[291] Boyle Lectures (1705), etc., pp. 86, 87.
[292] l.c. p. 92.
[293] I think that Kant, in applying this axiom, does not take due account of certain restrictive considerations. Cf. chap. vii. § [3] of this Book, and also Book iv. chap. v. § [3].
[294] Kant no doubt gives the agent’s own Perfection as another absolute end; but when we come to examine his notion of perfection, we find that it is not really determinate without the statement of other ends of reason, for the accomplishment of which we are to perfect ourselves. See Met. Anfangsgr. d. Tugendlehre, I. Theil, § v. “The perfection that belongs to men generally ... can be nothing else than the cultivation of one’s power, and also of one’s will, to satisfy the requirements of duty in general.”
[295] See [note] at the end of the chapter.
[296] On the relation of Rational Egoism to Rational Benevolence—which I regard as the profoundest problem of Ethics—my final view is given in the [last chapter] of this treatise.
[297] Utilitarianism, chap. i. pp. 6, 7, and chap. ii. pp. 16, 17.
[298] l.c. chap. iv. pp. 52, 53.
[299] It has been suggested that I have overlooked a confusion in Mill’s mind between two possible meanings of the term ‘desirable,’ (1) what can be desired and (2) what ought to be desired. I intended to show by the two first sentences of this paragraph that I was aware of this confusion, but thought it unnecessary for my present purpose to discuss it.