Japan began to urge upon the government the necessity of opening Yongampo to foreign trade, but Russia, of course, opposed this with all her powers of persuasion. Great Britain and the United States joined in urging the opening of the port. The United States had already arranged for the opening of the port of Antung just opposite Yongampo, and for the sake of trade it was highly desirable that a port on the Korean side of the Yalu should be opened. It had no special reference to the Russian occupation of the port, but as pressure was being brought to bear upon the government to throw open the port it was considered an opportune time to join forces in pushing for this desired end. And it was more for the interest of Korea to do this than for any of the powers that were urging it. Such an act would have been a check to Russian aggression and would have rendered nugatory any ulterior plan she might have as regards Korea. But the Russian power in Seoul was too great. It had not upheld the cause of Yi Yong-ik in vain, and the government, while using very specious language, withstood every attempt to secure the opening of the port. At last the American Government modified its request and asked that Wiju be opened, but to this Russia objected almost as strongly as to the other. There can be little doubt that this uncompromising attitude of Russia on the Korean border confirmed Japan in the position she had doubtless[doubtless] already assumed. It was quite evident that the force of arms was the only thing that would make Russia retire from Korean soil.
All through the summer complaints came in from the north that the Russians were working their own will along the northern border and taking every advantage of the loose language in which the agreement had been worded. Again and again information came up to Seoul that the Russian agents were going outside the limits specified in the bond but there was no one to check it. It was impossible to police the territory encroached[encroached] upon and there is reason to believe that the Government chafed under the imposition. At least the telegraph lines which the Russians erected entirely without warrant were repeatedly torn down by emissaries of the Government and apparently without check from the central authorities.
In the Summer when the text of the proposed Agreement between Russia and Korea anent Yongampo became public the Japanese Government made a strong protest. She probably knew that this was a mere form but she owed it to herself to file a protest against such suicidal action on the part of Korea. The insolence of the Russians swelled to the point of renaming Yongampo Port Nicholas.
In October the Japanese merchants in Seoul and other commercial centers began calling in all outstanding moneys, with the evident expectation of war. All brokers and loan associations closed their accounts and refused to make further loans. It is more than probable that they had received the hint that it might be well to suspend operations for the time being. From this time until war was declared the people of Korea waited in utmost suspense. They knew war only as a universal desolation. They had no notion of any of the comparative amenities of modern warfare or the immunities of noncombatants. War meant to them the breaking up of the very foundations of society, and many a time the anxious inquiry was put as to whether the war would probably be fought on Korean soil or in Manchuria. Once more Korea found herself the “Shrimp between two whales” and doubly afflicted in that whichever one should win she would in all probability form part of the booty of the victor.
The year 1904, which will be recorded in history as one of the most momentous in all the annals of the Far East, opened upon a very unsatisfactory state of things in Korea. It had become as certain as any future event can be that Japan and Russia would soon be at swords points. The negotiations between these two powers were being carried on in St. Petersburg and, as published later, were of the most unsatisfactory nature. Japan was completing her arrangements for striking the blow which fell on February the ninth. Of course these plans were not made public but there was conflict in the very air and all men were bracing themselves for the shock that they felt must soon come. The action of Japanese money-lenders in suspending operations was followed in January by the Korean pawn-brokers and at a season when such action inflicted the greatest[greatest] possible harm upon the poor people of the capital, who find it impossible to live without temporarily hypothecating a portion of their personal effects. This together with the excessive cold aroused a spirit of unrest which came near assuming dangerous proportions. Some of the native papers were so unwise as to fan the embers by dilating upon the hard conditions under which the Koreans labored. Their sharpest comments were directed at the Government but their tendency was to incite the populace against foreigners.
All through the month the various foreign legations were bringing in guards to protect their legations and their respective nationals and this very natural and entirely justifiable action was resented by the Government. It protested time and again against the presence of foreign troops, as if their coming were in some way an insult to Korea. The officials in charge thereby showed their utter incompetence to diagnose the situation correctly. It was well known that the disaffection among the Korean troops in Seoul was great and that the dangerous element known as the Peddlars Guild was capable of any excesses. The unfriendly attitude of Yi Yong-ik and Yi Keun-tăk towards western foreigners, excepting Russians and French, together with their more or less close connection with the Peddlars was sufficient reason for the precautionary measures that were adopted. But the native papers made matters worse by ridiculing both the government and the army. At one time there was considerable solicitude on the part of foreigners, not lest the Korean populace itself would break into open revolt but lest some violent faction would be encouraged by the authorities to make trouble; so little confidence had they in the good sense of the court favorite. It was fairly evident that in case of trouble the Japanese would very soon hold the capital and it was feared that the violently pro-Russian officials, despairing of protection at the hands of Russia, would cause a general insurrection, hoping in the tumult to make good their escape. It was felt that great precautions should be taken by foreigners not to give any excuse for a popular uprising. The electric cars diminished their speed so as to obviate the possibility of any accident, for even the smallest casualty might form the match while would set the people on fire.
But popular unrest was not confined to Seoul. A serious movement was begun in the two southern provinces where, it was reported, hundreds of the ajuns or prefectural constables were preparing to lead a formidable insurrection. The firm hold that these men have upon the people made it not unlikely that it would prove much more serious than the Tonghak insurrection of 1894. From the north, as well, persistent reports came of the banding together of the disaffected people, and foreign residents in those parts affirmed that they had never before seen such a state of affairs. One of them was driven from a country village and threatened with death if he should ever return. The Korean soldiers who formed the garrison of Pyeng-yang joined the police in breaking into the houses of wealthy natives and stealing money and goods. The authorities remonstrated, but without effect. By the twentieth of January the tension became so great in Seoul that a considerable number of the wealthy natives began removing their families and their valuables[their families and their valuables] to the country.
About the 20th of January the report circulated that Russia had proposed that northern Korea be made a neutral zone and that Japan exercise predominant influence in the south. This was only an echo of the negotiations which were nearing the breaking point in St. Petersburg, and it confirmed those who knew Japan in their opinion that war alone could settle the matter. On the following day the Korean Government issued its proclamation of neutrality as between Russia and Japan. This curious action, taken before any declaration of war or any act of hostility, was a pretty demonstration of Russian tactics. It was evident that in case of war Japan would be the first in the field and Korea would naturally be the road by which she would attack Russia. Therefore while the two were technically at peace with each other Korea was evidently induced by Russia to put forth a premature declaration of neutrality in order to anticipate any use of Korean territory by Japanese troops. At the time this was done the Foreign Office was shorn of all real power and was only the mouth-piece through which these friends of Russia spoke in order to make their pronouncements official. It was already known that two of the most powerful Koreans at court had strongly urged that Russia be asked to send troops to guard the imperial palace in Seoul and the Japanese were keenly on the lookout for evidences of bad faith in the matter of this declared neutrality. When, therefore, they picked up a boat on the Yellow Sea a few days later and found on it a Korean bearing a letter to Port Arthur asking for troops, and that, while unofficial in form, it came from the very officials who had promulgated the declaration of neutrality, it became abundantly clear that the spirit of neutrality was non-existent. It must be left to the future historian to declare whether the Japanese were justified in impairing a declared neutrality that existed only in name and under cover of which the Korean officials were proved to be acting in a manner distinctly hostile to the interests of Japan.
All through January the Japanese were busy making military stations every fifteen miles between Fusan and Seoul. All along the line small buildings were erected, sufficiently large to house twenty or thirty men. On January 22nd Gen. Ijichi arrived in Seoul as military attaché of the Japanese Legation. The appointment of a man of such rank as this was most significant and should have aroused the Russians to a realizing sense of their danger, but it did not do so. Four days later[later] this general made a final appeal to the Korean Government, asking for some definite statement as to its attitude toward Russia and Japan. The Foreign Office answered that the government was entirely neutral. Two days later the Japanese landed a large amount of barley at the port of Kunsan, a few hours’ run south of Chemulpo, and a light railway of the Decauville type was also landed at the same place. On the 29th all Korean students were recalled from Japan.
On February the first the Russians appeared to be the only ones who did not realize that trouble was brewing, otherwise why should they have stored 1,500 tons of coal and a quantity of barley in their godowus on Roze Island in Chemulpo Harbor on the second of that month? On the seventh the government received a dispatch from Wiju saying that several[several] thousand Russian troops were approaching the border and that the Japanese merchants and others were preparing to retire from that place. The same day the Foreign Office sent to all the open ports ordering that news should be immediately telegraphed of any important movements.