[183] Indeed Aristotle, who stood alone among the schools sprung from Socrates in distinguishing sharply ‘theoretic’ from ‘practical’ wisdom, restricts the term σοφία to the former, and uses another word (φρόνησις) to denote the latter.
[184] I have already adverted to the difference between ancient and modern thought in this respect. Cf. ante, Book i. chap. v. § 1, p.[ 59], note.
[185] It may be observed that there is another meaning again in which the term ‘Caution’ is sometimes used. Since of the various means which we may use to gain any end, some are more and some less certain; and some are dangerous—that is, involve a chance of consequences either antagonistic to our pursuit, or on different grounds to be avoided—while others are free from such danger; ‘Caution’ is often used to denote the temper of mind which inclines to the more certain and less dangerous means. In this sense, in so far as the chance in each case of winning the end, and the value of the end as compared with other ends, and as weighed against the detriment which its pursuit may entail, can be precisely estimated, the limits of the duty of Caution may obviously be determined without difficulty.
[186] See p. [223], and § [2] of the next chapter.
[187] The qualifications which this proposition requires have been already noticed, and will be further illustrated as we proceed.
[188] The phase of this view most current at present would seem to be Utilitarianism, the principles and method of which will be more fully discussed hereafter: but in some form or degree it has been held by many whose affinities are rather with the Intuitional school.
[189] See [note] at end of chapter.
[190] Cf. Book i. chaps. [vii.] [ix.]
[191] A further reason for so doing will appear in the sequel; when we come to survey the general relation of Virtue to Happiness, as the result of that detailed examination of the particular virtues which forms the main subject of the present book. Cf. post, chap. [xiv.] of this Book.
[192] This reluctance, however, seems largely due to the fact that this precise measure of duty is most frequently demanded when the issue lies between Duty and Self-interest.