[173] In Book i. chap. v. § [3] I have explained the sense in which Determinists no less than Libertarians hold that it is in a man’s power to do his duty.
[174] Cf. Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, Appendix iv.
[175] If the phrase in the text were used by a moral person, with a sincere and predominant desire to do his duty, it must, I conceive, be used in one of two senses: either (1) half-ironically, in recognition of a customary standard of virtuous conduct which the speaker is not prepared expressly to dispute, but which he does not really adopt as valid—as when we say that it would be virtuous to read a new book, hear a sermon, pay a visit, etc.; or (2) it might be used loosely to mean that such and such conduct would be best if the speaker were differently constituted.
[176] Chap. [xiv.] of this Book.
[177] Cf. Met. Anf. d. Tugendlehre, § 33: “diese Tugend, welche mit Innigkeit der wohlwollenden Gesinnung zugleich Zärtlichkeit des Wohlwollens verbindet.”
[178] Or no “merit”:—but so far as this latter notion is precisely applied, it will be more appropriately considered in ch. [v.] of this Book (on Justice).
[179] I have before said that decidedly wrong acts are frequently considered to exhibit in a high degree the tendencies which, when exhibited in right acts, we call particular virtues—generosity, courage, patriotism, etc.: and this is especially true of acts bad through ignorance.
[180] This, I think, is a conclusion which common sense on the whole accepts: though I note a considerable reluctance to accept it; which, however, is not shown in the attribution of virtue to persons who do clearly wrong acts, but rather in an effort to explain their ignorance as caused by some previous wilful wrongdoing. We try to persuade ourselves that if (e.g.) Torquemada did not know that it was wrong to torture heretics, he might have known if he had not wilfully neglected means of enlightenment: but there are many cases in which this kind of explanation is unsupported by facts, and I see no ground for accepting it as generally true.
[181] Hence the Socratic doctrine that ‘all virtue is knowledge’; on the assumption that a rational being must necessarily wish for what is good.