[66] I ought, however, to point out that an important section of theologians who have held the belief in the moral government of the world in its intensest form have been Determinists.
[67] In order to determine this we should require first to settle another disputed question, as to the general reasonableness of our expectation that the future will resemble the past.
[69] Thus we find it necessary to punish negligence, when its effects were very grave, even when we cannot trace it to wilful disregard of duty; and to punish rebellion and assassination none the less although we know that they were prompted by a sincere desire to serve God or to benefit mankind.
[70] It should be observed that the same kind of change is sometimes brought about, without volition, by a powerful emotional shock, due to extraneous causes: and hence it might be inferred that in all cases it is a powerful impression of an emotional kind that produces the effect; and that the will is only concerned in concentrating our attention on the benefits to be gained or evils to be avoided by the change of habit, and so intensifying the impression of these. But though this kind of voluntary contemplation is a useful auxiliary to good resolutions, it does not seem to be this effort of will that constitutes the resolution: we can clearly distinguish the two. Hence this third effect of volition cannot be resolved into the second, but must be stated separately.
[71] As I have before said, the applicability of a method for determining right conduct relatively to an ultimate end—whether Happiness or Perfection—does not necessarily depend on the acceptance of the end as prescribed by reason: it only requires that it should be in some way adopted as ultimate and paramount. I have, however, confined my attention in this treatise to ends which are widely accepted as reasonable: and I shall afterwards endeavour to exhibit the self-evident practical axioms which appear to me to be implied in this acceptance. Cf. post, Book iii. chap. [xiii.]
[72] The notion of ‘Self-realisation’ will be more conveniently examined in the following chapter: where I shall distinguish different interpretations of the term ‘Egoism,’ which I have taken to denote one of the three principal species of ethical method.
[73] See [Note] at the end of the chapter.
[74] See [Note] at the end of the chapter.
[75] We shall have occasion to consider Mill’s argument on this point in a subsequent chapter. Cf. post, Book iii. chap. [xiii.]