While the Italians were thus engaged, what was the state of opinion in their own country? Would Bissolati's organ, the Secolo, and the Corriere della Sera, which had been favourable to the Slavs since Caporetto, have it in their power to moderate the fury of the anti-Slav papers? Malagodi of the Tribuna said on November 24 that the position at Rieka had been remedied. But was the public fully alive to what was happening at Zadar and Šibenik? "While these cities have been nominally occupied by us and are under the protection of our flag, the Italian population has never been so terrorized by Croat brutality as at this moment." The Mattino disclosed to its readers in flaring headlines that "Yugoslav oppression cuts the throats of the Italian population in Dalmatia and terrorizes them." Would the people of Italy rather listen to such thrills or to the Secolo, which deprecated the contemptuous writings of Italian journalists with regard to the Slavs—the Gazzetta del Popolo's "little snakes" was one of the milder terms of opprobrium. The Secolo recalled Italy's own illiterate herds and the fact that the Italian Risorgimento was judged, not by the indifferent and servile mass, but by its heroes. It explained that the Treaty of London was inspired by the belief that Austria would survive, and that for strategic reasons only it had given, not Rieka, but most of Dalmatia and the islands to Italy.
It was calamitous for Italy that she was being governed at this moment not by prudent statesmen such as she more frequently produces in the north, but by southerners of the Orlando and Sonnino type. The Giornale d'Italia would at a word from the Foreign Minister have damped the ardour of those journalists and other agitators who were fanning such a dangerous fire. Sonnino once himself told Radović, the Montenegrin, that he could not acquiesce in any union of the Yugoslavs, for such a combination would be fraught with peril for Italians. And now that Southern Slavs were forming what he dreaded, their United States, it would have been sagacious—it was not too late—if he had set himself to win their friendship. Incidents of an untoward nature had occurred, such as those connected with the Austrian fleet; nine hundred Yugoslavs, after fighting side by side with the Italians, had actually been interned, many of them wearing Italian medals for bravery;[20] the Yugoslavs, in fact, by these and other monstrous methods had been provoked. But it was not too late. A Foreign Minister not blind to what was happening in foreign countries would have seen that if he valued the goodwill of France and England and America—and this goodwill was a necessity for the Italians—it was incumbent on him to modify his politics. The British Press was not unanimous—all the prominent publicists did not, like a gentleman a few months afterwards in the Spectator, say that "if the Yugoslavs contemplated a possible war against the Italians, by whose efforts and those of France and Great Britain they had so recently been liberated, then would the Southern Slavs be guilty of monstrous folly and ingratitude." Baron Sonnino might have apprehended that more knowledge of the Yugoslav-Italian situation would produce among the Allies more hostility; he should have known that average Frenchmen do not buy their favourite newspaper for what it says on foreign politics, and that the Journal des Débats and the Humanité have many followers who rarely read them. And, above all else, he should have seen that the Americans, who had not signed the Treaty of London, would decline to lend themselves to the enforcement of an antiquated pact which was so grievously incongruous with Justice, to say nothing of the Fourteen Points of Mr. Wilson. But Sonnino threw all these considerations to the winds. He should have reconciled himself to the fact that his London Treaty, if for no other reason than that it was a secret one, belonged to a different age and was really dead; his refusal to bury it was making him unpopular with the neighbours. One does not expect a politician to be quite consistent, and Baron Sonnino is, after all, not the same man who in 1881 declared that to claim Triest as a right would be an exaggeration of the principle of nationalities; but he should not in 1918 have been deaf to the words which he considered of such weight when he wrote them in 1915 that he caused them to be printed in a Green Book. "The monarchy of Savoy," he said in a telegram to the Duke of Avarna on February 15 of that year, "has its staunchest root in the fact that it personifies the national ideals." Baron Sonnino was rallying to the House of Karageorgević most of those among the Croats and Slovenes who, for some reason or other, had been hesitating; for King Peter personified the national ideals which the Baron was endeavouring to throttle. As Mr. Wickham Steed pointed out in a letter to the Corriere della Sera, the complete accord between Italians and Yugoslavs is not only possible and necessary, but constitutes a European interest of the first order; if it be not realized, the Adriatic would become not Italian nor Slav, but German; if, on the other hand, it were brought about, then the language and the culture, the commerce and the political influence of Italy would not merely be maintained but would spread along the eastern Adriatic coast and in the Balkans in a manner hitherto unhoped for; if no accord be reached, then the Italians would see their whole influence vanish from every place not occupied by overwhelming forces. But Sonnino, a descendant of rancorous Levantines and obstinate Scots, went recklessly ahead; it made you think that he was one of those unhappy people whom the gods have settled to destroy. He neglected the most elementary precautions; he ought to have requested, for example, that the French and British and Americans would everywhere be represented where Yugoslav territory was occupied. But, alas, he did not show that he disagreed with the Tribuna's lack of wisdom when it said that "the Italian people could never tolerate that beside our flag should fly other flags, even if friendly, for this would imply a confession of weakness and incapacity."
THE STATE OF THE CHAMBER
The Government was in no very strong position, for the Chamber was now moribund and the many groups which had been formed, in the effort to create a war Chamber out of one that was elected in the days of peace, were now dissolving. An incident towards the end of November exhibited not only the contrivances by which these groups hoped to preserve themselves, but the eagerness with which the Government rushed to placate the powerful. A young deputy called Centurione, a member of the National Defence group (the Fascio), made a furious attack on Giolitti, under cover of a personal explanation. He had been accused of being a police spy. Well, after Caporetto, convinced that the defeat was partly due to the work of Socialists and Giolittians, he had disguised himself as a workman and taken part in Socialist meetings. He was proud to have played the spy for the good of his country, and he finished by accusing Giolitti and six others of treason. The whole Chamber—his own party not being strongly represented—seems to have made for Centurione who, amidst an indescribable uproar, continued to shout "Traitor!" to anyone who approached him. Sciorati, one of the accused, was at last able to make himself heard. He related how, at Turin, Centurione had made a fool of himself. (But if Lewis Carroll had been with us still he might have made himself immortal.) "I have seen him disguised," said Sciorati, "as an out-porter at the door of my own house." Giolitti appeared and demanded an immediate inquiry, with what was described as cold and menacing emphasis. And Orlando, the Prime Minister, flew up to the Chamber and parleyed with Giolitti in the most cordial fashion. Centurione's documents were at once investigated and no proofs of treason were found, no witnesses proposed by him being examined. He was expelled from the National Defence group for "indiscipline," his colleagues frustrating his attempts to sit next to them by repeatedly changing their seats. The attitude of the Fascio was humble and apologetic, and the other significant feature of the incident was the haste with which Orlando reacted to Giolitti's demand for an inquiry.
THE STATE OF THE COUNTRY
Baron Sonnino had to take into account not only the unsteadiness of the ground on which the Government stood, owing to these parliamentary regroupings, but the general effects that would ensue from the country's financial position. When, in spite of the victory and the approach of peace, the exchange price of the lira dropped 2 to 3 points towards the end of November, this may have had, contrary to what was thought by many, no connection with a revolutionary movement. The fact that in Triest the authorities had been obliged to isolate Italian ex-prisoners on their return from Russia, since they were imbued with revolutionary principles, at any rate were uttering loud revolutionary cries, may have been the mere temporary infection caught from their environment. But that of which there was no doubt was the entire truth of Caroti's statement when that deputy declared at Milan that while Italy had been triumphant in the military sphere, she had been economically overthrown. Bankruptcy had not been announced, though it existed. Sonnino may therefore have been impelled not only by imperialism, by his inability to adjust himself to the new international situation, but by the hope that through his policy the new internal situation might be tided over. If the thoughts of his fellow-countrymen could be directed elsewhere than to bankruptcy and possible revolution, it might be that in the meantime adroit measures and good luck would brush away these disagreeable phenomena. And he would then be rightly looked upon as one who had deserved well of his country. So he set about the task with such a thoroughness that he turned not alone the thoughts of men, but their heads. Professor Italo Giglioli addressed a letter to The New Europe in which he said that he was claiming now not the territories given by the Treaty of London, but considerably more. He wanted all Dalmatia, down to Kotor. In foreign hands, he said, Dalmatia would be an eternal danger, and besides: "What in Dalmatia is not Italian is barbaric!" It was a melancholy spectacle to see a man of Giglioli's reputation saying that Dubrovnik, the refuge of Slav culture in the age of darkness and the place in which Slav literature so gloriously arose, was, forsooth, throughout its history always Italian in culture and in literature. "Among thinking people in Italy," proclaims the Professor, "there are indeed but few who will abandon to the Balkan processes a region and a people which have always been possessed by Italian culture and which constitute the necessary wall of Italy and Western Europe against the inroads of the half-barbaric East." He protests that it is ridiculous of The New Europe to assert that the secret Treaty of London is supported by a tiny, discredited band of Italians; and indeed that Review has regretfully to acknowledge that many of his countrymen have been swept off their feet and carried onward in the gale of popular enthusiasm. Giglioli ends by asking that his name be removed from the list of The New Europe's collaborators. In vain does the The New Europe say that the Professor's programme must involve a war between Italians and Yugoslavs. "We must be prepared for a new war," said the Secolo on January 12. "The Italians who absolutely demand the conquest of Dalmatia must have the courage to demand that the demobilization of our Army should be suspended, and to say so very clearly." And the Corriere della Sera warned Orlando of the consequences if he took no steps to silence the mad voices. "No one knows better," it wrote, "than the Minister of the Interior, who is also Premier, that on the other coast Italy claims that part of Dalmatia which was assigned to her by the Treaty of London, but not more.... If the Government definitely claims and demands the whole of Dalmatia, then the agitation is justified; but if the Government does not demand it, then we repeat that to favour and not to curb the movement is the worst kind of Defeatism, for it creates among Italians a state of mind tending to transform the sense of a great victory into the sense of a great defeat ... quite apart from the intransigeance which this provokes in the Yugoslav camp." It was in vain. And when Bissolati, having resigned from office on the issue of Italo-Yugoslav relations, attempted to explain his attitude at the Scala in Milan on January 11, his meeting was wrecked, for though the body of the hall and the galleries were relatively quiet, if not very sympathetic—it was a ticket meeting—the large number of subscription boxes, which could not be closed to their ordinary tenants, had been packed by Bissolati's adversaries, who succeeded in preventing him from speaking. After a long delay he managed to read the opening passage, but when he came to the first "renunciation"—the Brenner for the Teutons—disturbance set in finally and he left the theatre. Afterwards the rioters adjourned to the Corriere and Secolo offices, where they broke the windows. And thus the first full statement of the war aims of any Italian statesman could not be uttered. It was spread abroad by the Press. Bissolati claimed to speak in the name of a multitude which had hitherto been silent.... The masses, he said, demanded, that their rulers should devote all their strength to "the divine blessing of freeing mankind from the slavery of war." ... "To those," he said, "who speak of the Society of Nations as an 'ideology' or 'Utopia' which has no hold over our people, we would reply: Have you been in the trenches among the soldiers waiting for the attack?" [Signor Bissolati had the unique record, among Allied or enemy statesmen, of having volunteered for active service, though past the fighting age, and of having served in the trenches for many months before entering the Orlando Cabinet.]
A FOUNTAIN IN THE SAND
The speech was an admirable expression of that new spirit which the Allies had been fighting for. "Each of the anti-German nations," he said, "must guard itself against any unconsciously German element in its soul, if only in order to have the right to combat any trace in others of the imperialism which had poisoned the outlook of the German people." With regard to the Adriatic: "Yugoslavia exists, and no one can undo this. But to the credit of Italy be it said, the attainment of unity and independence for the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was and must be alike the reason and the certain issue of our War.... Italy felt that if Serbia had been swallowed up by that monstrous Empire—itself a vassal of the German Empire—her own economic expansion and political independence would have received a mortal blow. And so she was on Serbia's side, first in neutrality, then in intervention.... Those who only see, in the formation of the Yugoslav State, a sympathetic or antipathetic episode of the War, or a subsidiary effect of it, have failed to detect its inner meaning." As for the Treaty of London which was concluded against the enemy, it was not to be regarded as intangible against a friendly people. By special grants of autonomy, as at Zadar, or by arrangements between the two States, he would see the language and culture of all the trans-Adriatic sons of Italy assured. He warned his countrymen lest, in order to meet the peril of a German-Slav alliance against them, they should have to subordinate themselves to France and England, and be their protégés instead of their real Allies—a situation not unlike that of the Triple Alliance when Germany protected them against the ever-imminent attack of Austria.... "But perhaps the Yugoslavs will not be grateful or show an equal spirit of conciliation? Certainly they will then have no vital interests to push against Italy, and in the long run sentiments follow interests." There was, in fact, throughout the speech only one questionable passage, that in which he said that "if Italy renounced the annexation of Dalmatia she might obtain from Yugoslavia or from the Peace Conference the joy of pressing to her heart the most Italian city of Rieka, which the Treaty of London renounced." This may have been a sop to Cerberus. But Bissolati's appeals to justice and to wisdom fell upon the same stony ground as his demonstration that Dalmatia's strategic value is very slight from a defensive point of view to those who possess Pola, Valona and the outer islands. There is a school of reasonable Italians, such as Giuseppe Prezzolini, who for strategic reasons asked for the isle of Vis. Mazzini himself, after 1866, found it necessary, for the same reasons, that Vis should be Italian, since it is the key of the Adriatic. Some of us thought that it might have been feasible to follow the precedent of Port Mahon, which Great Britain occupied without exercising sovereignty over the rest of the island of Minorca. The magnificent harbour of Vis, perfectly protected against the bora, would have satisfied all the demands of the Italian navy. Vis is to-day practically as much Slav as Minorca was Spanish, and if the Slavs had been left in possession of the remainder of that island it would have proved the reverse of a danger to the Italians, since with a moderate amount of good sense the same relations would have existed as was the case upon Minorca.... The solution which was ultimately found in the Treaty of Rapallo was to allocate to the Italians in complete sovereignty not the island of Vis, but the smaller neighbouring island of Lastovo.
While the vast majority of Italians would not listen to Bissolati they delighted in Gabriele d'Annunzio. The great poet Carducci[21] had his heart full when he thought about the ragged, starving Croat soldiers, pitiable victims of the Habsburgs, exploited by them all their lives and fighting for them in a foreign land—and they fought bravely; but as they were often clad in miserable garments, they were called by those who wanted to revile them "Croat dirt." And that is what they are to Gabriele d'Annunzio. When the controversies of to-day have long been buried and when d'Annunzio's works are read, his lovers will be stabbed by his Lettera ai Dalmati. And if the mob had to be told precisely what the Allies are, it did not need a lord of language to dilate upon "the thirty-two teeth of Wilson's undecipherable smile," to say that the French "drunk with victory, again fly all their plumes in the wind, tune up all their fanfares, quicken their pace in order to pass the most resolute and speedy—and we step aside to let them pass." No laurel will be added to his fame for having spoken of "the people of the five meals" [the English] which, "its bloody work hardly ended, reopens its jaws to devour as much as it can." All Italy resounded with the catchword that the Croats had been Austria's most faithful servants, although some Italians, such as Admiral Millo, as we shall see, when writing confidentially, did not say anything so foolish. Very frequently, however, as the Croats noticed, those who had been the most uncompromising wielders of Austria's despotism were taken on by Italy, the new despot. For example, at Split when the mayor and other Yugoslav leaders were arrested at the beginning of the War, one Francis Mandirazza was appointed as Government Commissary, after having filled the political post of district captain (Bezirkshauptmann) which was only given to those who were in the entire confidence of the Government. As soon as the Italians had possession of Šibenik they took him into their service.
THOSE WHO HELD BACK FROM THE PACT OF ROME