[311] The controversy on vivisection, to which I referred just now, affords a good illustration of the need that I am pointing out. I do not observe that any one in this controversy has ventured on the paradox that the pain of sentient beings is not per se to be avoided.
[312] I have before noticed (Book ii. chap. iii. p. [134]) the metaphysical objection taken by certain writers to the view that Happiness is Ultimate Good; on the ground that Happiness (= sum of pleasures) can only be realised in successive parts, whereas a “Chief Good” must be “something of which some being can be conceived in possession”—something, that is, which he can have all at once. On considering this objection it seemed to me that, in so far as it is even plausible, its plausibility depends on the exact form of the notion ‘a Chief Good’ (or ‘Summum Bonum’), which is perhaps inappropriate as applied to Happiness. I have therefore in this chapter used the notion of ‘Ultimate Good’: as I can see no shadow of reason for affirming that that which is Good or Desirable per se, and not as a means to some further end, must necessarily be capable of being possessed all at once. I can understand that a man may aspire after a Good of this latter kind: but so long as Time is a necessary form of human existence, it can hardly be surprising that human good should be subject to the condition of being realised in successive parts.
[313] Book i. chap. [vi.] It may be worth while to notice, that in Mill’s well-known treatise on Utilitarianism this confusion, though expressly deprecated, is to some extent encouraged by the author’s treatment of the subject.
[314] I have already criticised (Book iii. chap. [xiii.]) the mode in which Mill attempts to exhibit this inference.
[316] Those who held the opposite opinion appear generally to assume that the appetites and desires which are the mainspring of ordinary human action are in themselves painful: a view entirely contrary to my own experience, and, I believe, to the common experience of mankind. See chap. iv. § [2] of Book i. So far as their argument is not a development of this psychological error, any plausibility it has seems to me to be obtained by dwelling onesidedly on the annoyances and disappointments undoubtedly incident to normal human life, and on the exceptional sufferings of small minorities of the human race, or perhaps of most men during small portions of their lives.
The reader who wishes to see the paradoxical results of pessimistic utilitarianism seriously worked out by a thoughtful and suggestive writer, may refer to Professor Macmillan’s book on the Promotion of General Happiness (Swan Sonnenschein and Co. 1890). The author considers that “the philosophical world is pretty equally divided between optimists and pessimists,” and his own judgment on the question at issue between the two schools appears to be held in suspense.
[317] It should be observed that the question here is as to the distribution of Happiness, not the means of happiness. If more happiness on the whole is produced by giving the same means of happiness to B rather than to A, it is an obvious and incontrovertible deduction from the Utilitarian principle that it ought to be given to B, whatever inequality in the distribution of the means of happiness this may involve.
[318] The relation of Egoistic to Universalistic Hedonism is further examined in the [concluding chapter].
[319] It is to be observed that he may be led to it in other ways than that of argument: i.e. by appeals to his sympathies, or to his moral or quasi-moral sentiments.