The main anxiety of the German Admiral lay in the continuance of his supplies, which could only be assured by careful organisation. This was rendered comparatively easy in South America, where every port teemed with Germans; the wheels of communication, through the agency of shore wireless stations, were well oiled by German money, and there were numerous German merchantmen, fitted with wireless, ready to hand to be used as supply ships or colliers.
It was thus of paramount importance that the German Squadron should be rounded up and annihilated before it could become a serious menace to our trade and that of our Allies. The other remaining light cruisers of the enemy, who were operating singly, could be dealt with more easily, since our ships could afford to separate in order to search for them, thus rendering it only a matter of time before they were destroyed.
What was the object, then, of the German Admiral? This was the all-important question that occupied the thoughts of all our naval officers in foreign parts. On the assumption that he would come eastwards, there appeared to be few choices open to him beyond the following:
(1) To bombard the seaports of our colonies on the west coast of Africa and to attack weakly defended but by no means valueless naval stations (such as St. Helena), at the same time operating against British and French expeditions going by sea against German colonies.
(2) To go to South Africa, destroy the weak British squadron at the Cape, and hang up Botha's expedition by supporting a rising against us in the South African Dominions.
(3) To endeavour to make his way home to Germany.
(4) To operate in the North Atlantic.
(5) To harass our trade with South America.
Both the first and second appeared quite feasible, but they had the twofold disadvantage of involving actions nearer England and of very possibly restricting the enemy a good deal in his movements; there are few harbours on this coast, and his every movement would become known in a region where we held the monopoly in methods of communication. Consequently, any success here was bound to be more or less short-lived. On the other hand, matters were undoubtedly very critical in these parts. De la Rey, when he was shot, was actually on his way to raise the Vierkleur at Potchefstroom, and any striking naval success which it would have taken us three weeks to deal with at the very least, might have just set the balance against us at this time in the minds of the waverers. Moreover, it would not have been difficult to ensure supplies from the German colonies.