REJECTED SCHEMES FOR FRESH ADVANCE

The design of breaking down the siege and freeing the Narrows for the fleet, by cutting the neck of the Peninsula at Bulair, by a landing at Enos, or by a direct attack, was obvious and tempting. As before, its weakness was that the occupation of Bulair would neither have cut the enemy’s communications nor freed the Narrows. In spite of the daring resource of our submarines in penetrating into the Sea of Marmora, and even shelling the trains and destroying the culverts on the railway which runs from Scutari along the north coast of the Gulf of Ismid, the main Turkish supplies and drafts still came to the Peninsula by sea. Some crossed to the Asiatic side from Constantinople; some came up by train from Smyrna to Panderma; in either case, the transports edged along the coast by stages at night till they reached the Straits and crossed at Gallipoli, Galata, or Maidos, always keeping beyond the range or vision of any guns on Bulair. A landing at Enos would have lengthened the journey from Mudros by about 50 miles. An attempt at Bulair would have implied a landing against lines long reputed impregnable, and lately developed even more carefully than the April defences at Helles. The attempt also would have contained no element of surprise; for an attack at that point would be the merest amateur’s first expectation.

SIR IAN’S DESIGN

An advance in Asia, as from Adramyti Bay opposite Mitylene, with a view to reaching the Smyrna-Panderma railway, might have looked more promising. It was much favoured by British authorities in Mitylene. The arrival of half the 10th Division appeared to point that way, and Mr. Compton Mackenzie was sent there to encourage the false report, for the benefit of Turkish spies. The French, harassed by the Asiatic guns, were probably anxious for some movement along that coast. But Sir Ian was perhaps still bound by Lord Kitchener’s express orders not to entangle himself in Asia. At all events, he refused to dissipate his comparatively small forces at such distances apart. Committed to the Peninsula, he felt that there or nowhere lay his hope of victory. Already in June, with the full concurrence of Generals Gouraud and Birdwood, he had laid his plan. Anzac, instead of remaining subsidiary as “a thorn in the side,” was now to become the main base of attack. The first objective was to be the Sari Bair range; the ultimate object an advance across the five miles to Maidos. A new frontal attack was to detain the enemy at Achi Baba. A surprise landing at Suvla Bay was to protect the Anzac left flank, occupy the heights threatening that flank with artillery, and assist the assault upon the central mountains of Sari Bair range—Koja Chemen Tepe (Hill 971) and Chunuk Bair. When once those heights were gained, the Turkish communications would indeed be cut in two; the positions on Achi Baba and Kilid Bahr plateau would be turned and taken in rear; the very gate of the Narrows would be exposed to our guns. It was a high hope. The battle for its realisation is generally known as Suvla, but more accurately as Sari Bair. In the first week of August it began.

Note to p. 199.—During the assault on July 12 and 13 there was “much confused fighting,” as Sir Ian’s dispatch states. General Paris, then commanding the R.N.D., writes: “I know the confusion was immense, and the difficulty of locating actual positions continued for some (say two or three) days.” I now take the following to be the order of events: On the morning of the 12th, the 155th Brigade went forward, with the French on its right, and captured two lines of trenches. It was counter-attacked, and one battalion suffered severe loss. In support, General Hunter-Weston ordered the 157th Brigade to attack in prolongation of the left, and this Brigade captured three lines of trenches. Early on the morning of the 13th, part of its right was driven back by a counter-attack of bombers, and the left of the 155th Brigade was also heavily pressed. The men were, however, rallied almost immediately, and returned.

As to the reinforcement by the R.N.D., I quote Sir Ian’s dispatch: “I decided that three battalions of the R.N.D. should reinforce a fresh attack to be made that afternoon (July 13) on such portions of our original objectives as remained in the enemy’s hands. This second attack was a success. The Nelson Battalion on the left valiantly advanced and made good, well supported by the artillery of the French. The Portsmouth Battalion, pressing on too far, fell into precisely the same error at precisely the same spot as did the 4th K.O.S.B. on the 12th, an over-impetuosity which caused them heavy losses.”

It was on the morning of the 13th that Major Sketchley (R.M.L.I.) added to his previous services on the Staff of the R.N.D. by the action which gained his D.S.O.—“a very gallant affair,” as General Paris writes.

CHAPTER X
THE VINEYARD, LONE PINE, AND THE NEK

Friday, August 6, was the day fixed for the new attempt. The waning moon was due to rise at 2 of the 7th. To have waited longer would have meant a month’s delay, until moonless nights returned. A month’s experience would have increased the fighting value of the new Divisions, as was seen in the case of the 13th Division at Helles; but the collapse of Russia in Poland, and the growing danger of Bulgaria’s attitude, would have given the greater advantage to the enemy; and the approach of autumn had to be considered. Accordingly, utterly untried as four of his five new Divisions were, Sir Ian resolved to strike at once, even before two of them had arrived, chiefly in hope of gaining the incalculable advantage of surprise. To distract the enemy’s attention, he had arranged a scare at Mitylene by sending a brigade and a half (31st and 30th) of the 10th Division there, as we have seen; by visiting the island himself on August 2; by causing maps of the Asiatic coast to be distributed with surreptitious freedom; and by deputing Mr. Compton Mackenzie and others to spread indiscreet rumours among the gossips and spies there under pledge of deathlike secrecy. Beyond the extreme left of his new line, of which Anzac had now become the centre, he also arranged a smaller but more violent scare by dispatching a party of about 300 men (chiefly Greek and Cretan “Andarti,” under command of a Levantine, Captain Binns) to Karachali, on the northern shore of the Gulf of Xeros, as though an attack on the Bulair lines were contemplated.[149] But the two chief “containing” movements to distract the enemy’s notice from the main attack, and at the same time to make any possible local advance, were directed against the enemy opposite the centre of our line at Helles, and opposite the right at Anzac.

ARRANGEMENT OF FORCES