Mr. Lindsay reported back to the Emperor the substance of his interview with Lord Cowley, who said that the English Government was not prepared to act until further developments. It was about this time that Mr. Seward was getting in his fine diplomatic work with Earl Russell and Palmerston, which helped materially to upset the calculations of the Emperor.
Napoleon then requested Mr. Lindsay to see Palmerston, Russell, Derby and Mr. Disraeli, and to gather their intentions. He desired Mr. Lindsay to do all this of his own motion, and not as coming from him, and said he did not wish to be embarrassed by the forms and delays of ordinary diplomacy, because he felt the necessity of immediate action.
Lindsay again saw Earl Russell, as the accredited and special ambassador of the Emperor, viva voce. The Earl informed him that he could not receive any communications from a foreign power, except through the regular diplomatic channel. He then sought an interview with Mr. Disraeli, who was much more affable and communicative than the little Lord who stood so punctiliously on ministerial ceremony.
Disraeli threw considerable light on the subject. After expressing a deep interest in the affairs of the Confederacy, and saying that he fully concurred in the views of the Emperor, he told Mr. Lindsay that he had good reasons for believing that a secret understanding existed between Earl Russell and Mr. Seward; that England, in the meantime, would respect the Federal blockade and withhold recognition of the South. “But if France should take the initiative,” said Mr. Disraeli in conclusion, “any course she may adopt to put an end to the present state of affairs will undoubtedly be supported by a large majority in Parliament, and knowing this, Lord Russell will give a reluctant assent to this, to avoid a change of ministry, which would otherwise certainly follow.”
This shows that Disraeli saw very clearly through the duplicity of English diplomacy, and that while England was profuse in her promises to Mr. Seward, she was only waiting for the Emperor to act as pioneer in order that she might have a safe opportunity as well as a plausible pretext for armed intervention.
The Emperor complained that Earl Russell had divulged his views on American affairs, as expressed through his ambassador, to Mr. Seward. Lord Russell placed himself squarely on the “fence,” to be prepared for any emergency. Finally, about the middle of April, the Emperor thought it would be best that he himself should make a friendly appeal to the Federal Government alone to open the ports, if England did not join him, without further hesitation. He thought it would be necessary, however, to accompany the appeal with a demonstration of force on the Southern coasts; and if the appeal should be effective, to back it up by a declaration of his purpose not to respect the blockade. He determined, however, to wait a few days longer to see how England would act.
This resolution of the Emperor to make a friendly appeal to raise the blockade was only a thin excuse to find a cause for quarrel with the North, and it is very probable he would have acted on this determination alone, but for an unexpected event which changed his projects, and the apparent course of history.
About a week after this diplomatic conference, Commodores D. G. Farragut, and D. D. Porter, with their able commanders Bailey and Bell, had made the famous passage of forts Jackson and St. Philip, at the mouth of the Mississippi, with the United States squadron, silenced the Chalmette batteries and anchored in the harbor of New Orleans. After two days’ parleying the city surrendered at discretion, or rather, the city authorities passively and sullenly permitted Farragut, and afterwards General Butler, to take possession of the city without shedding any blood.
This great naval victory of Farragut’s squadron and its consequences dampened the ardor of the Emperor. He saw the chances of backing up his “friendly appeal” by a demonstration of force, were cut off, so far as New Orleans and the forts of the Mississippi were concerned.
Yet, Napoleon did not totally relinquish the enterprise, on account of this crushing defeat of the Confederacy. M. Billault, a prominent member of Napoleon’s cabinet, after this event said to Slidell, “The cabinet, with the probable exception of M. Thouvenel, are in favor of the South. If New Orleans had not fallen, our recognition could not have been long delayed, but if the Confederates should obtain successes in Virginia and Tennessee, and hold the enemy at bay a month or two longer, we may see an opportunity for intervention.”