Assuming that the worst had happened, and that the German squadron was now on its way round to the east coast, it became imperative to unite our remaining ships into one squadron as quickly as possible. It was obvious that with the Australian and Japanese ships behind them, the Germans could not afford to linger where they were; moreover, they had learned at Valparaiso that we had no naval force of any preponderance with which to oppose them. Flushed with their recent victory, it seemed probable that if they were not much damaged they would most likely hasten their movements in the hope of meeting our ships before we had had time to unite or to gather reinforcements.
The German squadron would not be able to separate with any safety once we had succeeded in joining together our scattered forces, so that the damage they might do to our commerce would be thereby reduced to a minimum.
For these reasons it will be seen that the River Plate was admirably situated for the rendezvous of our ships that had escaped from Coronel to the Falklands, and of the northern squadron. Again, it was possible to coal there without infringing territorial rights, as there is an excellent anchorage well outside the three mile limit from the foreshore.
The following calculations, written on November 6th, 1914, were made by the author:
"The German Admiral will expect us to get reinforcements out from England, so that it seems probable that he will lose no time in coming round to the east coast.
"He arrived at Valparaiso on November 3rd. Supposing he coals there and leaves at earliest on November 4th, the distance from Valparaiso to the Plate is roughly 2,600 miles, or nine days at 12 knots; therefore, allowing one day for coaling en route, the earliest that he could be off the Plate would be the 13th, more likely not before November 15th."
The strategical aspect in this sphere of operations was completely changed by the success of the German squadron off Cape Coronel, and necessitated not only a complete change of plans, but also an entire redistribution of our ships. These consisted of the Carnarvon, Cornwall, Bristol, Macedonia, and Edinburgh Castle, also the Defence and Orama, who were near Montevideo, and the Canopus, Glasgow, and Otranto.
Admiral Stoddart, therefore, decided to go south to Montevideo at once in order to meet the remainder of our scattered ships. The Bristol, Macedonia, and Edinburgh Castle were left to continue the search for the Karlsruhe, although as a matter of fact she had blown up on November 4th. Colliers were sent down south to Montevideo to be in readiness for our ships, and were ordered to sail at twelve-hour intervals to diminish the chance of capture.
The Carnarvon and Cornwall left the base on November 6th, the former calling at Rio de Janeiro on the way for telegrams. Arriving at the Plate on the 10th, where we found the Defence and Orama, the Admiral immediately transferred his flag to the former ship, which was the newest and most powerful of our cruisers. All ships filled up with coal and awaited the arrival of the Glasgow and Otranto; meanwhile, patrols were constantly maintained at the mouth of the river.
The following evening the Glasgow arrived amidst congratulations from us all; she had put in to the Falkland Islands to coal, in which assistance was provided by volunteers from amongst the inhabitants. After coaling, she was detached to Rio de Janeiro to go into dry dock, so that the damage to her side might be properly repaired. The same day the Orama, whilst patrolling, met and sank the German storeship Navarra which was set on fire by the Germans when escape was seen to be impossible. We also got the cheering news that the Emden had been sunk and that the Königsberg had been bottled up, tidings which augured well for the future.