The New Europe, whose directors had taken a chief part in bringing the Italians and the Yugoslavs together, which congress had resulted in the Pact of Rome, of April 1918, pointed out that in those dark days of the high-water mark of the great German offensive, this Pact—which provided the framework of an agreement, on the principle of "live and let live"—was publicly approved of by the Italian Premier and his colleagues, but was rejected now when the danger was past and Austria was broken up. Those who brought about the Pact reminded Italy that she was bound to it by honour and that the South Slav statesmen never had withdrawn from the position which it placed them in with reference to Italy.... Everyone must sympathize with the disappointment of those gentlemen who—Messrs. Franklin-Bouillon, Wickham Steed and Seton-Watson were associated in this endeavour—had striven for a noble end, had achieved something in spite of many obstacles, and now saw that one party simply would not use the bridge which they had built for it. This party had, however, shown such reticence both while the bridge was being made and afterwards that one could scarcely be astonished at their attitude. The Congress at Rome was in no sense official, but a voluntary meeting of private persons, who were got together with a certain amount of trouble. So unofficial, in fact, was the Congress that those Serbs who worked with the representatives of the Yugoslav Committee belonged to the Opposition; the Serbian Government, then in Corfu, not giving their adhesion to the Congress, which was perhaps a very clever move on the part of Pašić. Whether it be true or not that Signor Amendolla, the General Secretary—he is the political director of the Corriere della Sera—was asked by the Yugoslav Committee not to admit any Serbian deputies except those of the Opposition, it appears that no other Serbs took a part in the proceedings. The Italian Government adopted an ambiguous attitude, for while Orlando publicly endorsed the resolutions, as did several other Ministers, notably Bissolati, the Premier gave no confirmation to those who interpreted his attitude as implying the tacit abandonment of Italy's extreme territorial claims. Sonnino was so reserved that he took no share at all in the Congress and refused to receive the Yugoslavs. He made no secret of his determination to exact the London Treaty. Nothing was signed by the Italian Government; and if Orlando's honour was involved it certainly does not seem possible to say the same of Sonnino. It may be that Pašić foresaw what would happen and was therefore unwilling to be implicated. He is an astute statesman of the old school—"too old," says The New Europe, which regards him as an Oriental sultan. But respecting the Pact of Rome they were rather at issue with the Italians. What the Italians gained was that the various clauses of the Pact were used as the basis for propaganda in the Austrian ranks on the Piave. And when once the Austrian peril had vanished the old rancour reappeared, particularly when, by the terms of the military armistice with Austria, Italy obtained the right to occupy a zone corresponding with what she was given by the London Treaty. Whereas in that instrument the frontiers were exactly indicated, there was in the Pact of Rome no more than a general agreement that the principles of nationality and self-determination should be applied, with due regard to other "vital interests." Bissolati's group was in favour of something more definite, but to this Orlando was not well disposed; and Trumbić, the President of the Yugoslav Committee, did not avail himself of the, perhaps rather useless, offer of some Serbs who were not participating in the Congress, but suggested that while he worked with the Government they would keep in touch with the Bissolati group; even as Bismarck who would work openly with a Government, and through his agents with the Opposition.

GATHERING WINDS

As the Serbian Society of Great Britain observed in a letter of welcome which they addressed to Baron Sonnino on the occasion of a visit to London, they were convinced "after a close study and experience of the Southern Slav question in all its aspects and some knowledge of the Adriatic problem as a whole, that there is no necessary or inevitable conflict between the aspiration of the Southern Slav people towards complete unity and the postulates of Italian national security and of the completion of Italian unity; but that, on the contrary, there exist strong grounds for Italo-Southern Slav co-operation and friendship." The Italian Government, however, had now got almost their whole country behind them, and in the months after the War so many Italians had become warlike that they were enchanted with the picture drawn by Gabriele d'Annunzio: "And what peace will in the end be imposed on us, poor little ones of Christ? A Gallic peace? A British peace? A star-spangled peace? Then, no! Enough! Victorious Italy—the most victorious of all the nations—victorious over herself and over the enemy—will have on the Alps and over her sea the Pax Romana, the sole peace that is fitting. If necessary we will meet the new plot in the fashion of the Arditi [units of volunteers employed on specially dangerous enterprises], a grenade in each hand and a knife between our teeth." It is true that the other poor little ones of Christ, the Franciscans, who are greatly beloved by the people of Dalmatia, from whom they are sprung, have hitherto preached a different Pax Romana. The Dalmatian clergy, who are patriotic, have been rather a stumbling-block in the way of the Italians. A very small percentage of them—about six in a thousand—have been anti-national and opportunist. At one place a priest whom his bishop had some years ago had occasion to expel, returned with the Italian army in November 1918 and informed the bishop that he had a letter from the Pope which reinstated him, but he refused to show this letter. He was anxious to preach on the following Sunday; the bishop declined to allow him. Then came unto the bishop the chief of the Italian soldiery and he said unto him: "Either thou shalt permit this man to preach or I will cause thine office to be taken from thee." Unfortunately the bishop yielded, and the sermon, as one would imagine, was devoted to the greater glory of the Italians. Sometimes the Italians, since their occupation, have made a more humorous if not more successful use of the Church. On Palm Sunday, after the service a number of peasants, in their best clothes, were walking through a village holding the usual palm leaves in their hands. They were photographed, and a popular Italian newspaper printed this as a full-page coloured illustration. It was entitled: "Dalmatian Peasants on their way to pay Homage to Admiral Millo."

This policy of a grenade in each hand and a knife between the teeth makes a powerful appeal to the munition firms. And others who feed the flame of Italo-Slav hatred are, as Gaetano Salvemini, the anti-chauvinist, pointed out in the Unità of Florence, those professional gladiators who would lose their job, those agents of the Italo-German-Levantine capitalism of the Triest Chamber of Commerce who want to be rid of the competition of Rieka and think that this can only be obtained by annexation, and also those Italian Nationalists who believe that the only path to national greatness is by acquiring territory everywhere. No light has come to them from the East; the same arguments which are now put forward by such societies as the "Pro Dalmatia" could be heard in Italy before she possessed herself of Tripoli. One heard the same talk of strategic necessities; one heard that nearly all the population was waiting with open arms for the Italians; one heard that from a business point of view nothing could be better; one heard that the Italians without Tripoli would be choked out of the Mediterranean. And what have been the fruits of the conquest of Tripoli? No economic advantages have been procured, as Prezzolini wrote, no sociological, no strategic, no diplomatic benefits. A great deal of money was thrown away, a vast amount of energy was wasted, and thousands of troops have to be stationed permanently in the wilderness. That expedition to Tripoli, which was one of the gravest errors of Italian politics, was preceded by clouds of forged documents, of absurdities, of partial extracts out of consular reports, of lying correspondence which succeeded in misleading the Italians.

WHY THE ITALIANS CLAIMED DALMATIA

"The Italian Government," said the Morning Post,[22] "is well qualified to judge of the interests of its own people." Here the Morning Post is not speaking of the Italian Government which dealt with Tripoli, but that which has been dealing with Dalmatia. The reasons which have been advanced for an Italian or a partly Italian Dalmatia are geographical, botanical, historical, ethnical, military, naval and economic. As for the geographical reasons: even in the schools of Italy they teach that the Italian natural frontier is determined by the point of division of the waters of the Alps and that this frontier falls at Porto Ré, a few miles to the south of Rieka—everything to the south of that belonging to the Balkan Peninsula. We may note the gallant patriotism of an Italian cartographer mentioned by Prezzolini; this worthy has inscribed a map of Dalmatia down to the Narenta with the pleasing words: "The new natural boundaries of Italy." As for the argument that the flora of Dalmatia resembles that of Italy, this can equally well be employed by those who would annex Italy to Dalmatia. Historically, we have seen that Venice, which held for many years the seacoast and the islands, did not alter the Slav character of the country. It is not now the question as to whether Venice deserved or did not deserve well of Dalmatia, but "the truth is," says M. Emile Haumant,[23] the learned and impartial French historian, "the truth is that when Marmont's Frenchmen arrived they found the Slav language everywhere, the Italian by its side on the islands and the coast, Italian customs and culture in the towns, and also the lively and sometimes affectionate remembrance of Venice; but nowhere did a Dalmatian tell them that he was an Italian. On the contrary, they all affirmed that they were brothers of the Slav beyond, in whose misfortunes they shared and whose successes they celebrated." The Italians themselves, in achieving their unity, were very right to set aside the undoubted historical claims of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, those of the House of Este and those of the Vatican, seeing that they were in opposition to the principle of nationality and the right of a people to determine its own political status. With regard to the ethnical reasons, we are flogging another dead horse, as the statistics—even those taken during the Italian occupation—prove to the meanest intellect; and now the pro-Italians, despairing to make anyone believe that the 97·5 per cent. of the people of Dalmatia are truly Italians who by some kink in their nature persist in calling themselves Slavs, have invented a brand new nationality, the Dalmatian, after the classic style of the late Professor Jagić who at Vienna, under the pressure of the Austrian Government, began talking of the Bosnian language in order not to say that it is Serbo-Croat. He was drowned in laughter. With respect to the military reasons, the Dalmatian littoral cannot be defended by a State which is not in possession of the hinterland. In time of peace a very strong army would be needed; Italy would, in fact, have to double her army for the defence of a frontier 700 kilometres long. And in the event of war it would be necessary either to abandon Dalmatia or to form two armies of operation, one on the frontiers of Julian Venetia, the other in Dalmatia, and without any liaison between them. From the military point of view it is incomparably more to the interest of Italy that she should live on friendly terms with the people of the eastern shore of the Adriatic than that she should maintain there an army out of all proportion to her military and economic resources—an army which in time of war would be worse than useless, since, as M. Gauvain observes, the submarines, which would find their nesting-places in the islands, would destroy the lines of communication. An Italian naval argument is, that if she had to fight on the eastern side of the Adriatic her sailors in the morning would have the sun in their eyes; but the Yugoslavs would be similarly handicapped in the case of an evening battle. With regard to the economic reasons, the longitudinal lines will continue to guarantee to the Germans and Magyars the commercial monopoly of the East, and Italy will perceive that she has paid very dearly for a blocked-up window. The sole method by which Italy can from the Adriatic cause her commerce to penetrate to the Balkans is by concluding with a friendly Yugoslavia the requisite commercial treaties, which will grow more valuable with the construction of the lateral railways, running inland from the coast, which Austrians and Magyars so constantly impeded.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE TREATY OF LONDON

If, then, it is difficult to see where the Italian interests will be profited by the possession of Dalmatia, there remains the argument that, irrespective of the consequences, she must have a good deal of it since it was allotted to her by the Treaty of London,[24] although the engagements entered into by Italy, France and Great Britain when they signed the Treaty with Germany caused the earlier instrument to be subject to revision where its terms had been disregarded. Signor Orlando, in an interview granted in April 1918 to the Journal des Débats, eagerly insisted that the Treaty had been concluded against the Austrian enemy, not against the Yugoslav nation; and if this be more than a mere phrase it is clear that with the disappearance of Austria-Hungary the Treaty automatically fell to the ground. By this Treaty of April 1915, France and Great Britain are bound—if necessary, by force of arms—to assist Italy in appropriating what, I believe, will be acknowledged to be some one else's country, at all events a country the vast proportion of whose inhabitants have determined that on no account will they come under the Italians. Would it not have been advisable if those who signed this document had made a few not very recondite researches into eastern Adriatic questions? They must have felt some qualms at the cries of indignation and amazement which arose when the provisions of the Treaty were disclosed, for it did not remain a secret very long. They had imagined, on the whole, that as Dalmatia had been under alien rulers, Venetian, Austrian and so forth, for so many years it really would not matter to them very much if they were governed from Vienna or from Rome. Perhaps a statesman here and there had heard that the Dalmatian Diet had petitioned many times since 1870 that they should be reunited to their brothers of Croatia and Slavonia in the Triune Kingdom. But all the calculations seem to have been made upon the basis that Austria-Hungary would survive, as a fairly formidable Power at any rate. The union of the Southern Slavs was too remote, and the Italians would be kindly masters. When the howl of indignation rose, the statesmen seem to have conceived the hope that the Italians would be generous and wise. The chief blame for the Treaty does not rest, however, on the Frenchmen and the Englishmen, but on the Russians; it was naturally felt that they should be more cognizant of Slav affairs, and if they were content to sign the Treaty, France and England might well follow their example. When Dr. Zarić, the Bishop of Split, saw the former Russian Foreign Minister, M. Sazonov, in Paris in the spring of 1919, this gentleman was in a state of such dejection that the Bishop, out of pity, did not try to probe the matter. "Sometimes," said Sazonov, "sometimes the circumstances are too much opposed to you and you have to act against your inclinations."[25] The French and British statesmen gave the Bishop the impression that they were ashamed of the Treaty. He read to them in turn a memorandum in which he suggested that the whole Dalmatian question should be left to the arbitration of President Wilson, who was well informed, through experts, of the local conditions. And was it, in any case, just that an Italian, both claimant and judge, should sit on the Council of Four, to which no Yugoslav was admitted? To President Wilson the Bishop said, "You have come to fight for the just cause."

The President made no reply.

The Bishop, a native of the island of Hvar, a great linguist, was a man who made you think that a very distinguished mind had entered the body of the late Cardinal Vaughan. To him the most noticeable features of the President were the clear brow, the mystic eyes and the mouth which showed that he stood firmly on the ground.