[629] ‘Arians and Socinians are idolaters and denyers of God, say the orthodox. They retort upon the orthodox, that they are Tritheists; and so do other sects; and thus they spirit up magistrates to persecute. While yet it is plain that in all these sects there are all the same motives to all social virtues from a belief of a moral providence, the same acknowledgments that the goodness of God is the source of all the good we enjoy or hope for, and the same gratitude and resignation to him recommended. Nor do any of their schemes excite men to vices, except that horrid tenet, too common to most of them, the right of persecuting.’ Hutcheson's Moral Philosophy, vol. ii. p. 316. See also vol. i. p. 160; and Hutcheson's Inquiry into our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, London, 1738, p. 283.
[630] ‘We all know the notions entertained by the vulgar concerning all hereticks; we know the pride of schoolmen and many ecclesiasticks; how it galls their insolent vanity that any man should assume to himself to be wiser than they in tenets of religion by differing from them.’ Hutcheson's Moral Philosophy, vol. i. p. 167.
[631] ‘As he had occasion every year in the course of his lectures to explain the origin of government, and compare the different forms of it, he took peculiar care, while on that subject, to inculcate the importance of civil and religious liberty to the happiness of mankind.’ Leechman's Life of Hutcheson, p. xxxv., prefixed to Hutcheson's Moral Philosophy.
[632] ‘The ideas of beauty and harmony, like other sensible ideas, are necessarily pleasant to us, as well as immediately so.’ Hutcheson's Inquiry into our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, p. 11. ‘Our sense of beauty seems designed to give us positive pleasure.’ p. 71. ‘Beauty gives a favourable presumption of good moral dispositions.’ p. 257. ‘But it is plain we have not in our power the modelling of our senses or desires, to form them for a private interest; they are fixed for us by the Author of our nature, subservient to the interest of the system; so that each individual is made, previously to his own choice, a member of a great body, and affected with the fortunes of the whole; or at least of many parts of it; nor can he break himself off at pleasure.’ Hutcheson's Essay on the Passions, pp. 105, 106.
[633] ‘Fille de la scholastique, la philosophie moderne est demeurée longtemps étrangère aux grâces, et les Recherches d'Hutcheson présentent, je crois, le premier traité spécial sur le beau, écrit par un moderne. Elles ont paru en 1725. Cette date est presque celle de l'avénement de l'esthétique dans la philosophie européenne. L'ouvrage du père André, en France, est de 1741, celui de Baumgarten, en Allemagne, est de 1750. Ce n'est pas un petit honneur à Hutcheson d'avoir le premier soumis l'idée du beau à une analyse méthodique et régulière.’ Cousin, Histoire de la Philosophie, première série, vol. iv. p. 84.
[634] In his Inquiry into Beauty and Virtue, p. 107, he so completely opposed the prevailing notions, as to assert that ‘our perception of pleasure is necessary, and nothing is advantageous or naturally good to us, but what is apt to raise pleasure, mediately, or immediately.’ Compare what he says at p. 91 respecting ‘superstitious prejudices against actions apprehended as offensive to the Deity.’
[635] ‘Hence a taste for the ingenious arts of musick, sculpture, painting, and even for the manly diversions, is reputable.’ Hutcheson's Moral Philosophy, vol. i. p. 83. At p. 129 he says, that in them ‘our time is agreeably and honourably employed.’ See also vol. ii. p. 115.
[636] ‘Wealth and power are truly useful, not only for the natural conveniences or pleasures of life, but as a fund for good offices.’ Hutcheson's Moral Philosophy, vol. i. p. 104. Compare Hutcheson on Beauty and Virtue, pp. 93–95; and his Essay on the Passions and Affections, pp. 8, 9, 99. ‘How weak also are the reasonings of some recluse moralists, who condemn in general all pursuits of wealth or power, as below a perfectly virtuous character; since wealth and power are the most effectual means, and the most powerful instruments, even of the greatest virtues, and most generous actions.’
[637] ‘The chief happiness of any being must consist in the full enjoyment of all the gratifications its nature desires and is capable of.’ Hutcheson's Moral Philosophy, vol. i. p. 100. ‘The highest sensual enjoyments may be experienced by those who employ both mind and body vigorously in social virtuous offices, and allow all the natural appetites to recur in their due seasons.’ p. 121. ‘Nay, as in fact it is for the good of the system that every desire and sense natural to us, even those of the lowest kinds, should be gratified as far as their gratification is consistent with the nobler enjoyments, and in a just subordination to them; there seems a natural notion of right to attend them all.’ pp. 254, 255.
[638] ‘’Tis pleasant to observe how those authors who paint out our nature as a compound of sensuality, selfishness, and cunning, forget themselves on this subject in their descriptions of youth, when the natural temper is less disguised than in the subsequent parts of life. ’Tis made up of many keen, inconstant passions, many of them generous; ’tis fond of present pleasure, but ’tis also profusely kind and liberal to favourites; careless about distant interests of its own; full of confidence in others; studious of praise for kindness and generosity; prone to friendships, and void of suspicion.’ Hutcheson's Moral Philosophy, vol. ii. p. 11. ‘Men are often subject to anger, and upon sudden provocations do injuries to each other, and that only from self love without malice; but the greatest part of their lives is employed in offices of natural affection, friendship, innocent self love, or love of a country.’ Hutcheson's Essay on the Passions, pp. 97, 98. And at p. 165: ‘There are no doubt many furious starts of passion, in which malice may seem to have place in our constitution; but how seldom and how short, in comparison of years spent in fixed kind pursuits of the good of a family, a party, a country?’ … ‘Here men are apt to let their imaginations run out upon all the robberies, piracies, murders, perjuries, frauds, massacres, assassinations, they have ever either heard of, or read in history; thence concluding all mankind to be very wicked; as if a court of justice were the proper place for making an estimate of the morals of mankind, or an hospital of the healthfulness of a climate. Ought they not to consider that the number of honest citizens and farmers far surpasses that of all sorts of criminals in any state; and that the innocent or kind actions of even criminals themselves, surpass their crimes in numbers? That it is the rarity of crimes, in comparison of innocent or good actions, which engages our attention to them, and makes them be recorded in history; while incomparably more honest, generous, domestic actions are overlooked, only because they are so common; as one great danger, or one month's sickness, shall become a frequently repeated story, during a long life of health and safety.’