When we thus see the identity of method at the two extremes—when we see that the general laws of evolution, as they are exemplified in known organisms, have been unconsciously conformed to by chemists in the artificial evolution of organic matter; we can scarcely doubt that these laws were conformed to in the natural evolution of organic matter, and afterwards in the evolution of the simplest organic forms. In the early world, as in the modern laboratory, inferior types of organic substances, by their mutual actions under fit conditions, evolved the superior types of organic substances, ending in organizable protoplasm. And it can hardly be doubted that the shaping of organizable protoplasm, which is a substance modifiable in multitudinous ways with extreme facility, went on after the same manner. As I learn from one of our first chemists, Prof. Frankland, protein is capable of existing under probably at least a thousand isomeric forms; and, as we shall presently see, it is capable of forming, with itself and other elements, substances yet more intricate in composition, that are practically infinite in their varieties of kind. Exposed to those innumerable modifications of conditions which the Earth's surface afforded, here in amount of light, there in amount of heat, and elsewhere in the mineral quality of its aqueous medium, this extremely changeable substance must have undergone now one, now another, of its countless metamorphoses. And to the mutual influences of its metamorphic forms under favouring conditions, we may ascribe the production of the still more composite, still more sensitive, still more variously-changeable portions of organic matter, which, in masses more minute and simpler than existing Protozoa, displayed actions verging little by little into those called vital—actions which protein itself exhibits in a certain degree, and which the lowest known living things exhibit only in a greater degree. Thus, setting out with inductions from the experiences of organic chemists at the one extreme, and with inductions from the observations of biologists at the other extreme, we are enabled deductively to bridge the interval—are enabled to conceive how organic compounds were evolved, and how, by a continuance of the process, the nascent life displayed in these became gradually more pronounced. And this it is which has to be explained, and which the alleged cases of "spontaneous generation" would not, were they substantiated, help us in the least to explain.
It is thus manifest, I think, that I have not fallen into the alleged inconsistency. Nevertheless, I admit that your reviewer was justified in inferring this inconsistency; and I take blame to myself for not having seen that the statement, as I have left it, is open to misconstruction.
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I pass now to the second allegation—that in ascribing to certain specific molecules, which I have called "physiological units," the aptitude to build themselves into the structure of the organism to which they are peculiar, I have abandoned my own principle, and have assumed something beyond the re-distribution of Matter and Motion. As put by the reviewer, his case appears to be well made out; and that he is not altogether unwarranted in so putting it, may be admitted. Nevertheless, there does not in reality exist the supposed incongruity.
Before attempting to make clear the adequacy of the conception which I am said to have tacitly abandoned as insufficient, let me remove that excess of improbability the reviewer gives to it, by the extremely-restricted meaning with which he uses the word mechanical. In discussing a proposition of mine he says:—
"He then cites certain remarks of Mr. Paget on the permanent effects wrought in the blood by the poison of scarlatina and small-pox, as justifying the belief that such a 'power' exists, and attributes the repair of a wasted tissue to 'forces analogous to those by which a crystal reproduces its lost apex.' (Neither of which phenomena, however, is explicable by mechanical causes.)"
Were it not for the deliberation with which this last statement is made, I should take it for a slip of the pen. As it is, however, I have no course left but to suppose the reviewer unaware of the fact that molecular actions of all kinds are now not only conceived as mechanical actions, but that calculations based on this conception of them, bring out the results that correspond with observation. There is no kind of re-arrangement among molecules (crystallization being one) which the modern physicist does not think of. and correctly reason upon, in terms of forces and motions like those of sensible masses. Polarity is regarded as a resultant of such forces and motions; and when, as happens in many cases, light changes the molecular structure of a crystal, and alters its polarity, it does this by impressing, in conformity with mechanical laws, new motions on the constituent molecules. That the reviewer should present the mechanical conception under so extremely limited a form, is the more surprising to me because, at the outset of the very work he reviews, I have, in various passages, based inferences on those immense extensions of it which he ignores; indicating, for example, the interpretation it yields of the inorganic chemical changes effected by heat, and the organic chemical changes effected by light (Principles of Biology, § 13).
Premising, then, that the ordinary idea of mechanical action must be greatly expanded, let us enter upon the question at issue—the sufficiency of the hypothesis that the structure of each organism is determined by the polarities of the special molecules, or physiological units, peculiar to it as a species, which necessitate tendencies towards special arrangements. My proposition and the reviewer's criticism upon it, will be most conveniently presented if I quote in full a passage of his from which I have already extracted some expressions. He says:—
"It will be noticed, however, that Mr. Spencer attributes the possession of these 'tendencies,' or 'proclivities,' to natural inheritance from ancestral organisms; and it may be argued that he thus saves the mechanist theory and his own consistency at the same time, inasmuch as he derives even the 'tendencies' themselves ultimately from the environment. To this we reply, that Mr. Spencer, who advocates the nebular hypothesis, cannot evade the admission of an absolute commencement of organic life on the globe, and that the 'formative tendencies,' without which he cannot explain the evolution of a single individual, could not have been inherited by the first organism. Besides, by his virtual denial of spontaneous generation, he denies that the first organism was evolved out of the inorganic world, and thus shuts himself off from the argument (otherwise plausible) that its 'tendencies' were ultimately derived from the environment."
This assertion is already in great measure disposed of by what has been said above. Holding that, though not "spontaneously generated," those minute portions of protoplasm which first displayed in the feeblest degree that changeability taken to imply life, were evolved, I am not debarred from the argument that the "tendencies" of the physiological units are derived from the inherited effects of environing actions. If the conception of a "first organism" were a necessary one, the reviewer's objection would be valid. If there were an "absolute commencement" of life, a definite line parting organic matter from the simplest living forms, I should be placed in the predicament he describes. But as the doctrine of Evolution itself tacitly negatives any such distinct separation; and as the negation is the more confirmed by the facts the more we know of them; I do not feel that I am entangled in the alleged difficulty. My reply might end here; but as the hypothesis in question is one not easily conceived, and very apt to be misunderstood, I will attempt a further elucidation of it.