ATTACK OF 11TH DIVISION, AUGUST 21
MISTAKES IN ADVANCE ON RIGHT
On the right the 34th Brigade (now under Brigadier-General J. Hill) advanced successfully across the narrow front of plain between the small farms of Hetman Chair and Aire Kavak (a quarter-mile south of Hetman). They took the trenches on the plain without great loss. But the 32nd Brigade (now under Lieut.-Colonel J. T. R. Wilson), which was to have kept in touch with them at Hetman Chair, and to have seized a long trench running thence towards W Hill, lost direction and kept edging off to their left or north-east, instead of due east. The plain is open but for a sprinkling of small trees, and the mist was not thick enough to confuse. They may have been attracted by the chance of cover among the slopes leading up to the hills on their left, and the fire from the long communication trench was certainly very severe. It was still more unfortunate that when the 33rd Brigade (Maxwell’s) was sent up to capture the trench at all costs, they “fell into precisely the same error,” as we are told. Some of the brigade followed the 32nd to the left; some edged away to their right in the direction of Susuk Kuyu, which must have taken them behind the 34th Brigade, almost into the Anzac country. But as we are further told that the 32nd, though without success, attempted to rectify the error by bravely attacking the trench from the north-east, the solution remains uncertain.[205] The attack on that side did not develop further. After 4.30 p.m. one could perceive that the battalions were confused, and still suffering heavily both from that long and loopholed trench which ran across the open almost diagonally to their right flank, and from most formidable trenches which the Turks had now visibly constructed right across the sombre face of W Hill, against which they showed up as lines of whitish grey, loopholed also and roofed with head-cover. Parties tried to press forward here and there, and the dead lay scattered. Two stretcher-bearers I saw quietly going up a slope under very heavy fire, when both fell dead simultaneously, dropping on hands and knees, so that the stretcher remained supported on their shoulders after they were dead. But no individual courage could retrieve the error of direction.
THE 29TH DIVISION IN THE CENTRE
The attack in the centre suffered from the mistake. The 29th Division now contained far less than half of the troops who landed in April. Few indeed of their original officers were left, few of the trusted sergeants and corporals whom they knew. They had been brought hurriedly into the midst of an unknown scene, and found themselves included between lines of unknown and untried battalions. Their former General was gone. His successor was compelled to remain in the Corps Headquarters far away on Karakol Dagh. The Division was commanded by the C.O. of a brigade. None the less, this indomitable Division, in this its last battle upon the Peninsula, displayed to the last the indomitable spirit habitual to its nature, and fought with the same proud self-sacrifice and confident enthusiasm as had distinguished it at the landing.
Between 3.30 and 4, the 87th Brigade (2nd South Wales Borderers, 1st K.O.S.B., 1st Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, and 1st Border Regiment) advanced from our front trenches, and began working up through the bush on the left front of Scimitar Hill. At first they were partially concealed by the thickets or covered by dead ground in ravines. Reaching the top of the slope, they charged forward to the summit. The Inniskillings, who were leading, actually gained it. They drove the Turks back along the communication trenches towards Anafarta Sagir. They even pursued them down the reverse slope, which is not steep but runs without much fall toward the village plateau. For a few minutes the Hill was ours. But still stronger trenches had been constructed on the edge of the plateau beyond. They were invisible from the ascent to Scimitar Hill; but from Chocolate Hill we could see fire flashing from them, and Turks springing on to the parapets to pour bullets upon our scattered line as it advanced. At the same time the enemy’s guns on W Hill and on the concealed point near the foot of Tekke Tepe hurled a storm of incessant shrapnel over the summit of Scimitar Hill and all its slopes. The converging fire was intolerable. Unless help came speedily, the position could not be held. It is doubtful whether any help could have retained the hold. But none came.
On the right of the hill the 86th Brigade (2nd Royal Fusiliers, 1st Lancashire Fusiliers, 1st Munster Fusiliers, and 1st Dublin Fusiliers) was intended to storm the position in a similar manner from that side. But as they advanced they found their progress hindered by battalions of the 32nd and 33rd Brigades, which, as narrated above, had edged off to their left instead of keeping their direction straight forward and working on parallel lines with the 29th Division. Battalions in the three brigades thus converged and became confused. The men were mixed up in the shallow valley beyond Green Hill and upon the south-west slopes of Scimitar Hill. Instead of being covered by the 11th Division as intended, the right flank of the 29th Division was hampered and almost paralysed. Such battalions as got clear attempted to work up that side of the hill, turning north-east. But the confusion was increased by a raging fire, which with long tongues of flame consumed what was left of the bush around the base of the hill already called “Burnt,” and entirely shut off co-operation with the 87th Brigade on the left. Such parties as reached the broad bare patch of ravine from which the other name of “Scimitar” was derived, became at once exposed to the storm of shrapnel and rifle-fire. Sir Ian in his dispatch says, “The leading troops were simply swept off the top of the spur, and had to fall back to a ledge south-west of Scimitar Hill, where they found a little cover.” If the “top of the spur” means the summit of the hill, it is certain that none of this brigade ever reached it. The Inniskillings were the only men who occupied it even for a time.
ADVANCE OF THE YEOMANRY
About five o’clock the Yeomanry Division was ordered to advance from the cover of Lala Baba, where it had remained in reserve, and to take up its position under the slighter cover of Chocolate Hill. In extended order the small brigades, each numbering about 350, advanced with the steadiness and regularity of parade across the bare and fully exposed level of the Salt Lake. Some of the enemy’s guns diverted their fire from Scimitar Hill and showered shrapnel over the slowly moving lines. But their regularity was exactly maintained, and owing to the accurate distance kept in the intervals the loss was small. Only too eager to reach the firing line, they forced their way through the reserves of the 11th Division around the slopes on the left side of Chocolate Hill, and plunged into the brigades at the centre of the lines, already so much confused and embarrassed. There was much delay, and in places the crowding troops exposed themselves unnecessarily to heavy fire. But the 2nd South Midland Brigade (Bucks, Berks, and Dorsets) concentrated, as was intended, behind Chocolate Hill itself, and was at last able to advance with fair cohesion. Very slowly the men made their way across our trenches to the left front of the hill, and through the difficult and intricate ground beyond, still swept by the flames of the burning bushes, and encumbered by groups of men who had lost leadership. It was past seven by the time they reached the foot of the main ascent, and began to work their way up through fire and smoke and shrapnel.
At 7.30, through the gathering obscurity of mists and evening, we from the parapet in front of Chocolate Hill dimly discerned a crowd of khaki figures struggling at full speed up that broad, bare patch of the “Scimitar.” They seemed to gain the summit, and then darkness covered them. All thought the terrible position was won at last, and though there was no cheering, and hardly a word was said, all felt the joy of hope renewed. We did not know the hope was disappointed as soon as raised. The cross-fire of shrapnel, machine-guns, and rifles from the two hidden trenches beyond the summit, swept off the Yeomanry as it had swept off the 87th Brigade at an earlier hour. Hearing that the position was utterly untenable, General Marshall was compelled to order a withdrawal to the original line, and in the darkness the sorely tried and exhausted men came back. One regiment, working round the right of the hill later in the evening, gained a knoll between Scimitar and W Hills, apparently near the Abrikja Farm, and reported they had taken W Hill itself. When the mistake was discovered, they also were withdrawn, for in daylight they would have been exterminated there.[206]