The Crime of the Century; Or, The Assassination of Dr. Patrick Henry Cronin

by Henry M. Hunt

"Foster treats the Beggs-Spellman correspondence as if Beggs was publishing to the world that he was going to commit murder. Not so. Our theory is, and it is the correct one, that these letters were written for the purpose of covering up that which they expected this committee to do. That is our theory. That is why they were written. That is why Mr. Beggs said to me when he was brought face to face with the record that a committee had been appointed, but does he explain? You can see that it is a blind. You can see why he flushed these letters in the face of the people; because it was the work of the conspirators to begin in this line. Nothing had yet been prepared for the disposition of Cronin. Nothing had been arranged, but they must make a sort of an investigation in this way. Talk about reading between the lines? The Lord knows there is enough in the lines without reading between the lines.

"Recollect that the letter in which he says: 'I hope no trouble will result,' is one of the links. Let us get it just right, 'I hope no trouble will result.' On the 18th the flat is rented. And on the 20th they finish laying the carpet. Now jump on to the 22d, the next meeting of Camp 20, where these minutes are approved, and what do you find? On the 22d of February in the line of his letters, in the line that he hopes that no trouble will result, what does he do? Pat McGarry read his speech, in which he said that the man who gave Le Caron his credentials to go into the convention was a greater scoundrel than ever Le Caron could pretend to be."

Mr. Donahoe—"You will concede that every Irishman knew who it was that gave Le Caron his credentials?"

Mr. Longenecker—"I do not know whether they did or not. I presume they did. Beggs said that they had members who were coming in and violating the hospitality of that camp. That would have to be stopped. It was not right. He said that they came in there talking about Alexander Sullivan, and it was cowardly to talk of a man behind his back. Why did they not say so to his face? He said Alexander Sullivan had strong friends in that camp, and he slapped his breast and says, 'I am one of them.'

"Now, gentlemen, that alone does not amount to so much. Beggs' letters alone would not amount to so much. The speech alone—story I mean—the fact of what happened in Camp 20 alone; but when you take into consideration the manner in which he speaks of the letter to Spelman—the speeches he makes and the letter on the 22d, when you bring them all in together, then it does become strong. Now, gentlemen, I am not going to bother you about reading. I am anxious that you should not be misled in reference to Beggs. Because, if Foster is correct—and I know he is—then, if Beggs is guilty, he is awful guilty. A man who is educated, a man who has practiced law, a man who ought to be ready to see that the law is executed, a man who is educated in a profession of this character, is held accountable for his acts in a higher degree than is the man who does not know the law. And for less acts he is more responsible. If this man set the machinery in motion—and his counsel says he is not a dupe—if he set this terrible conspiracy in motion, then he becomes the worst of the men on trial. And he is just the character who would do just the little which would have more effect than if he stood by in the shoes of Martin Burke or Dan Coughlin. He stands at the head of the conspiracy. He stood there helping to forge the first link in this great conspiracy; and I am anxious, gentlemen, that you do not be misled in reference to John F. Beggs. John F. Beggs made his record on this chain of evidence the same as Martin Burke made his record.

"Well, but Mr. Foster says that Beggs is acquainted with Harrison. He introduced this fact that this second constable introduced him to Bailey Dawson and Mr. Babcock, and that he only introduced him for the purpose of what? Of showing his associations. Is that the reason why he introduced this speech that Beggs had made to President Harrison? Does that show the associations of every man who has shaken the President's hand? Does it give him character? Does it throw open the record? Is it an open book of his character to go and shake the hand of President Harrison? If that is so, President Harrison had better stand and shake the hands of men who are all over this country, and give them characters. If that is opening up the book of a man, if that gives him a reputation and a standing when he is charged for cruel murder, why then Mr. Harrison ought to shake hands with a good many fellows in Chicago. That is not it. He didn't know what might come. Providence had been causing the sewer to give up the silent witness. Providence had been giving up the German woman that heard the last words of the dying man. He don't know what Providence might do before the case ended, so an alibi must be proven for Beggs, and when he finds out that he does not establish an alibi, then he wants you to understand that he was practicing a fraud on you, and simply introduced it for the purpose of showing his associations.

"Of course, take a circumstance alone, and it may be weak. But when it stands in relation to another circumstance in the line of the object, then it becomes strengthened. And Mr. Forrest will not find me disputing his propositions of law. Right here let me say that the Court will give you the law; but do not forget that you are to try this case on the facts under the law. He may give you fifty instructions that the law is so and so, and that if the facts are so and so, apply them under that law and that is so and so. He will tell you that if from all the circumstances in the case, you have no reasonable doubt as to the guilt, then you must convict; but, that if you have a reasonable doubt, then you must acquit. It is you after all who become the judges of the case. Do not forget the evidence in the case. The Court does not intend to instruct the evidence out of your mind in giving you a long chain of instructions which it is his duty under the law to give. He does not intend that you shall forget the evidence that is applicable under that law. For instance, he might give you an instruction, and it is possible he will, that before you can find the men guilty, you must believe beyond a reasonable doubt that Dr. Cronin, if killed, was killed in the manner and form as charged in the indictment, and that the cause of death was as charged in the indictment.

"Well, now, that means you are to decide whether he was killed as charged in the indictment, not as testified by any particular doctor on the stand. Why, this counsel undertakes to tell me what my duty is as State's Attorney. This man, who says there was a great conspiracy here; that Ingham and Hynes and Scanlan and the Clan-na-Gael got up a conspiracy here to murder innocent men, and I, W. S. Forrest, have discovered it. This man argues this point, that it was not the cause of death, with the same force and strength that he does any other point in the case, and yet he knows in his soul there is nothing in it. Why, he tells you that I made a blunder in that indictment. Why, gentlemen, if that indictment had charged that this man was killed and that the cause was unknown, with all these wounds on his head, with all this blood in the trunk and in the cottage, wouldn't you have a right to take that into consideration, the blood in the cottage and on the sidewalk and in the trunk, and the condition of him when he was found? If I had drawn such an indictment, he would have a reason to say that. I don't know what effect their argument has had upon you, whether you think you know more about drawing an indictment than I do, or Judge Baker, who has drawn them for years and years, and hence I am going to read to you just what the doctors say on that proposition.

"But recollect that that can be proven the same as any other circumstance. But before going into that, gentlemen, I like to talk when I come to a fact and not leave it for some other time. Mr. Culver, you buy a wad, you buy a pistol, and you buy a bullet. Now Culver may intend to have that pistol to shoot somebody. It was known that you were going to shoot him. Then you are just as guilty for buying the wad, and you the bullet, and you the powder, as he is for doing the shooting, fully so. Now, Martin Burke held the pistol, wad, bullet and all. He hired the cottage, he moved the furniture, he was present when it was ordered. But if he only did all that, just as I say, it must be a criminal intention. Suppose you said you didn't buy that powder at all, had nothing to do with it. Well, we find out that when you bought the powder that you said you were going to give it to Culver, and Culver was going to shoot Longenecker for talking so long about this case. That would nail you. The same way as the other. Now, of course, just to say that these innocent acts alone of themselves are not criminal, but what may seem to be innocent may be guilty circumstances. That is the point I want to make on that. Same with Martensen. Here is evidence from Martensen, who moved the furniture. Why Martensen tells us, 'I was hired to haul this furniture; that is my business.' He went and hauled it, and said he was the man who hauled it there. Nothing out of the way for him to haul that furniture. That circumstance of itself is innocent, while under certain circumstances it might be guilty."

The State's Attorney then took up the cause-of-death phase of the case. He had not, he said, intended to say much about it, as the Judge, according to law, would tell the jurors that they must determine the cause. But the statement made by Attorney Forrest to the effect that if the jurors returned a verdict of acquittal on the present indictment, the State could try the prisoners again on an indictment stating that the cause of death was unknown, compelled him to refer to it. The statement made by Attorney Forrest was, the speaker cried, absolutely untrue. No law would permit the suspects to be tried again. Moreover, the indictment was strictly in accord with the testimony given by the medical witnesses who had on the stand sworn that death was caused by violence from blows inflicted on the head.