[58] In a subsequent chapter (chap. [ix.] of this Book) I shall examine more fully the relation of the antithesis ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ to the vaguer and wider antithesis ‘good’ and ‘bad,’ in our practical reasonings.
[59] It is not uncommon for Determinists to conceive of each volition as connected by uniform laws with our past state of consciousness. But any uniformities we might trace among a man’s past consciousnesses, even if we knew them all, would yet give us very imperfect guidance as to his future action: as there would be left out of account—
(1) All inborn tendencies and susceptibilities, as yet latent or incompletely exhibited;
(2) All past physical influences, of which the effects had not been perfectly represented in consciousness.
[60] I do not mean that this is the only view that we take of the conduct of others: I hold (as will presently appear) that in judging of their conduct morally, we ordinarily apply the conception of Free Will. But we do not ordinarily regard it as one kind of causation, limiting and counteracting the other kind.
[61] It is not the possibility of merely indeterminate choice, of an “arbitrary freak of unmotived willing,” with which we are concerned from an ethical point of view, but the possibility of choosing between rational and irrational motives.
[62] I think that in most cases when a man yields to temptation, judging that it is “no use trying to resist,” he judges in semi-conscious self-sophistication, due to the influence of appetite or passion disturbing the process of reasoning. I do not doubt that this self-sophistication is likely to take a Determinist form in the mind of one who has adopted Determinism as a speculative opinion: but I see no reason for thinking that a Libertarian is not in equal danger of self-sophistication, though in his case it will take a different form. E.g. where a Determinist would reason “I certainly shall take my usual glass of brandy to-night, so there is no use resolving not to take it,” the Libertarian’s reasoning would be “I mean to leave off that brandy, but it will be just as easy to leave it off to-morrow as to-day; I will therefore have one more glass, and leave it off to-morrow.”
[63] There is, however, a special case in which this probability may be indirectly a reason for not resolving to do what would otherwise be best; i.e. where this resolution would only be right if followed by subsequent resolutions. The problem thus presented is considered later, pp. [75], [76].
[64] I should admit, indeed, that the ordinary notion of merit becomes inapplicable (see pp. [71], [72]). But I do not see that Perfection becomes less an End to be aimed at, because we cease to regard its attainment as meritorious. The inapplicability of the notion of ‘merit’ to Divine action has never been felt to detract from the Perfection of the Divine Nature.
[65] See Book ii. chap. [v.] and the concluding [chapter] of the treatise.