[619] Bower (History of the University of Edinburgh, vol. i. p. 217) says, ‘The history of the universities and of the church is, in modern Europe, and perhaps in every other civilized portion of the globe, very nearly connected. They are more nearly connected in Scotland than in any other civilized country called Protestant; because the General Assembly have the legal power of inquiring into the economy of the institutions, both as it respects the mode of teaching, and the doctrines, whether religious, moral, or physical, which are taught.’ Spalding, under the year 1639, gives an instance of the power of the General Assembly in ‘the College of Old Aberdeen.’ Spalding's History of the Troubles, vol. i. p. 178. See also, on the authority exercised by the General Assembly over the universities, a curious little book, called The Government and Order of the Church of Scotland, Edinburgh, 1690, p. 25.
[620] In 1632, the ‘ministers’ of Perth were greatly displeased because John Row was made master of the grammar-school without their consent. The Chronicle of Perth, p. 33, where it is stated that, consequently, ‘thair wes much outcrying in the pulpett.’
[621] See, for instance, Minutes of the Presbyteries of St. Andrews and Cupar, pp. 66, 83, 84, 118. One of the entries is, that in January 1648, ‘The Presbyterie ordained that all young students, who waittes on noblemen or gentlemen within thir bounds, aither to teach ther children, or catechise and pray in ther families, to frequent the Presbyterie, that the brether may cognosce what they ar reading, and what proficiencie they make in ther studies, and to know also ther behaviour in the said families, and of their affectione to the Covenant and present religione.’ p. 118. Compare Selections from the Registers of the Presbytery of Lanark, pp. 56, 65.
[622] This I have already touched upon in the first volume, pp. 808, 809. Hereafter, and in my special history of the English mind, I shall examine it carefully and in detail. The revival of the old logic is a great symptom of it. Works like those of Whately, De Morgan, and Mansel, could not have been produced in tho eighteenth century, or, at all events, if by some extraordinary combination of events they had been produced, they would have found no readers. As it is, they have exercised a very extensive and very salutary influence; and, although Archbishop Whately was not well acquainted with the history of formal logic, his exposition of its ordinary processes is so admirably clear, that he has probably contributed more than any other man towards impressing his contemporaries with a sense of the value of deductive reasoning. He has, however, not done sufficient justice to the opposite school, and has, indeed, fallen into the old academical error of supposing that all reasoning is by syllogism. We might just as well say that all movement is by descent.
[623] See a letter from Sir James Mackintosh to Parr, in Mackintosh's Memoirs, London, 1835, vol. i. p. 334. ‘To Hutcheson the taste for speculation in Scotland, and all the philosophical opinions (except the Berkleian Humism) may be traced.’ M. Cousin (Histoire de la Philosophie, première série, vol. iv. p. 35, Paris, 1846) observes, that before Hutcheson ‘il n'avait paru en Ecosse ni un écrivain ni un professeur de philosophie un peu remarquable.’
[624] Tytler's Memoirs of Kames, Edinburgh, 1814, vol. i. p. 223. Hutcheson's Moral Philosophy, vol. i. p. iii. London, 1755, 4to.
[625] ‘The intention of Moral Philosophy is to direct men to that course of action which tends most effectually to promote their greatest happiness and perfection; as far as it can be done by observations and conclusions discoverable from the constitution of nature, without any aids of supernatural revelation: these maxims or rules of conduct are therefore reputed as laws of nature, and the system or collection of them is called the Law of Nature.’ Hutcheson's Moral Philosophy, vol. i. p. 1.
[626] ‘The natural understanding is the most whorish thing in the world.’ … ‘The understanding, even in the search of truth amongst the creatures, is a rash, precipitate, and unquiet thing.’ Rutherford's Christ Dying, p. 181. ‘Innocent Adam,’ indeed, says Boston, ‘Innocent Adam had a stock of gracious abilities, whereby he might have, by the force of moral considerations, brought himself to perform duty aright. But where is that with us?’ Boston's Sermons, p. 65.
[627] ‘A like natural right every intelligent being has about his own opinions, speculative or practical, to judge according to the evidence that appears to him. This right appears from the very constitution of the rational mind, which can assent or dissent solely according to the evidence presented, and naturally desires knowledge. The same considerations show this right to be unalienable: it cannot be subjected to the will of another: though where there is a previous judgment formed concerning the superior wisdom of another, or his infallibility, the opinion of this other, to a weak mind, may become sufficient evidence. As to opinions about the Deity, religion, and virtue, this right is further confirmed by all the noblest desires of the soul; as there can be no virtue, but rather impiety in not adhering to the opinions we think just, and in professing the contrary.’ Hutcheson's Moral Philosophy, vol. i. pp. 295, 296. See also vol. ii. p. 311. ‘Every rational creature has a right to judge for itself in these matters: and as men must assent according to the evidence that appears to them, and cannot command their own assent in opposition to it, this right is plainly unalienable.’
[628] ‘Thus no man can really change his sentiments, judgments, and inward affections, at the pleasure of another, nor can it tend to any good to make him profess what is contrary to his heart.’ Hutcheson's Moral Philosophy, vol. i. pp. 261, 262.