[252] In the case of pain which cannot be avoided we consider that Fortitude will suppress outcries and lamentations: though in so far as these relieve the sufferer without annoying others, the duty seems doubtful.
[253] Cf. ante, chap. iv. § [5] of this Book.
[254] The above remarks apply in a less degree to the “moral courage” by which men face the pains and dangers of social disapproval in the performance of what they believe to be duty: for the adequate accomplishment of such acts depends less on qualities not within the control of the will at any given time.
[255] I do not refer to customary marks of respect for officials, the omission of which would be a breach of established order; since the special political reason for requiring these obviously takes the question beyond the sphere of application of the Virtue of Humility.
[256] Hence the practical importance of the Formal test of Rightness, on which Kant insists: cf. ante, chap. i. § [3] of this Book.
[257] The final arbiter, that is, on the question what the rule is: of course the moral obligation to conform to any rule laid down by an external authority must rest on some principle which the individual’s reason has to apply.
[258] Cf. Book i. chap. iii. § [2].
[259] Cf. Book i. chap. iii. § [2].
[260] It has been fairly urged that I leave the determinations of Common Sense very loose and indefinite: and if I were endeavouring to bring out a more positive result from this examination, I ought certainly to have discussed further how we are to ascertain the ‘experts’ on whose ‘consensus’ we are to rely, in this or any other subject. But my scientific conclusions are to so great an extent negative, that I thought it hardly necessary to enter upon this discussion. I have been careful not to exaggerate the doubtfulness and inconsistency of Common Sense: should it turn out to be more doubtful and inconsistent than I have represented it, my argument will only be strengthened.
[261] In chap. [ix.] Temperance was regarded as subordinate to, or a special application of, Prudence or Self-love moralised: because this seemed to be on the whole the view of Common Sense, which in the preceding chapters I have been endeavouring to follow as closely as possible, both in stating the principles educed and in the order of their exposition.