W. S. FORREST, LEADING COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENSE.
An adjournment was taken at this point until 10 o'clock Monday morning, December 9, when Mr. Forrest resumed his address to the jury.
He began with an apology for his discussion of the question of law on Saturday, stating that he thought it was his duty to do so. Then he went on to argue that witnesses may lie, but facts can not. He took a peculiar line on this point, referring to the tariff discussion, and showing that the Republicans claimed that the tariff is a benefit to the country, and that the Democrats claimed the opposite. "So you see," continued counsel, "much depends upon the disposition you have when you start to look at facts." He then read from "Taylor on the Law of Evidence," citing a case in which Macbeth was quoted to show that the smearing of the daggers was an intentional effort to create circumstantial evidence against the innocent. The decision also referred to Joseph's coat of many hues which was stained by the blood of a kid. All this was done to show the unreliability of circumstantial evidence. Then Mr. Forrest turned his attention to the case on trial, referring to the fact that Klahre had soldered the box that was supposed to contain Dr. Cronin's clothes, which, he remarked, according to the theory of the prosecution, was to have been shipped to England and received by some accomplice in the crime and afterward published to the world as containing Dr. Cronin's clothes.
"You do not claim that I said that?" asked Judge Longenecker.
"No," replied Mr. Forrest, "but that was your theory and that was the theory of the whole world. It was not only the State's Attorney's theory, gentlemen; it was not only the theory of the press of Chicago; it was the theory of the whole world. The whole world has learned the proof. These clothes were never in that box. You have since seen that the clothes that these gentlemen assure had been sent by Martin Burke to England in that box were never shipped over the sea. The box was never intended for an alleged accomplice. It was never intended to contain the corpse of Dr. Cronin. In spite of all their reasoning and of all the inferences that they drew, by chance a workman in a sewer in the town of Lake View turned up Dr. Cronin's clothes, which, instead of being in England in a tin box, were in a valise buried in a sewer in the town of Lake View.
"In all seriousness I will ask you two questions: suppose the cleaning of that sewer had not occurred until after this trial. Don't you know that in every speech of these distinguished orators they would have urged that Martin Burke was guilty because he sent Dr. Cronin's clothes over the sea? If that argument had been made to me, and these clothes had not been discovered would not I have given it weight? Can not you learn from that fact some lessons? You can learn that these gentlemen for the State are no safer guides than we are. You can learn that circumstantial evidence can lie and mislead, and although the defendant may not be able to disprove what they prove, as they say, it does not follow that the defendants are guilty."
DIFFICULT PART OF THE DEFENSE.
"You see the difficulty that the defense is in when we have to prove a negative. How could we prove that the clothes were not over the sea if accident had not turned them up in the sewer in Lake View? You see the danger of assuming to be true what we can not disprove. You see the unreliability of circumstantial evidence. You see the difficulty we have in proving a negative. Suppose that one of you were on trial, and suppose that the State's Attorney could introduce a witness to swear he saw you burning a deed or will, and suppose in the middle of the trial the deed should be produced in all its entirety, how rejoiced you would be. So rejoiced were we, and so rejoiced was the soul of Martin Burke, so gladdened was my soul, when the clothes were found in the North Town; call it fate, call it blind chance, call it an overruling Providence, call it what you will, it did for Martin Burke what his counsel and all the witnesses in the world could never have done. Suppose that the truth had not been disclosed. Suppose that the clothes had not been found; suppose that the argument had been made by these gentlemen—and what an argument they would have made in the form of a narrative!—describing how the clothes crossed the stormy sea, describing the ship containing this guilty secret. They could have speculated about what was to be done over there, and how it was to be done. Suppose they had done that; suppose that you had believed it; suppose you had drawn the conclusion that they urged you to draw in their opening, and that they would have urged you to draw in their closing. Suppose you had imposed the death penalty on Martin Burke; suppose the death penalty had been executed, and then the proof should have been discovered that the clothes were in the North Town sewer, what justification could you have made to the people of the State of Illinois? What justification could you have made in your prayers to your God? What justification could you have made in the forum of your own consciences to yourselves?
"Facts do lie. Now, by an agreement between this court and counsel for the defendant, I am not to speak of the Camp 20 conspiracy; but if that agreement had not been made, may it please your honor, I would not have spoken of the Camp 20 conspiracy, because it is wholly unnecessary. That has been done ably and exhaustively by the distinguished gentleman who represents Mr. Beggs. One thing I want to call your attention to and pass it. These gentleman have said, 'What difference does it make whether that remark of Beggs' that the committee reported to him alone was made May 3 or May 10.' Why, it makes all the difference in the world to all the defendants except Beggs, if you believe it was the appointment of a secret committee to kill Dr. Cronin. It makes all the difference in the world to them, and the gentleman that asked the question well knew it. It was made after May 3, and, therefore, if made, it is evidence against nobody but Beggs. If it was made before May 3, it would be evidence against everybody on trial, if you believe that conspiracy was entered into between them. That is the reason why these witnesses were prevailed on to swear that it was made May 3 instead of May 10. Every one of them, I believe, swore that it was May 3, but on cross-examination it turns out that it was May 10. O'Connor says that it occurred on a certain night when he was appointed on an auditing committee, and the record shows that that motion was made on May 10 and that was the only time he was there. So you see that somebody had a motive to change that from May 10 to May 3; and the motive was to make it evidence against all instead of evidence against only one."
Mr. Forrest went on to say that it was a remarkable thing in this case that the State had just one witness to every matter of importance. There was just one witness who heard Burke say that Cronin was a British spy and ought to be killed. They had just one other witness who heard Coughlin say it was rumored that Cronin was a spy; then they had just one other witness who heard O'Sullivan say, on the 22d of May, that Cronin was a spy, and is it not remarkable that there should be just one person who heard those gentlemen make such remarks? If they were in the habit of making those remarks, is it not highly probable that they made them more than once, and that they made them to more than one person, yet why was only one produced? It looks as if they were going out into the highways and by ways of the world, searching for witnesses, and had found only one.