At noon on August 6 the forces were thus situated: At Anzac the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, together with the 13th Division, the Indian Brigade, and the 29th Brigade of the 10th Division, all of which had been secretly and with great skill added to the Anzac force in the darkness of the two preceding nights, and stowed away in prepared dug-outs among the most hidden ravines; at Helles, the 29th, the 42nd, the 52nd, the R.N.D., and the two French Divisions; at Mitylene, the 31st Brigade and half the 30th of the 10th Division; at Mudros, the other half of the 30th Brigade; and at Imbros, the 11th Division. The infantry of the 53rd and 54th Divisions, to be kept as general reserve, were on the sea, approaching Mudros, whence they were ultimately hurried to Suvla without disembarking.
The day was fine; the water perfectly calm; and at Imbros the 11th Division spent the hot and sunny hours in practising disembarkation from the unaccustomed “beetles,” or playing in naked crowds among the shallows of Kephalos beach. The first anniversary of the war had only just passed; most of the men had volunteered at the very beginning; the Division had been organised for nine or ten months, and held a high reputation in the New Army. Nevertheless, the physique and bearing were not exceptionally fine, and, though the men displayed the cheerful and ironic stoicism usual among English working-people, observers noticed an absence of eager enthusiasm—of that excitement straining for adventure which had illuminated the departure from Mudros three months before. Hope was not so high; knowledge of the enemy’s power, or the depressing criticism which had permeated the nation at home, increased the common apprehensions of war; and it may be that the unconscious paralysis of cautious and uninspiring age had crept downwards from the higher commands, through that infection of personality which acts as by magic for good or evil.
AUGUST 6 AT HELLES
As though perceiving this absence of devoted enthusiasm, Sir Ian issued a characteristic Order, calculated to stir the spirits of the troops.[150] As Commander-in-Chief, he was himself compelled to remain at Imbros, so as to retain communication with the three principal scenes of action, and, in case of emergency, to visit one or other point; Suvla, the most distant, being fifty minutes, and Helles, the nearest, only forty minutes away by torpedo-boat. So narrow is the dividing sea that all that afternoon of August 6 the booming of the guns, and even the incessant rattle of rifle-fire at Helles and Anzac, could be plainly heard in the headquarters at Imbros, and by the newcomers enjoying their last security upon the beach. For that afternoon the two main blows designed as feints to deceive the enemy regarding our real objective, and to hold him to his positions, were struck, the one at Helles, the other at Anzac, as far away as was possible from our intended advance on the left.
At Helles the main attack covered about two-thirds of a mile along the right centre of the British lines, and was carried out by the 88th Brigade of the 29th Division, and the 42nd (East Lancashire) Division. The advance across open ground began just before 4 p.m., the brigades pushing forward resolutely against massed fire from crowded Turkish trenches, which our want of howitzers and trench-mortars prevented us from suppressing. The Essex Battalion of the 88th Brigade especially distinguished itself by plunging into a trench crammed with the enemy; but, exposed to rifle-fire on both flanks and to showers of bombs, the men were shattered. Nor could the 42nd Division make headway against the withering fire. It was evident that in the pause of the last three weeks the Turks had gained in confidence owing to the success of their Allies in Galicia and Poland, their reinforcement by two fresh Divisions, and the fast of Ramazan or its termination. Officers’ night patrols discovered that they had even designed an attack on our lines that very evening, which was the reason why their trenches were so crowded with men. Better intelligence, either by aeroplane or the investigation of spies and prisoners, might have warned us of this intention, and our object in holding the Turks to their position would in that case have been gained with greater loss to them and less terrible loss to ourselves.
J. Russell & Sons]
GENERAL SIR IAN HAMILTON (1918)
Nevertheless, Sir Ian resolved to renew the attack the following morning. It was August 7, the first and critical day at Anzac and Suvla—the day which was expected to be decisive. At all costs the Turks at Helles were to be prevented from reinforcing their vitally threatened positions, and as long as possible to be kept ignorant of the threats. In the early morning they appear to have remained ignorant, for they were preparing a counter-attack upon our centre when they were confronted by our renewed onset along a half-mile front. Why an advance was not then attempted by all the Divisions upon our lines from sea to sea has not been stated. Guns and gun-ammunition were short, but that was an invariable condition on the Peninsula, and big attacks had been made in spite of helpless deficiency. Probably the higher command had now concluded that frontal attacks against the complicated works on Krithia and Achi Baba only implied fruitless loss; but now if ever, when the enemy’s rear and communications were threatened, an opportunity might have offered itself.
FIGHT FOR THE VINEYARD