3. According to the practice of international law, at this day, the recognition of one to whom sovereignty has been conceded, as a sovereign, can even follow of itself, in certain cases. Almost all governments, especially Great Britain and the United States of America[84] have adopted the rule of considering de facto governments as legitimate, as far as they themselves are concerned. (See Heffter, pars. 51, 53, pp. 101-105.)
Let us suppose a European nation had concluded a treaty of friendship or commerce with the chief of a savage tribe, inhabiting a fixed territory. This treaty is supposed to be concluded, and is effectively concluded with the State which the chief represents. The chief had ceded his rights of sovereignty to a European individual or a European association, who are put in real possession of the sovereignty. Could the European nation deny the legitimacy of this new Government if it was a government de facto, according to international usages? No. At least, Great Britain and the United States would recognise it, and probably other States also. And if the preceding chief had been displaced by internal revolution—which can break out among blacks as among whites—and if the black chief had ceded his sovereignty to another Negro, a relation or even a stranger to his family, would that be a reason for refusing recognition to the new sovereign? And if the chief of the tribe had ceded his sovereignty to a white man, in place of choosing for his successor a black man, or an association composed of whites, certainly the difference of colour could not be a reason for refusing recognition to the new sovereign.
Thus it is seen that in wandering away from true and simple principles difficulties of every kind are encountered.
Therefore I am of opinion that independent chiefs of savage tribes can validly cede to a private individual the whole or part of their State, with the sovereign rights which belong to them, and conformably to the traditional customs of the country.
Brussels, December 15, 1883.
OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED
(Extract from the Droit international codifié, by M. Bluntschli.)
(Page 68, paragraph 35): A new State has the right to enter into the international association of States, and to be recognised by other powers when its existence cannot be put in doubt and is assured. It has the right because it exists, because international law unites existing States by common laws and principles based upon justice and humanity.
Recognition by other sovereign States is a voluntary act on a part of these latter. It is not, nevertheless, an absolutely arbitrary act, because international law unites, even against their will, diverse existing States, and makes of them a kind of political association.
The opinion is frequently advanced by the older publicists that it depends upon the good pleasure of each State to recognise or not to recognise another, outside of the necessary and absolute line of international law. If this law rested solely upon the arbitrary will of States, it would not be just that it should be simply a conventional law.