[135] Lectures on Metaphysics, vol. ii. Lect. xlii.
[136] In Aristotle’s exposition of this theory—which with him is only a theory of pleasure—the ethical motive of exhibiting the philosophic life as preferable to that of the sensualist, in respect of the pleasures it affords, is quite unmistakable.
[137] Analytic Psychology, chap. xii. 2.
[138] The physiological theory which Mr. Stout puts forward, as at once correspondent and supplementary to his psychological generalisation, will be noticed later.
[139] Psychology, chap. ix. § 128.
[141] It may be added that in the case of emotional pains and pleasures, the notion of quantitative difference between the cerebral nerve-processes, antecedent respectively to the one and the other, seems altogether unwarrantable: the pains of shame, disappointed ambition, wounded love, do not appear to be distinguishable from the pleasures of fame, success, reciprocated affection, by any difference of intensity in the impressions or ideas accompanied by the pleasures and pains respectively.
[142] See Wundt, Grundzüge der physiologischen Psychologie, chap. x.
[143] Power of Sound, chap. i. § 2.
[144] I say “appreciably” because the controverted psychological question whether there are any strictly neutral or indifferent modifications of consciousness seems to me unimportant from a practical point of view. See Sully, Human Mind, chap. xiii. § 2.