[301] Cf. Stephen, Science of Ethics, chap. iv. § 16.
[302] Chap. xi. § [3]; see also chap. xii. § [3].
[304] Final, that is, so far as the quality of the present feeling is concerned. I have pointed out that so far as any estimate of the desirability or pleasantness of a feeling involves comparison with feelings only represented in idea, it is liable to be erroneous through imperfections in the representation.
[305] The term “cognition” without qualification more often implies what is signified by “true” or “valid”: but for the present purpose it is necessary to eliminate this implication.
[306] Cf. Lecky, History of European Morals, pp. 52 seqq.
[307] Book i. chap. [iv.]; cf. Book ii. chap. [iii.]
[308] I ought at the same time to say that I hold it no less reasonable for an individual to take his own happiness as his ultimate end. This “Dualism of the Practical Reason” will be further discussed in the [concluding chapter] of the treatise.
[309] We may illustrate this double explanation by a reference to some of Plato’s Dialogues, such as the Gorgias, where the ethical argument has a singularly mixed effect on the mind. Partly, it seems to us more or less dexterous sophistry, playing on a confusion of thought latent in the common notion of good: partly a noble and stirring expression of a profound moral faith.
[310] Cf. Stewart, Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers, Book ii. chap. i.