Canada the base of Burgoyne’s invasion, his feeble support by the Canadians themselves proved a material factor in his ultimate disaster. He was practically starved to surrender for want of adequate support in men and provisions, from his only natural base of supply.

It is sufficient, at present, to notice the departure of the two expeditions, that of Schuyler and Montgomery, assembling at Ticonderoga, August 20, and that of Arnold, consisting of eleven hundred men, without artillery, which left Cambridge on the seventeenth day of September and landed at Gardiner, Me., on the twentieth. Several companies of riflemen from Pennsylvania and Virginia which had reported for duty were assigned to Arnold’s command. Among the officers were Daniel Morgan and Christopher Greene. Aaron Burr, then but nineteen years of age, accompanied this expedition.

As the summer of 1775 drew near its close, and the temporary excitement of Arnold’s departure restored the routine of camp life and the passive watching of a beleaguered city, the large number of “Six Months” men, whose term of enlistment was soon to expire, became listless and indifferent to duty. Washington, without official rebuke of this growing negligence, forestalled its further development by redoubling his efforts to place the works about Boston in a complete condition of defence. None were exempt from the scope of his orders. Ploughed Hill and Cobble Hill were fortified, and the works at Lechmere Point were strengthened. (See map, “Boston and Vicinity.”) Demonstrations were made daily in order to entice the garrison to sorties upon the investing lines. But the British troops made no hostile demonstrations, and in a very short time the American redoubts were sufficiently established to resist the attack of the entire British army.

A Council of War was summoned to meet at Washington’s headquarters to consider his proposition that an assault be made upon the city, and that it be burned, if that seemed to be a military necessity. Lee opposed the movement, as impossible of execution, in view of the character of the British troops whom the militia would be compelled to meet in close battle. The Council of War concurred in his motion to postpone the proposition of the Commander-in-Chief. Lee’s want of confidence in the American troops, then for the first time officially stated, had its temporary influence; but, ever after, through his entire career until its ignominious close, he opposed every opportunity for battle, on the same pretence. The only exception was his encouragement to the resistance of Moultrie at Charleston, against the British fleet, during June, 1776, although he was not a participant in that battle.

Meanwhile, the citizens of the sea-coast towns of New England began to be anxious as to their own safety. A British armed transport cannonaded Stonington, and other vessels threatened New London and Norwich. All of these towns implored Washington to send them troops. Governor Jonathan Trumbull, of Connecticut (the original “Brother Jonathan”), whose extraordinary comprehension of the military as well as the civil issues of the times made him then, and ever, a reliable and constant friend of Washington, consulted the Commander-in-Chief as to these depredations, and acquiesced in his judgment as final.