On the eighth day of February the Japanese posted notices in Seoul and vicinity that what Japan was about to do was dictated by motives of right and justice and that the property and personal rights of Koreans would be respected. Koreans were urged to report any cases of ill-treatment to the Japanese authorities and immediate justice was promised. From this day the port of Chemulpo was practically blockaded by the Japanese and only by their consent could vessels enter or clear.
Having arrived at the point of actual rupture between Japan and Russia, it is necessary before entering into any details of the struggle to indicate the precise bearing of it upon Korea. Japan has always looked upon Korea as a land whose political status and affinities are of vital interest to herself; just as England once looked upon the Cinque ports, namely as a possible base of hostile action, and therefore to be carefully watched. One of two things have therefore been deemed essential, either that Korea should be thoroughly independent or that she should be under a Japanese protectorate. These two ideas have animated different parties in Japan, and have led to occasional troubles. There is one radical faction which has consistently and persistently demanded that Japan’s suzerainty over Korea should be established and maintained, and it was the unwillingness of the Japanese authorities to adopt strong measures in the Peninsula which led to the Satsuma Rebellion. Another large fraction of the Japanese, of more moderate and rational view, are committed to the policy of simply holding to the independence of Korea, arguing very rightly that if such independence is maintained and the resources of the country are gradually developed Japan will reap all the material advantages of the situation without shouldering the burden of the Korean administration or meeting the violent opposition of the Koreans which such a step would inevitably entail. It is this latter policy which has prevailed and according to which Japan has attempted to work during the past three decades. It is this which actuated her during the period of China’s active claim to suzerainty and finally caused the war of 1894 which finally settled the question of Korea’s independence. But following upon this came the encroachments of Russia in Manchuria and the adoption of a vigorous policy in Korea. Japan’s efforts to preserve the intrinsic autonomy of Korea were rendered abortive partly through mistakes which her own representatives and agents made but still more through the supineness and venality of Korean officials. The subjects of the Czar at the capital of Korea made use of the most corrupt officials at court and through them opposed Japanese interests at every point. Furthermore they made demands for exclusive rights in different Korean ports and succeeded in encroaching upon Korean sovereignty in Yongampo. The evident policy of Russia was to supplant Japan in the peninsula, and no reasonable person can fail to see that it was their ultimate plan to add Korea to the map of Russia. The cause of the war was, therefore, the necessity laid upon Japan of safe-guarding her vital interests, nay her very existence, by checking the encroachments of Russia upon Korean territory.
But before submitting the matter to the arbitrament of the sword Japan exerted every effort to make Russia define her intentions in the Far East. With a patience that elicited the admiration of the world she kept plying Russia with pertinent questions until at last it was revealed that Russia intended to deal with Manchuria as she wished and would concede Japanese interests in Southern Korea, only and even then only as Japan would engage not to act in that sphere as Russia was acting in Manchuria.
All this time the Japanese people were clamoring for war. They wanted to get at the throat of their manifest foe; but their Government, in a masterly way, held them in check, kept its own secrets so inviolable as to astonish the most astute diplomatists of the day, and at last, when the hour struck, she declared for war without having weakened the enthusiasm of her people and without giving occasion to adverse critics to say that she had yielded to popular importunity. When she communicated to Russia her irreducible minimum one would think that even the blind could see that war was certain to follow soon. But even then, if there is any truth in direct evidence, the great majority of the Russians laughed the matter aside as impossible. The moderation and self-control of Japan was counted to her for hesitation, so that when the moment for action came and Japan sprang upon her like a tigress robbed of her whelps, Russia cried aloud that she had been wronged. It was on the morning of the seventh that Baron Rosen’s credentials had been handed back to him in Tokyo. The evening before this the Japanese Minister had left St. Petersburg. This in itself was a declaration of war, but forty hours elapsed before Japan struck the first blow. During those hours Russia had ample time in which to withdraw her boats from Chemulpo even though the Japanese refused to transmit telegrams to Seoul. A fast boat from Port Arthur could easily have brought the message.
It was on the sixth and seventh that reports circulated in Seoul that the Japanese were landing large bodies of troops at Kunsan or Asan or both. These rumors turned out to be false, but beneath them was the fact that a fleet was approaching Chemulpo. The question has been insistently asked why the Russian Minister did not inform the commanders of these Russian vessels and see to it that they were clear of the harbor before these rumors were realized. The answer as given is that the Russian Minister had no control over these boats. They had their orders to remain in Chemulpo and they must stay. One would think that there would be at least enough rapport[rapport] between the civil and military (or naval) authorities to use the one in forwarding the interests of the other.
Even yet the Russians did not appreciate the seriousness of the situation, but they decided that it was time to send notice to their authorities in Port Arthur of what was rumored at Chemulpo. So the small gunboat Koryetz made ready to move out. Her captain, Belaieff, proposed to the Russian Consul that the Russian steamship Sungari, which was in port, should go with the Koryetz and thus enjoy her protection, but the agent of the company which owned the steamship strongly objected to her leaving the neutral port at such a time. He evidently realized in part the acuteness of the situation. So the Sungari remained at her anchorage and the Koryetz steamed out of port at two o’clock in the afternoon. Now, the harbor of Chemulpo is a somewhat peculiar one, for in one sense it is land-locked and in another it is not. It is formed by islands between which there are many openings to the open sea, but most of these are so shallow that ships of medium draught do not dare attempt them. There is but one recognized entrance and that is from the southwest, or between that and the south. This entrance is several miles wide and in the center of it lies Round Island. When the Koryetz arrived at the exit of the harbor she suddenly found herself surrounded by torpedo-boats. The only witnesses of what occurred at this point are the Japanese and the Russians and we can only give their accounts. The Russians say that the Japanese launched four torpedoes at the Koryetz and when within ten feet of her side they sank. Another statement is that a shot was fired on board the Koryetz but it was a mere accident! The Japanese claim that the Koryetz fired first. If we try to weigh the probabilities it seems impossible that the torpedoes of the Japanese should have missed the Koryetz if the torpedo-boats were as near as the Russians claim. On the other hand the admission on the part of a single Russian that the first gun was fired on the Koryetz, even though by accident, is rather damaging, for it is more than singular that an accident should have happened at that precise time. It is a tax on the credulity of the public to give this lame excuse.
In any case it makes little difference who began the firing. The Japanese had already seized the Russian steamer Mukden in the harbor of Fusan and the war had begun. The Japanese doubtless held with Polonius, that “if[“if] it is necessary to fight the man who strikes first and hardest will have the advantage.” The Koryetz turned back to her anchorage and the Russians became aware of the extreme precariousness of their position. Whatever attitude one may take toward the general situation it is impossible not to extend a large degree of sympathy to these Russians personally. Through no fault of their own they were trapped in the harbor and found too late that they must engage in a hopeless fight in order to uphold the honor of the Russian flag. But even yet it was not sure that the neutrality of the port would be ignored by the Japanese. Lying at anchor among neutral vessels in a neutral harbor, there was more or less reason to believe that they were safe for the time being.
About four o’clock in the afternoon of February eighth, which fell on Monday, three Japanese transports entered Chemulpo harbor from the south, convoyed by cruisers and torpedo-boats. They seemingly took no notice of the two Russian boats lying at anchor and were evidently sure that the Russians would not fire upon the transports[transports]. It would be interesting to know whether the Japanese were relying upon the declared neutrality of the port in thus venturing or whether they felt sure that their own superior strength would keep the Russians still, or whether, again, they were certain that the Russians had orders not to fire the first gun. But it is bootless to ask questions that can never be answered. Here is where the assailant has the advantage. He can choose the time and method of his attack. We may surmise that had the Russians divined the intentions of the Japanese and had foreseen the outcome they would have acted differently, but divination of Japanese intentions does not seem to be Russia’s strong point.
As soon as the Japanese came to anchor preparations were made for the immediate landing of the troops, and the cruisers and torpedo-boats, that had convoyed them in, left the port and joined the fleet outside. This fleet consisted of six cruisers and several torpedo-boats. The Asama and the Chiyoda were the most powerful of the cruisers, the former being nearly half as large again as the Variak.
Night came on, and throughout its long hours the Japanese troops, by the light of huge fires burning on the jetty, were landed and marched up into the town. When morning came everyone was in a state of expectancy. If there was a Japanese fleet outside they doubtless had other work on hand than simply watching two Russian boats. Nor could they leave them behind, for one of them was Russia’s fastest cruiser and might steam out of the harbor at any time and destroy Japanese transports. Knowing, as we do now, that an immediate attack on Port Arthur had been decided upon we see it was impossible to leave these Russian boats in the rear. Japan had never recognized the neutrality[neutrality] of Korea, for she knew that the declaration was merely a Russian move to embarrass her, and she never hesitated a moment to break the thin shell of pretense.