Europe Since 1918

by Herbert Adams Gibbons

Germany, powerless, had to submit to the dictates of the victors. Russia did not. Warding off this danger, of course, meant the abandonment of the ideals preached in 1917 and 1918. It meant the return of militarism, of centralization of power in Moscow, and probably of the old Czarist Imperialism. There was no choice, however. The leaders of the Soviets soon became autocrats, militarists, imperialists. As in their internal affairs, they continued to preach cautiously the original doctrine, but in practice they fought fire with fire. And they began to see that the new Russia, internally and internationally, could not exist with policies radically different from those of the old Russia unless the other nations changed at the same time.

The first move was to get rid of the counter-revolutionary insurrections. Successively Yudenitch, Denikin, Kolchak, and Wrangel were utterly defeated. The next move was to bring back under the central authority of Moscow the outlying provinces whose independence was being used as a means of stealing Russia’s natural wealth and organizing counter-revolutionary movements. The Soviet form of government was successfully established in Ukrainia, the Caucasus states, including Armenia, the central Asiatic emirates, and throughout Siberia. This took several years, but, with the exception of Poland, Bessarabia, and the Baltic states, it was accomplished before the end of 1922 and entailed the evacuation of Siberia by the Japanese and of the Caucasus by the British. The ill fated Archangel expedition was allowed to freeze itself out.

Along with this astoundingly successful policy of reunifying Russia, vigorous diplomatic campaigns were carried on, the first to bring within the orbit of Russian influence the Asiatic neighbors, alliance with whom was necessary to prevent a recurrence of the effort to destroy the empire; and the second to reëstablish peace with European neighbors and secure recognition from the larger powers, trade with whom was necessary for the revival of Russian prosperity. The two campaigns were carried on simultaneously, and the Asiatic objectives were skilfully used to bring about the European ones.

Soviet Russia has not yet succeeded in coming to an understanding with China, because of the continuance of civil war in that country. But the policy of Moscow since the Washington Conference leaves no room for doubt as to the complete change from the attitude of 1918, when Russia gave up voluntarily all the rights and ambitions of the czarist régime. Now that the Russians are back in Vladivostok and have resumed through service on the Transsiberian Railway, they have once more taken over the military control of Mongolia and are beginning to insist on their rights in Northern Manchuria. It sounds like old times to read Comrade Joffe’s answer to the protest of Peking:

There is none who could prove or so much as sincerely believe that Russia pursues any selfish or imperialistic interests whatsoever in this Mongolian question. The stationing of our troops there concerns Chinese interests no less than Russian; and while, in the name of my people, I reject energetically the demand for their withdrawal from Urga, the only reason is that I am totally convinced that not only would this be impossible at present from the point of view of Russian interests, but that it would be impossible also from the point of view of real Chinese interests, rightly understood, let alone those of the good people of Mongolia.

No Czarist minister at his prime, no present-day Curzon or Poincaré could have done better!

When the Bolshevists announced in the early part of 1918 their intention of withdrawing from countries where Russia had no business to be, Persia was the nation to whom an amende honorable was most due. Against no people had Czarist Russia sinned more than against the Persians. In 1907 Petrograd had virtually partitioned Persia with London, and by the secret treaty of 1915, in return for Constantinople, the Czarist ministers agreed to let Great Britain have the middle zone, which was to be maintained as neutral when the Russians occupied the north and the British the south.

But Lenin and his associates soon discovered that their renunciation of a sphere of influence in Persia, just as their recognizing the independence of the Caucasus states, did not mean freedom for the natives. The Germans, and then the British, occupied the Caucasus. When the Russians withdrew from northern Persia, the British accepted this as a sign of weakness and not as the initiation of a new policy. British troops overran northern Persia, attempted to invade the Transcaspian province and used the Persian port of Enzeli on the Caspian Sea as a base of naval and military operations against Moscow. Then, after having prevented the Persian delegation at the Peace Conference from getting a hearing, the British intimidated the Teheran Government into signing an agreement on August 9, 1919, placing Persia completely in the power of Great Britain.

As soon as they had defeated the counter-revolutionary movements, the Bolshevists forced the British to evacuate the Caucasus and aided the Persians to expel the British from northern Persia. The treaty with the British had not been ratified by the Persian Parliament. A new treaty was concluded in 1921, this time with Moscow, which reëstablished Persia as an independent nation, master of its own destinies.

British military weakness also enabled the Soviet leaders to encourage Afghanistan to throw off the veiled British protectorate that had existed for several decades. The Russo-Afghan treaty signed at Moscow on October 16, 1920, was a success the Czarist Government had never been able to attain. After the collapse of the Kolchak insurrection and the restoration of Russian authority in Siberia the British Government was compelled to recognize the independence of both Persia and Afghanistan and to conclude treaties with these two countries on terms as liberal as those granted by Russia. Consequently the Persians were able to turn again to the United States in 1922 for a financial commission, and the Afghans established legations at European capitals and Washington.