[145] See Stout, Analytic Psychology, l.c.
[146] Physiological Æsthetics, chap. ii.
[147] See Stout, Analytic Psychology, chap. xii. § 4.
[148] See Book i. chap. iv. [Note].
[149] Principles of Psychology, § 125, and Data of Ethics, § 33.
[150] The quotations are from Mr. Spencer’s Social Statics, chap. iv.: but I should explain that in the passage quoted Mr. Spencer is not writing from the point of view of Egoistic Hedonism.
[152] It may seem, he admits, that “since interest, one’s own happiness, is a manifest obligation,” in any case in which virtuous action appears to be not conducive to the agent’s interest, he would be “under two contrary obligations, i.e. under none at all. But,” he urges, “the obligation on the side of interest really does not remain. For the natural authority of the principle of reflection or conscience is an obligation ... the most certain and known: whereas the contrary obligation can at the utmost appear no more than probable: since no man can be certain in any circumstances that vice is his interest in the present world, much less can he be certain against another: and thus the certain obligation would entirely supersede and destroy the uncertain one.”—(Preface to Butler’s Sermons.)
[153] I have before observed (Book i. chap. viii. § [1]) that in the common notion of an act we include a certain portion of the whole series of changes partly caused by the volition which initiated the so-called act.
[154] Some would add “character” and “disposition.” But since characters and disposition not only cannot be known directly but can only be definitely conceived by reference to the volitions and feelings in which they are manifested, it does not seem to me possible to regard them as the primary objects of intuitive moral judgments. See chap. ii. § [2] of this Book.