The ascendancy of France, 1598-1715

by Henry Offley Wakeman

(1) France had acquired beyond all question the position of the leading nation of Europe, and that, not merely through the extension of her frontiers, the splendour of her court, or the ambition of her king; but through the energy and ability of her people, the richness of her soil, and the advantages of her geographical position. A settlement of Europe, which ignored this fact, could not stand for ten years, and the allies showed their wisdom in permitting France to retain the position which she had legitimately won, and guarding against her abuse of it by forming states on her frontiers, powerful enough to keep her in check. Events proved that they were right. Austria and the Dutch in combination on the dangerous northern frontier, Prussia and the Empire to the east, Savoy to the south-east, with Austria in reserve in Italy, were as a matter of fact found strong enough to deal with France in the eighteenth century; and it was not until the balance of power and the European states system were alike swept away by the militant democracy of the Revolution, that France became once more a menace to the liberties of Europe.

2. The commercial and maritime supremacy of England.

(2) England had launched herself on that career of colonial and commercial ascendency which has made her the most prosperous country in the world. She was learning to found her colonial empire more upon the conquests of colonies, which France could not support, than upon the efforts of her own children. Her acknowledged superiority at sea, dating from the battle of La Hogue, emphasised by the battle of Vigo, and the capture of Gibraltar and Minorca, might from time to time be questioned by France and Spain, it could never be overthrown, and it brought naturally with it the acquisition of French colonies and Spanish trade privileges. The assiento was the thin end of the wedge by which England soon obtained the lion’s share of the lucrative and nefarious slave-trade. The cessions in north America were the beginning of her hold over the vast stretches of land to the north of her plantations, which were to be reduced wholly under her rule during the eighteenth century, and are now known as the Dominion of Canada, and the colony of British Columbia. In securing to England power and privileges, which she alone, owing to her maritime supremacy could properly use, the peace not only helped her forward on her true line of national development, but contributed in no slight degree to add to the resources and prosperity of the world at large.

3. It established European safe-guards against France.

(3) The dismemberment of the Empire, which had been recognised and made permanent by the peace of Westphalia, had finally removed the last vestiges of national feeling and national policy in Germany. The smaller German states grouped themselves for purposes of offence or defence naturally around the larger powers of the north and south,—Prussia and Austria. The barrier to French aggression on the Rhine had therefore to be sought, not in bolstering up an effete institution like the Empire, out of which vitality had long ago departed, but in strengthening and utilising the national forces of the two leading powers. The peace of Utrecht adopted this policy as far as was at that time possible. It planted Prussia as a sentinel over against France on the lower Rhine, and added to her possessions in that quarter as well as to her general dignity, in order to make her discharge her duties with the greater zeal. The subsequent history of Europe is one long commentary on the wisdom of this policy. Austria required no incentive to fulfil a similar task in the upper Rhine and in Italy, but she was sadly deficient in the necessary resources. In the last war the gold of England and the armies of England alone had saved her from irretrievable ruin. By giving over to her the richest part of Italy, and defending her from French attack by the buffer state of Savoy, the peace did all that was possible to strengthen the defences of Europe against a renewal of French tyranny, while ministering to the dynastic ambition of the House of Habsburg.

Advantages gained by the peace.

If Europe had no just reason to find fault with the peace of Utrecht from the point of view of her larger interests, neither could the nations themselves complain that their individual aspirations had been unduly neglected. In the Austrian Netherlands, in spite of the grotesque device of the barrier fortresses, the United Provinces gained a protection against the aggression of France and the rivalry of Antwerp, not less efficient than the Spanish Netherlands had proved to be. By the partial opening of the Spanish trade, and the establishment of a colonial empire by England, the maritime nations obtained the extension of their commerce, which was one of the principal objects which they hoped to gain by taking up arms. Portugal regained its independence and opened up through the Methuen treaty an important and lucrative trade with England. Savoy retained its political importance as a buffer state, and was encouraged to make itself more definitely an Italian power. Prussia was received into the brotherhood of independent monarchies. Even Spain, though she lost the integrity of her empire, was able to retain the king of her own choice. It is here that the provisions of the peace have been most violently assailed, but with little justice. The war of the Spanish Succession was fought, say the critics of the peace, to prevent the House of Bourbon from ascending the throne of Spain, and after eleven years of terrible bloodshed the peace of Utrecht sanctioned the very connection between the two crowns of France and Spain, which the Grand Alliance was formed to render impossible. The family compacts of the eighteenth century are adduced to show the evil effects of such a policy. It may be frankly admitted that the relations between the houses of Habsburg and Bourbon were the least satisfactory parts of the settlements effected at Utrecht, and for the simple reason that they were the most difficult satisfactorily to settle. It might have been possible to impose the archduke Charles upon the Spanish people under the Partition Treaty or at the beginning of the war. It had become impossible in 1712, when the Spaniards themselves had driven him out without French assistance. It was wholly out of the question when after the death of his brother Joseph he had become Emperor. Philip V. was left on the throne of Spain because there was no one else who could be put there. Events soon proved that Austria could not even hold Naples and Sicily against Spain, much less could she conquer her. The weak point in the peace of Utrecht, the danger to Europe from the family compacts, much exaggerated as it has been, came from a cause over which the negotiations of the peace could have no control whatever—the inherent weakness of the House of Habsburg. The danger to Europe from the family compacts lay not in the fact that France and Spain were intrinsically so much more powerful than Austria, the Milanese and Naples, but in the far greater ability to use their opportunities which distinguished the House of Bourbon and their political advisers.

It is the end of the seventeenth century.

The seventeenth century ends properly speaking with the peace of Utrecht. The earnestness and the ambitions to which it had given birth found in that peace either their accomplishment or their burial-place. The attempt of France to establish a dictatorship over Europe, which has formed the dramatic interest of the century, has failed. France remains but one, and not always the chief, of the nations of Europe. The determination of England on the contrary to attain the commercial leadership of the world, the effort made by Prussia to obtain leadership in Germany, of Austria to obtain command of the left bank of the Danube, and a footing in Italy, have been crowned with success. By the treaties of Passarovitch and Nystädt, which were to follow the peace of Utrecht, as the treaties of Oliva and the Pyrenees followed the peace of Westphalia, Sweden and Poland have to give way to Russia and Prussia in the north, while Turkey stands face to face with Russia on the Pruth and the Black Sea. In the peace of Westphalia the religious rivalries of the century found their appropriate solution. In the treaties of Utrecht and Nystädt the political questions of the century received their appropriate answer. The rivalry between the House of Bourbon and the House of Habsburg for the Rhine was over. The aggrandisement of Prussia, the rise of Russia, the development of England, the failure of Sweden, the decline of the Ottoman Turks, were accomplished facts, recognised and dealt with by the treaties. In the future the great political questions of Europe take a somewhat different form. As the power of the Austro-Spanish house is finally broken at Utrecht, the Franco-German question begins to take the place of the Franco-Imperial question. As Russia advances to the Pruth, and the Turks retire behind the Danube the Eastern Question takes its rise. As English traders press into every part of the world the old rivalry between France and England breaks out again and again in another ‘hundred years war.’ But these are the problems of the years which are to come, and as they appear upon the scene the questions of the seventeenth century which have given birth to them pass into history.

The last years of Louis XIV.