[243] See Book iv. chap. v. § [3] for a further discussion of this axiom.
[244] It is to be observed that men derive pleasure from the pains and losses of others, in various ways, without the specific emotion which I distinguish as malevolent affection: either (1) from the sense of power exercised—which explains much of the wanton cruelty of schoolboys, despots, etc.—or (2) from a sense of their own superiority or security in contrast with the failures and struggles of others, or (3) even merely from the excitement sympathetically caused by the manifestation or representation of any strong feeling in others; a real tragedy is interesting in the same way as a fictitious one. But these facts, though psychologically interesting, present no important ethical problems; since no one doubts that pain ought not to be inflicted from such motives as these.
[245] Butler (Sermon VIII., Upon Resentment) recognises that deliberate resentment “has in fact a good influence upon the affairs of the world”; though “it were much to be wished that men would act from a better principle.”
[246] If the amount at stake is such as to constitute a real sacrifice, the conduct seems to be more than liberal, and (unless blamed as extravagant) is rather praised as generous or highminded.
[247] Kant argues (Met. Anfangsgr. d. Tugendlehre, Th. I., § iv.) that as every one “inevitably wills” means to promote his own happiness this cannot be regarded as a duty. But, as I have before urged (Book i. chap. iv. § [1]), a man does not “inevitably will” to do what he believes will be most conducive to his own greatest happiness.
The view in the text is that of Butler (Dissertation Of the nature of Virtue); who admits that “nature has not given us so sensible a disapprobation of imprudence and folly as of falsehood, injustice, and cruelty”; but points out that such sensible disapprobation is for various reasons less needed in the former case.
[248] See Whewell’s Elements of Morality, Book ii. chap. x.
[249] The notion of Chastity is nearly equivalent to that of Purity, only somewhat more external and superficial.
[250] In so far as mere illegitimacy of union is conceived to be directly and specially prohibited, and not merely from considerations of Prudence and Benevolence, it is regarded as a violation of Order rather than of Purity.
[251] It was partly owing to the serious oversight of not perceiving that Purity itself forbids too minute a system of rules for the observance of purity that the mediæval Casuistry fell into disrepute.