"How was it with Luke Dillon, who came from Philadelphia, interested in the prosecution of this case, going home, whining like a sick child, squealing like a stuck pig, because investigation was going too far, and giving to the public the secrets of the organization. But Beggs says: 'Tell everything you know.'
"Gentlemen, my client has already suffered too much in this case. He is ruined. A young man who has blossomed out in a noble profession is forever ruined. It requires but a charge of this kind, it matters not what your verdict may be, and the stain is fastened upon his skirts and there it must stay forever. He has already suffered too much, I have no peroration to make. I demand your cool, deliberate judgment, and that is all I ask. I make no appeal to your sympathy. On behalf of myself, and on behalf of Beggs, and of my associates, I extend to you thanks for the kind and patient manner in which you have listened to the testimony and listened to my efforts at an argument.
"I hope the time is short when he will be able to thank each one of you, to take each one of you by the hand and in person thank you for his deliverance, and then may you be returned to the loved ones at home, and may he be returned to the bosom of his loved wife, for love makes the world so small that all the beauty is in one face, all the music in one voice and all the rapture is in one kiss. Gentlemen, I thank you."
Forrest's able Plea on Behalf of his Clients.
"If your Honor please, and you, Gentlemen of the Jury, you sit in judgment on the lives of your fellow-citizens. You act, you look, like men who are thoroughly imbued with a sense of your responsibility. You have listened attentively to all the details of the testimony. You have listened with admiration to the discussion of the testimony by the distinguished gentlemen who have preceded me. You can not have failed to note the radical difference between the method of treating the evidence by counsel for the defendant and by counsel for the people. One is wrong, altogether wrong; the other is right, altogether right. The question is an important one. You will hear my discussion on it and the discussion of Brother Mills, and then you will hear the Judge pronounce upon the method of treating the evidence. You will pay no attention to what I say about the law unless it commends itself to your reason, and unless what I shall say is afterward given in principle or substance by the Court. It must be that the method of treating the circumstantial evidence has been pointed out clearly. The books are filled with decisions, and our judges can not be radically different in treating it. In England and America they treat it alike, and therefore, I say the prosecution is altogether wrong, or we are altogether wrong. The gentlemen for the prosecution tell you that the law of circumstantial evidence is represented by the fable of the farmer and the bunch of fagots, which fable was intended by Æsop, and by all reproducers of Æsop, to illustrate, not circumstantial evidence, but the fact that in unity there is strength, or, to use the expression sometimes used in politics or war,'United we stand, divided we fall.' We claim that that is altogether wrong, and, if I am right, they are altogether wrong in their method, and, if wrong in their method, my inference, is they dare not apply the legal method. Judge Wing, Mr. Donahoe and myself have applied the analytical method, which is adopted by every scientific man and every searcher after truth. I propose, gentlemen, to consume this afternoon in discussing the question as to which is right in their method of considering the evidence. Mr. Ingham commented upon the rule as laid down by the Supreme Court of Illinois, and then quoted the instruction given by Judge Wing in a case in which he appeared for the prosecution. You are convinced, as jurors, if you are convinced as men, that it is right, when properly understood, but you must not take one piece of this instruction and consider it, when the Supreme Court in passing upon a set of instructions never takes one by itself, but considers one in the light of all the others. So you must consider these instructions in the light of each other."
The counsel proceeded to read at extreme length from "Wells on Circumstantial Evidence," with the view of showing the unreliability of such testimony. Burrill's work on the same subject was also considered.
He next read a decision of the Supreme Court, which, in effect, declares that a verdict of guilty can only be arrived at when there is no reasonable hypothesis consistent with the innocence of the person charged, even though at the same time the only solution of the crime is the theory of the guilt of the defendant. The life and liberty of the citizen can not be sacrificed on the ground that only by regarding him as guilty can the crime be explained. Mr. Forrest then quoted a case showing that where a physical possibility existed of the crime being committed by some other means than that claimed in the theory of the guilt of the defendant, the supposition of his innocence was not to be excluded on the ground of its moral impossibility.
